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INDEX TO VOLUME 31

NO. 1—OCTOBER 1952

November 1952: Imperatives of Foreign Policy *McGeorge Bundy* 1
Foreign Aid: What Sort? How Much? How Long? *Richard M. Bissell, Jr.* 15
Operation Rewrite: The Agony of Soviet Historians *Bertram D. Wolfe* 39
Germany's Dual Aim: Unity and Integration . . *Walter Hallstein* 58
Russian Manpower . . . . . *Eugene M. Kulischer* 67
New India . . . . . *Chester Bowles* 79
NATO's Growing Pains . . . . . *Charles M. Spofford* 95
Toward European Integration: Beginnings in Agriculture *S. L. Mansholt* 106
The Soviet State Fails to Wither . . . . . *Calvin B. Hoover* 114
Greenland and the World Around . . . . . *John J. Teal, Jr.* 128
Toward Federation in Central Africa . . . . . *Roy Welensky* 142
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 150
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 169

NO. 2—JANUARY 1953

The World Is Round . . . . . *Hamilton Fish Armstrong* 175
If Nato Had to Fight . . . . . *Chester Wilmot* 200
Military Problems of the New Administration . . *Walter Millis* 215
The Germans Reappraise the War . . . . . *H. R. Trevor-Roper* 225
The Nineteenth Party Congress . . . . . *Philip E. Mosely* 238
Touch-and-Go in Italy . . . . . *Ugo La Malfa* 257
The Fissure in Nato: North American and Sterling Area Trade *W. A. Mackintosh* 268
The Siege of the West . . . . . *Arnold J. Toynbee* 280
Hard Choices in South Africa . . . . . *C. W. M. Gell* 287
Finland Maintains Democracy . . . . . *Arthur Spencer* 301
German Labor Asks Co-Management . . . *Hedwig Wachenheim* 310
Portugal's Strategic Territories . . . . . *Jose Shercliff* 321
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 326
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 343

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO. 3—APRIL 1953

France and Europe . . . . . *Robert Schuman* 349
Germany and Europe . . . . . *Konrad Adenauer* 361
Stalin's Last Thesis . . . . . *Bernard Taurer* 367
The Free World and the United Nations . . . *Sir Gladwyn Jebb* 382
America's New Economic Rôle . . . . . *Frank Altschul* 392
The Problem of Our Trade Balance . . . . . *Willard L. Thorp* 405
North Africa in Atlantic Strategy . . . . *General de Monsabert* 418
NATO Changes Direction . . . . . *Drew Middleton* 427
Indonesia's Foreign Policy . . . . . *Mohammad Hatta* 441
Rice Politics . . . . . *John Kerry King* 453
Behind the Oil Dispute in Iran: A British View
Sir Reader Bullard 461
The Science of Soviet Politics . . . . . *Gordon W. Millikan* 472
Afghanistan, Independent and Encircled . . . *Donald N. Wilber* 486
India and the Tibetan Tragedy . . . . . *C. H. Alexandrowicz* 495
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 501
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 520

NO. 4—JULY 1953

Atomic Weapons and American Policy . *J. Robert Oppenheimer* 525
Will Britain and America Split in Asia? . . . . . *G. F. Hudson* 536
The Struggle for the Soviet Succession . . *Bertram D. Wolfe* 548
The Soviet Economy Outpaces the West . . . . . *Peter Wiles* 566
Canada's Northern Horizon . . . . . *L. B. Pearson* 581
Excesses of Self-Determination . . . . . *Clyde Eagleton* 592
The Suez: International Roadway . . . . . *André Siegfried* 605
The Mediterranean: Pivot of Peace and War . *W. Gordon East* 619
New Zealand and the New Pacific . . . . . *L. K. Munro* 634
Spain in Western Defense . . . . . *Lawrence Fernsworth* 648
The Future of the Ryukyus . . . . . *Joseph W. Ballantine* 663
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 675
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 692

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 31 OCTOBER 1952 No. 1

NOVEMBER 1952:
IMPERATIVES OF FOREIGN POLICY

By McGeorge Bundy

FOR the student of foreign affairs, the most important part of the campaign of 1952 ended in Chicago in July. The choice which remains is as nothing compared to the choices that were made in the nominating conventions. Differences exist between General Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson and between their parties, but at least in the first few weeks after the conventions these differences seemed esoteric in comparison with those which might have been expected on the basis of what was being said and done by party leaders on both sides in the Washington of the 82nd Congress. To men of sober opinion this result was deeply satisfying; even earnest partisans were able to agree that both parties had chosen with distinction. Only the heartiest haters were disappointed.

Contemplating this remarkable result, many were tempted simply to thank their lucky stars; but it was not all luck. These two nominations were not accidental. They were not even the result primarily of the managerial skill of those whose manœuvres were so closely followed by the nation in the alternating boredom and fascination of the television proceedings. Behind these nominations lay a widespread and solid recognition of certain great national imperatives, not the least of which were in the field of foreign affairs. Whatever might be honestly believed by partisans of Senators Kefauver and Taft, it was agreed by uncommitted observers that the two nominees were the strongest candidates their respective parties could have found, and in each case a significant part of this strength was related to foreign policy.

II

The fundamental meaning of the Eisenhower candidacy can best be understood by considering the nature of the forces he was

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drafted to stop—for fundamentally he was the stop-Taft candidate and would almost surely have remained in Europe if the pre-convention Republican front-runner had been a Dewey or a Vandenberg. This is not to deny that General Eisenhower was and is a candidate of great attraction and power in his own right, but merely to assert that these qualities can best be understood and evaluated by considering what they were measured against.

The main objects in stopping Mr. Taft were two—first, to prevent the nomination of a loser; and second, to avoid selecting as the party leader a man of isolationist or neo-isolationist background. These two purposes were closely related, for much of Mr. Taft's supposed weakness as a Presidential vote-getter was believed to be due to the vulnerability of his record on foreign affairs. So clear was this weakness in his candidacy that Mr. Taft himself was driven to claim that there were no important differences between his views on foreign affairs and those of General Eisenhower—an announcement which must have been surprising to some of the Senator's more passionate supporters.

Yet judged only by his views on present and future policy, Mr. Taft's astonishing claim is correct. In his little campaign book on foreign policy, published at the end of 1951, he took a surprisingly moderate position on current and future problems; it was only as he gazed backward that his zestful opposition became specific. In some past cases, indeed, like that of his vote against the Atlantic Treaty, he seemed prepared to forgive and forget; he now professed to be a friend of NATO. No man with Mr. Taft's temperament could be accused of "me-too-ism," but his program for the future did make him look surprisingly like a reluctant double for President Truman. Even in regard to the Far East, while breathing the righteous indignation of a belated friend of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Taft advanced no specific recommendations that differed greatly from the position of the Administration. Throughout his campaign for the nomination he made a determined effort to stand before the friends of the bipartisan tradition as a man of reasonable and moderate views.

Mr. Taft's conversion may have been more tactical than substantial; behind the apparent similarity of present purposes there remained large differences of temperament and emphasis between him and General Eisenhower. Yet these reservations merely reinforce the central point. If it was against his will and perhaps for political advantages that Mr. Taft came as far as he did, then the

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forces driving him must have been powerful indeed. The basic propositions of which General Eisenhower was a symbol had been accepted as national imperatives. To these imperatives Mr. Taft himself made a stiff bow.

These national imperatives, however complex and testing they may be in detailed application, are essentially simple and can be stated for this generation in three propositions. First, the United States is required by its own principles and purposes to act in opposition to and restraint of the aggressive and hostile pressures of the Soviet Union. Second, this and other actions in world politics must be taken with a decent respect to the opinions of others, and with an understanding of the importance of independent friends. Third, the great limitation upon all policy is that a third world war would be a catastrophe of a new order of magnitude, and perhaps most of all for the United States. In short, the United States must act with friends and against enemies, for freedom and peace. The simple statement holds within it all the complexities of a constantly shifting and infinitely variable international scene; the three propositions define the problem without solving it. Yet without definition—or while there is a national debate on definition—problem-solving must be cumbersome and slow.

The affirmative meaning of General Eisenhower's candidacy, above and beyond his evident reputation as a great American, lay primarily in the quite extraordinary degree to which in his one person there were symbolized all three of these basic propositions of modern American policy. He was a soldier who had stated only the bald and self-evident truth when he remarked with anger in June that he did not have to defend himself against the perverted suggestion that he might be blind to the character of the Soviet Power; for over a year it had been his reputation and leadership, as much as any other single factor, that gave energy to the European will to outlast that Power. Yet his whole career was a reminder that the United States must not try to go it alone; he was the most successful leader of mixed forces in modern history. And withal, soldier and Supreme Commander though he might be, he had succeeded beyond the possibility of pretense in convincing both Americans and their friends abroad that he was at heart a man of peace.

Throughout the Republican Convention speakers denied with fervor the validity of the imperatives we have asserted, and by no distant inference they talked in opposition to Eisenhower. It is at

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least possible that a majority of the delegates would have liked to believe and act on what they heard. Yet although no one can assert that the actual result was inevitable, there was discernible in the response to General MacArthur, Mr. Hoover and the rest a sense that however beautiful it might be, it was not life; this time the fadeaway, though much regretted, was real. In the end the choice fell on the man who was self-evidently a believer in the new necessities. It was not good enough to be a tardy and begrudging convert. It is hard to avoid the feeling that in choosing as they did the Republicans went with the stream of history.

A final reinforcement to this view comes to the student who steps back to consider this Convention in the light of its predecessors. In 1948 there had been no such set of speeches, and still less had the vitriol of frustration spilled out into the platform. In 1952 the platform indulged in a belated backward leer at "Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam;" four years earlier, when these supposed crimes were a good deal more recent and relevant, there had been no such reference, but only sober contentment with the responsible realities of the age of Vandenberg. Similarly in 1944 the Republicans had chosen to stand up for international coöperation, and it was a fact of life that very little in the whole roll-call of great actions since 1944 had been without substantial bipartisan support. Yalta itself had once had Republican friends.

Seen in this perspective, the speakers at the Republican Convention of 1952 must appear as throwbacks, and the strong feelings which they represented are precisely those which may properly be called reactionary—for there is a special fervor and bitterness among men who are fighting to defeat their own inner conviction that history had passed them by. And the whole of the two-year outburst which surrounded the name of Senator McCarthy might turn out, in the same fashion, to be scum on the wave of the past. It was too soon to preach a funeral oration over the corpses of the Republican reactionaries; if General Eisenhower should be beaten, they would probably again have a violent fling in 1956. Yet there was good reason to hope that the forces represented by the Convention speeches were much weaker than they seemed.

III

The nomination of Governor Stevenson was generally regarded as having no unusual meaning in terms of foreign affairs, yet in

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some ways it has a significance equal to the choice of General Eisenhower. The Governor combines a set of qualities that any candidate would need in order to oppose the General successfully; he would need these qualities because the General himself has them in such considerable measure.

First, Governor Stevenson is a man of stature, which is important because in a time of evident international trouble it is not easy to beat a big man with a little one. At least one candidacy on the Democratic side was fatally damaged by a simple and widespread feeling that the candidate lacked size. Governor Stevenson on the other hand had a double claim to stature: he was the successful governor of a great state, which is the best known preparation for the Presidency, and he showed in his opening remarks to the delegates a quality of mind and speech which was not matched at either convention.

The quality of magnitude is always important in politics, but it has a special meaning in 1952. In the back of the citizen's mind, more and more, there is a gnawing knowledge that the ordinary political interest can be served only after the problem of survival has had at least partial attention. Such is the complexity and weight of this problem, however, that much the most pleasant way to deal with it is to hand it over to someone else. The natural trustee is the President of the United States. Yet for seven years, since the death of Franklin Roosevelt, this sort of relief has been impossible for most Americans. Having many qualities of his own, Mr. Truman has lacked the ability to serve as a father-substitute for most of his fellow countrymen; fortunately for the Democrats, a similar inability existed in the Governor Dewey of 1948. But in 1952 the Republicans chose a man whom citizens could readily trust, in generous and personal fashion, with decisions and responsibilities which they deeply desired to devolve on someone. It became vital for the Democrats to do the same thing.

Personal stature alone would not have been enough, however. It was also important that the nominee should have another asset which Mr. Stevenson plainly possesses—a background of experience which entitles him to think and speak for himself on matters of foreign affairs. To a long-continued interest as a private citizen he has added experience in the moderately high reaches of the Navy Department and the Department of State, and in the American delegations to the United Nations; this is a combination at least vaguely reminiscent of large names in the American

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past—the Roosevelts, Root and Stimson. And it is a further proof of his quality that, like General Eisenhower, he has made plain his conviction that the central task of the next President, dwarfing the matters noisily discussed in campaign argument, must be to try to work for freedom and peace in the world.

The two nominees share a final and more complex advantage: they are known as supporters of the basic outlines of the American foreign policy developed since 1947, and both have had a part in this policy (General Eisenhower much the larger part, it is fair to note), yet both, in different ways, have been spared the necessity to defend or attack this policy in any partisan or inflexible spirit. Both have kept largely clear of the destructive debate over the fall of China, and neither can be tagged as a mere spokesman for past policy. General Eisenhower has been a most eloquent witness for Administration programs in Europe, but he has testified at times when his prestige was so high and that of the Administration so low that he has spoken as one bringing help to the deserving poor, and not as the beneficiary of a rich man's bounty.

This combination of general support for policy with a visible personal independence is of double value. Tactically, it gives to each candidate the best of both sides of the argument. Along with an unwillingness to accept the doctrines of reaction, there is among us a very considerable feeling that it would be worth it to try changing the guard in Washington; this is a view which is often combined with high respect and even admiration for those who have been on duty in recent years. When the Republicans chose a man who looked both safe and fresh, the Democrats came under heavy pressure to match this choice.

But these choices have a meaning which is larger and less ephemeral than tactics. The last 12 years have seen a revolution in American foreign policy, but no revolution is ever safely complete until its work is carried on by men not in the immediate circle of those who made it; and the longer it is led by a small or limited group, the greater its fragility. Close as they have been to the making of foreign policy, both Governor Stevenson and General Eisenhower still give promise of the kind of new leadership that consolidates basic changes by the very act of taking power. If this promise should be fulfilled, then indeed we could assess this year as one in which historical imperatives were properly obeyed.

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IV

The basic similarities between the two candidates in the area of foreign affairs are close, but differences remain, and they deserve attention. In both parties there are forces incompletely alive to the historical imperatives that have driven us. The Republicans, of course, have their die-hard obstructionist wing—those we have called the true reactionaries. Some of them, perhaps, have been obstructionist at least partly because they have found themselves in the opposition party; there is a striking difference between the Congressional Republicanism of 1952 and that of 1948, when the Republicans had a majority, and this difference is most marked in the field of foreign affairs. Those who lean toward General Eisenhower will argue that the reactionaries would be much muted under a modern Republican President: "Anything Van could do Ike can do better." It will even be claimed, and with real plausibility, that General Eisenhower's election is the one and only way of drawing the teeth of the McCarthys and McCarrans in both parties. But it can also be argued that many powerful Republicans are reactionaries of desperate integrity, not to be won round by White House pressure; would General Eisenhower have the skill to circumvent them when in many matters his Administration would need their support? Many will wonder why they should not simply vote against the Party which is so much tainted by a reactionary view of foreign affairs and for the Party which has done most of the work of facing new realities.

Governor Stevenson has a quite different problem: fatigue and stalemate beset the groups on which he must rely. However much he himself may be a symbol of refreshing change, his Party, and even his part of his Party, are symbols of the *status quo*. Except where it has had Republican help, the Administration has been stalemated for several years, both at home and abroad. The much-debated Fair Deal is still a set of paper promises, and in foreign affairs the great achievements of the last four years are precisely those of which General Eisenhower is a symbol (except for the defense of Korea, which is surely not a one-party triumph). Moreover, in the sham battles over the past which have so often passed for Great Debating in the last two years, rôles have been set and lines of contest fixed in a way which might make it hard for Mr. Stevenson to fulfill his promise of a change in tone. His friends will say that this is an easy task for a determined man with the

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White House as his base; his opponents will assert that the inertia of the loyal partisan is a most formidable force.

Still more complex lines of argument are already heard among both partisan and non-partisan observers, and though they may be thin, they are not unimportant. It is clear, for example, that we do not today have a really effective arrangement for political control of the professional military services; in particular, there is no force in government which is fully a match for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (which emphatically does not mean that there has been any conspiracy of military men to capture power). Observing this problem, one group concludes that it is better to vote for a civilian, but another, relying on its assessment of the mind and purpose of the man Eisenhower, asserts that the civil-minded General is the one man with enough authority and knowledge to assert political supremacy in a time when fear leads many to hesitate before they question military counsel. Arguments so fragile and yet so important are certain to be modified by the course of debate in the campaign.

A more traditional issue is that of trade policy. Here at least the Parties tend to differ as they have differed for generations. The Republican Platform this year is more friendly to exports than ever before, but it also promises to "safeguard our domestic enterprises and the payrolls of our workers against unfair import competition." There is nothing in this plank to show any understanding of the large and simple fact that exports cannot grow unless foreign aid appropriations or imports grow too; it is unfortunately true that the Republican Party, as a Party, has never accepted the laws of international economics. Trade policy has recently been a relatively minor question, overshadowed by larger issues like European recovery and the problems of rearmament, but it might not always be so. It seems most improbable that General Eisenhower is as shortsighted on this point as his party tradition; one of his advisers, Mr. Hoffman, is an eminent advocate of an enlightened foreign economic policy. But students who recall the names of Payne, Aldrich, Smoot and Hawley will recall also that these men were able to get their legislation signed by Presidents who were counted as enlightened in their day. In the battles that President Taft lost and that President Hoover let go by default there was more than economic error; there was a failure in Party leadership which helped to destroy the two Administrations. Foreign economic policy might be a submerged

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rock in the channel of an Eisenhower Administration, resembling in this respect the civil rights issue for contemporary Democrats. (This parallel can be pressed a little further. The two ablest politicians of the century have been the two Roosevelts. Is it accidental that the Republican Roosevelt always ducked the tariff issue, while his Democratic cousin did the same with civil rights?) In any case, those who vote by issues of foreign affairs will watch closely to see what forecast they can make for the Republican future in this field.

Sound enough in its awareness that all trade is reciprocal (and even inclined to indulge in incantations over the program of Cordell Hull), the Democratic Platform raises other economic doubts. There appears to be a disposition to urge "aid" and "support" as if these things were solutions in themselves, until the innocent reader may wonder if it is supposed that spending money abroad is a good in itself. And the Platform's praise of the Point Four Program is distressingly extravagant. Is it statesmanship simply to propose a large-scale program? Point Four is a fairly sickly three-year-old for all this noise. There will be many —and not all diehards—who will wonder if the Democratic Platform-writers have not mistranslated Lord Keynes into a new doctrine that you can spend your way to peace. Yet spending to a purpose, and in support of policy, may well be needed on at least the present scale for many years. It is a matter of tone and temper, not yet revealed.

Both Platforms promise to take an interest in the peoples of the satellite countries. The Republicans do this with a little more energy, perhaps, and they did it first; moreover, they announce that such a policy "will mark the end of the negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment.' " This is puzzling, for the most that is promised is to make it clear on the highest authority that "United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence of these captive peoples." One would have supposed that repeated statements of both the President and the Secretary of State had already made this point plain, and that repetition in too loud a voice could only raise the question whether action would follow words—and, if so, what would happen to "peaceful purposes?" If the Soviet Union is as strong and dangerous as both Platforms tell us—and it almost certainly is—we may wonder how the Voice of America is going to set the satellites free.

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The desire to be "positive" on a low-cost basis is not a new phenomenon in our history; it gains increased attractiveness as a result of the contact between a reluctant America and the necessities of modern politics. In its earlier forms, this sort of "positive" thinking often led to the total unreality of isolationism or else to a touching faith in the power of fair words in world affairs. To the degree that we recognize modern realities the temptations are at once more moderate and more appealing, and we find men who are eager to believe that Point Four will remake the Middle East, or that fine phrases can free the satellites, or that there is no substitute for victory, or that you can always send more aid, or that free trade means peace, or that everything will be all right if you only get rid of Communists in the Department of State. Both Parties have a tendency to accept one or more of these devices for begging the question; both candidates seem relatively immune to their seductive wiles.

There is much more in the Platforms, but the differences which turn up in the remaining planks are mainly a matter of phrasing. The Republicans would "end neglect of the Far East;" the Democrats would give "continuing support" to all and sundry, specifically and cheerfully including Nationalist China. Are these policies different? Both parties are for streamlined administration. Both love Israel but also have a kind word for the Arabs. The Democrats give more prominence to the United Nations, but the Republicans claim part of the credit for its existence. On this last issue some may feel that there is a certain difference between the candidates, noting that Governor Stevenson, both by conviction and experience, is a man with a strong bent toward the United Nations, while General Eisenhower's talent and experience may lead him more in the direction of regional alliances; but this assessment must remain largely speculative until we have more evidence. Returning to the Platforms, we may safely assert that in their rewriting of history the two documents are both passionate and opposite, but this will not matter even to historians.

Taken together, the differences between the two candidates remain small. Campaigns being what they are, these differences will be enlarged beyond recognition by irresponsible speakers on both sides, but it is fair to hope that the candidates themselves may have the wisdom and courage to accept and even emphasize their basic agreement on what we have called the national imperatives. For if they use their present power to this end, the next

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Administration will be able to build on a new kind of national determination—a determination matured in the final and conclusive admission that the outside world is real and earnest.

A wise and experienced American has remarked that all our foreign policy in recent years has turned around a series of strenuous efforts to get public and Congressional support for actions which were plainly and urgently necessary. He exaggerates, but not by much. It is not hard, indeed, to frame the whole of the diplomatic history of our country in the last generation in exactly these terms. *Foreign Affairs* is now 30 years old, and its lifespan is punctuated by issues in which, to put it very bluntly, the wise and well-informed have been mostly on one side, and the historic tradition of America on the other. A bare list of men and issues may suggest the whole record: there was Mr. Hughes and the exclusion of Oriental immigration, Mr. Stimson and Manchuria, Mr. Hoover and the war debts, Mr. Hull and the World Economic Conference, Mr. Roosevelt and quarantine for aggressors. Then in crescendo came the events of 1939–1941, the framing of the United Nations Charter, and, above all, the whole great effort of Western reconstruction undertaken in the last five years.

Some of these battles have been won by the leaders of the new opinion, and others by tradition, but for all concerned it has been an exhausting struggle. It is not surprising that many men suppose this sort of strife to be the natural and inevitable order of the universe, so that they fail to see what might be hoped for if this long contest should gradually come to an end. Yet this is exactly what might happen if this election should in fact serve to consolidate the national will by electing a man uncompromised by past debates but deeply settled in his recognition of the new necessities.

V

With the end of the American adolescence, many things may become possible.

Consider, for example, America's relations with her allies. Since 1940 we have found ourselves in constant and changing connection with many friendly Powers. Some have been merely connections of convenience, while others respond to a deeper community of interest, but all have to be subject to strains imposed by our national uncertainties, and in all we have paid the costs that are levied against the uncertain ally. Much will be gained if as a peo-

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ple we begin to accept the fact that we need friends. In particular, we shall be able to treat with allied nations much more effectively than is now possible. Those who are known as reliable allies may deal firmly with their friends in a way which less trusted nations dare not try. If we finally lose our ancient fear of all alliances, we may perhaps look forward to a day when the Congress will be generally cordial and the Executive Branch specifically firmer in dealing with allied Powers; this would be a salutary reversal of our present practice.

An even larger opportunity lies in the area of the contest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. We have suggested that America's basic purpose for freedom in the world requires opposition to the aggressive and expanding Soviet Power. The first step in such opposition is to understand its necessity; it is precisely those who are most firmly committed to advancing freedom and opposing aggression who have the best chance of living in peace with the Kremlin; the central "situation of strength" is a settled national will. This, of course, the Kremlin itself has understood, and its blundering support has been given in this country openly to the so-called "progressives" and covertly to the reactionaries. Dangerous though it may be to judge our affairs by reversing the Soviet view, we may take some satisfaction in the evident Communist recognition that both candidates stand for national unity in active resistance to Soviet tyranny. The country will be stronger if it can understand the measure of its own agreement on this issue.

We also stand to gain if we can understand the significance of peace among our objectives. In contemporary America, there is no shortage of men with an ample hostility to the Soviet Union, and there has never been any lack of men who cared for freedom. But brave and angry men should understand that this country cannot start a third world war; it cannot even choose to fight such a war in self-defense except as a very last resort. There is a ceiling on our acts, and this ceiling may increase our danger, for the Kremlin knows as well as we do how little we are eager for atomic war. But since we will not use the bomb for every crisis, we are required to act and react at lower levels of force, in ways that are as far from peace as Korea, and only as far from World War III as the coolness of our statesmen and citizens permits.

The acceptance of this kind of life is possible only for those who reject the answers of peace by submission or peace by all-out

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war. The kind of peace that is possible is not the peace of inaction or the peace of total victory, or even the peace of truly united nations. It is the peace of politics, always to be won again and never wholly safe; this is the life of action and danger which is the lot of nearly all nations; America cannot any longer hope to escape it. To understand this—as both the candidates quite plainly do—is to have made the first great step toward survival.

VI

One hill climbed reveals another, and the very hopes which we find in the nominations suggest some of the great problems that the next President will have to struggle with. Even a nation fully alive to its modern responsibilities will not easily find the right ways to work for freedom and peace in the next four years. Between freedom and peace, for example, which comes first? It is a question which must be answered differently at different times; certainly it cannot always be escaped by claiming that the right response is "both." The service of the double goal requires both force and restraint, both strength and flexibility.

This is not the place for any attempt to chart the proper course for the next Administration. Whoever wins, there will be in Washington next January a stir of new beginnings and a mood of readiness in which there may be more room for action than our statesmen have enjoyed for many years. Plainly it will be important to use this opportunity to add to the pressures that may lead the Kremlin to desist from aggression—while at the same time reducing the rigidities of posture which sometimes seem to point us all toward eventual Armageddon. This dual task can have no formal blueprint. All that it is possible to suggest is that it will ask of the next President a level of courage, leadership and understanding of such height that even candidates like General Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson will be challenged to further growth. It is good to recollect that both candidates this year are men with a proven talent for rising to new occasions.

Without going further in comment on the responsibilities that will face the successful candidate, it may be appropriate to note one test which both must face even during the campaign. Both candidates will find it hard to resist the very heavy pressures which urge a Presidential candidate to say or to imply that life is easier than it is. Candidates of magnitude are not immune to this sort of pressure, as Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Willkie both demon-

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strated in 1940. There is required here a special kind of integrity, and a special ability to get through to a national conscience that is sometimes hidden by our lesser hopes and fears. Both candidates have shown this kind of integrity and ability in the past; they will add to their quality and to all our hopes if they continue to resist all those who come and ask them to pretend that life can be easy, safe and cheap.

The pressures of democracy are not light, and its records tell of many and considerable statesmen who have said soft things to voters in the shadow of the polls. Men who run for very high office are forced to many lonely choices, and in humanity, if not in history, they have a claim for charitable judgment. This year is no exception in the temptations which it offers; many citizens are eager for kind words and sweet promises. Yet this year it seems natural to set the standards high and to hope that we may have a campaign by each candidate that becomes a foundation for action and not a trap for inconsistent leadership. This will be about as important for the loser as for the winner.

This high standard may not be met, but not many will be found to claim that it is beyond the reach of this year's nominees. Much of the meaning of the two nominations may be doubtful and debatable, but it is surely very plain that Governor Stevenson and General Eisenhower are men of evident and contagious moral conviction. Seldom have two rival Americans more conspicuously embodied that combination of practical sagacity and deep moral quality which is central to the whole of our tradition. Nothing in all their equipment is more important for the future of American foreign policy. Without moral conviction a man might have the finesse of Bismarck and still not be able to lead America. The quality of these nominations, and their wide appeal throughout the world, are a clearcut refutation of those recent writers who urge us to put aside the trivia of moral issues and concentrate on what they conceive to be the beautiful realism of politics. These men are poor students of politics and they dispraise what they would exalt. Politics is inevitably the meeting-place of all that is human, and the convictions that have animated America could not be absent if we wished. We may take pride and comfort from the great and evident fact that the next American President, barring accident, will be a man who fully understands that national ideals and political realities have their deepest meaning when taken together.

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FOREIGN AID

What Sort? How Much? How Long?

By Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

SINCE VJ day the United States has given or loaned about 40 billion dollars to foreign governments. In Europe alone this process of extending foreign aid has been marked by overlapping phases—from relief to recovery to rearmament, from UNRRA to E.C.A. to NATO. Each has been described as temporary and as the next to the last, if not the last, venture of its kind. Yet each has involved larger outlays than its predecessor. By the end of 1952, the United States will be spending more money for foreign aid, at an annual rate, than at any other time during the postwar period.

In January, the new administration will fall heir to the two operations now in progress: Point IV and the Mutual Security Program. They involve appropriations for the current fiscal year of six billion dollars, of which more than 90 percent is going, as it has since World War II, to the European partners of the United States. Although the problems of the underdeveloped areas are on a smaller financial scale, they are no less difficult and pressing than those of more highly industrialized Western Europe, and they may turn out to be of even greater importance to the United States. Hence a fully-rounded treatment of foreign aid would perhaps give equal attention to both these programs. However, the discussion that follows will be concerned exclusively with aid to Europe, in part because Point IV and military aid to other areas are less significant for the American budget, but mainly to make the subject matter manageable.

Against the background of seven years of recent history, two quite divergent attitudes toward foreign aid are developing on both sides of the Atlantic. On the one hand, people are getting used to it and are coming to accept it, perhaps fatalistically, as a normal feature of the landscape. Many Europeans increasingly take it for granted that the United States, by far the wealthiest member of the Western coalition, should contribute military and economic aid as well as armed forces and their equipment to the common enterprise of defense. Many Americans are beginning to regard it as natural, if on the whole unfortunate, that they should have to continue at least moderate "charitable" contributions to

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their allies as a part of the price of preventing a third world war and maintaining the strength and cohesion of the non-Communist alignment, actual and potential.

Some thoughtful people on both sides of the Atlantic, however, display growing dissatisfaction with a policy which seems to be little more than a succession of *ad hoc* improvisations, none of them clearly foreseen, and leading to no visible end. Perhaps more Europeans than Americans recognize that foreign aid, as presently conceived, cannot continue indefinitely without "corrupting both the Europeans and the Congress and turning an alliance of self-respect into a confederacy of clients," as the London *Economist* has warned.

Neither the attitude of fatalistic giving and receiving of charity nor that of growing impatience with a procedure which seems to have outlived its usefulness is healthy. It is time, therefore, to reëxamine the practice of using subsidies to other countries as an instrument of national policy, to speculate on how long they may be needed, and to assess the benefits and burdens that they bring to the American people. If, as will be argued here, subsidies will probably be essential for some time to serve the interests of the United States, this likelihood should be frankly realized by both Americans and Europeans. In this event, the real problem is to handle these transactions in ways that clarify and intensify understanding of their mutually advantageous character. Otherwise they may foster the frictions associated with charity, and thus corrode the relationships between self-respecting allies.

II. THE SITUATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Perhaps the most fundamental fact about the position of the United States in the world is that its greatest comparative advantage over the Soviet bloc, and indeed over any other Great Power or Powers, is its economic strength. The basic data are familiar enough. After all, the United States has only 6 percent of the world's area and 6 percent of its population. In both respects it is considerably inferior to the Soviet Union alone, to say nothing of the whole Communist bloc. The United States is also probably weaker in its possession of basic resources. The report of the President's Materials Policy Commission has made it clear that this country will depend increasingly upon the rest of the world for imports of petroleum, iron ore and most of the non-ferrous metals. The reason, and the sole reason, therefore, that the

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United States today is the strongest single nation in the world is that it has accumulated an unparalleled structure of capital assets and has so raised the productivity of its population that its economic strength, no matter how measured, is incomparably greater than that of the Soviet bloc.

Although these points are familiar, their significance for foreign policy seems to be less generally perceived. If the United States is relatively "poor" in area, population and basic resources, but "rich" in productivity, capital equipment and current output, then its world strategy surely must be to make the most skillful and effective use of its own kind of economic strength in order to compensate for certain deficiencies in its rôle as a Great Power. One way this can be done is, of course, through our system of alliances. They add to the wealth of the United States some of the human and material resources of other nations; at the same time, they augment the human and material resources of the other nations with some of the wealth of the United States. The very purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance must be, then, to develop methods by which the strength of the United States can render more effective the manpower, strategic position, productive capacity and skill of the Europeans and by which, conversely, these can render the economic strength of the United States more effective not only for defense purposes but also for building the conditions of a dynamic and durable peace.

Now the mere fact that the resources of two countries are complementary (as, for instance, those of the industrial nations of Europe and the primary producing nations of Latin America and South Asia) does not create a case for a subsidy of one by the other. But the United States and its European allies are engaged in a joint enterprise which regrettably requires the diversion of enormous resources to the economically unproductive activity of building martial might. This task calls for manpower, strategic locations for construction of naval bases and airfields and other installations, the production of matériel, and a constant flow of supplies to sustain armed forces as they are brought into being. Only Europe can contribute to the coalition certain elements that go into a satisfactory military posture, notably strategic positions and military facilities. The nations of Europe can contribute manpower in proportion to their populations with no more (or less) sacrifice than the United States, and at a very much smaller cost per man. But their economic capabilities are

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far more limited than those of the United States, in terms of income per capita, plant and organization to produce heavy military equipment in volume at low cost; and they suffer from an adverse balance of payments. Under these circumstances the Europeans can contribute to the common cause less in wealth than in manpower and other resources such as land. What is more important is that the ratio of the economic burden the Europeans can assume to the manpower they can contribute, as they reach the ceiling of their capabilities, will be far below both the similar ratios in the United States. It is below the ratio required by modern warfare.

The implications are clear enough. If the United States is contributing a larger proportion of wealth than of manpower to the common enterprise, then a part of that wealth can best be used to help the Europeans rearm. If it were not being so used, the Europeans would certainly set up many fewer divisions than they are now preparing. Only if the different potentialities of America and Europe are combined in this fashion can they be efficiently utilized.

Few would disagree with this proposition if it were not constantly confused with another. If we concede that the United States should, on a comparative basis, contribute more heavily in one form and its European allies more heavily in another, is not the total American contribution unduly large, in view of the stakes at issue for everybody and the individual and collective strength of our allies? This is a key question. It reflects the suspicion that the Europeans do not "need" as much help as they claim, that they are not sufficiently "interested" in their own defense, and that the United States is carrying too big a share of the load. It is this suspicion which prompts many Americans to question the need for subsidies, or at any rate subsidies of the size of those proposed and currently being granted.

But the difficulty with this question is that no criteria exist for an answer. How can one measure the value that Frenchmen place on preserving the liberty of France or the value that an American places on preserving the independence of the United States? In short, "how much" is freedom? Moreover, can we be sure that our appraisal of Soviet motivations and ambitions is valid and that the somewhat more optimistic British and French appraisal is false? Even if we all place the same values on freedom and accept the same appraisal of the common risk, by what

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standards is a common burden to be allocated as between the relatively wealthier and the relatively poorer members of an international coalition? The Europeans, applying the principle of progressive taxation, would argue that the American share is certainly not excessive and is quite possibly less than it should be. Few Americans would accept this opinion. And there is neither a supreme court nor a legislature where the differing views may be resolved. The abstract question of the equities must, then, be left unanswered.

III. THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSIDIES

The concrete question, however, as to whether the subsidy is a useful instrument of United States foreign policy, whether it should be continued and in what sizes, and forms, and for how long, must somehow be reduced to quantitative terms. The starting point for any such inquiry, of course, is to determine the forces that today limit the economic abilities of the Europeans. Before going into this subject, something must first be said about the economic process involved when one government furnishes aid to another, as well as about the type of judgment invoked to assess the economic capabilities of any country. It need hardly be said that a subsidy from one nation to another comprises a transfer of resources, that is, of goods and services. The simplest way to effect a transfer of this sort is to make a payment in currency, or in gold, and allow the recipient to use this money to purchase goods and services as it sees fit. But it has been the general policy of the United States since World War II to grant subsidies in kind. We have supplied military equipment, under the Mutual Security Program, and have financed general imports of goods and services—the method employed under the Marshall Plan.

There is a great deal to be said for this procedure. Yet it has given rise to the fallacy that the composition of a subsidy in kind, the sheer make-up of the goods and services that may be provided, determines the impact of the subsidy upon the economy of the receiving country. From this premise, it is argued that there is one kind of subsidy called economic aid which differs from another kind of subsidy called military aid, and that they differ not only as to the purpose each is designed to serve, but also as to the physical nature of the goods that can appropriately be sent to the receiving country. It is argued that the way to help people achieve economic recovery is to give them machinery and,

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possibly, raw materials but that the way to help them rearm is to give them military equipment.

This line of reasoning has led to many wrong conclusions. If it is believed that the way to help the Europeans rearm is to provide them with tanks and planes, but not with any economic aid, then it follows that the extent of aid they need should be determined by calculating their total requirements for military equipment, subtracting the amount they can produce for themselves, and taking the difference between the two as the gap which must be filled by means of subsidy. This type of calculation would appear to make the whole problem a tidy and technical one. Its only defect is that it ignores reality. It provides no answer to two crucial questions: why is it that the Europeans cannot produce more equipment for themselves, and why is it that they cannot pay for the equipment they need to import from the United States? The moment these two questions are raised, the tidy, technical calculation is shown to be incomplete, if not actually irrelevant. In turn this ought to suggest that whatever the purpose to be advanced by a subsidy, the amount required depends upon the general economic position of the receiving country as well as upon the course of action it is expected to pursue. Since failure to grasp this point is the source of widespread confusion, it may be helpful to try and clarify the economic nature of a subsidy.

A subsidy is a transfer of resources, whether in cash or in kind, from one nation to another. It benefits the receiving country in two ways. First it enables the people of the recipient nation to consume more than they otherwise could, or to devote more resources to capital investment, or to rearmament, or to any other major goal which claims a part of the output of their economy. Second, a subsidy adds to the foreign exchange resources of the receiving country. In the 19th century world it would have been unnecessary to make the distinction between these two benefits, because the country which was sufficiently productive could always borrow at home or abroad, when it could not divert a sufficient portion of its goods and services into foreign exchange by taking them out of current production and selling them in world markets. For a variety of reasons, this condition no longer prevails generally. Few nations—even by invoking the most stern and judicious public and private policies—are today able to expand their exports of goods and services, quickly, flexibly, and

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to the extent they may require, and thus expand the rate at which they convert domestic output into foreign exchange.

What especially requires understanding is that a subsidy is only an addition to the flow of goods and services or the foreign exchange earnings already and independently available to the receiving country. If it is furnished in the form of particular goods and services it may increase the quantity of these available to the importing country. Alternatively, it may simply spare that country the necessity of buying them with its own foreign exchange or turning them out with its own facilities, and thereby enable them to buy or produce something quite different.

It is for this reason that the physical nature of the goods and services supplied to another country as a subsidy in kind need not determine, or even greatly influence, its economic position. The financing of European imports of American wheat, cotton and tobacco under the Marshall Plan, in amounts which the countries would have been compelled to import anyway, may well have allowed them to use their own dollars to buy Brazilian coffee and Canadian lumber. Thus the gift of a particular market basket of commodities from the United States might have had exactly the same effect as an unrestricted subsidy paid in dollars. When the subsidy is viewed as an addition to the total output of the receiving country, even greater possibilities of substitution emerge. The financing of European imports of foodstuffs and raw materials under the Mutual Security Program may release for production of military equipment both European labor and plant capacity that would otherwise have to be used to produce exports. Conversely, it does not automatically follow that aid in the form of military equipment will augment the military effort of the receiving country. Conceivably, a contribution of American military equipment to France will permit the French to devote less of their own production to military purposes and thus allow them to enjoy a better standard of living than they otherwise could. A market basket of U. S. commodities may be transformed, through the exchanges of international trade, into Canadian lumber or Brazilian coffee, or it may be transformed by substitution within the receiving countries into weapons, workers' houses or machinery.

There are physical and economic limits, of course, to the possibility of such substitution, but the limits are wide. Within them, what constitutes a subsidy in goods does not determine

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either the physical composition of the increase in real income which the subsidy brings, the amount of the increase, or the use to which it is put. Whether its net effect is to increase the supply of lumber, cotton or machinery, and whether it ultimately finds its way into an increase in consumption, in capital investment, in government expenditures for rearmament, or simply in the gold reserve of the central bank, is decided not by the composition of the subsidy but by the actions of the receiving country.

A grasp of these facts will focus attention on the considerations that must be weighed in determining the size of a subsidy. The shortage of a particular commodity in a country, whether it be food in India, or machinery in Europe during the Marshall Plan, or military equipment today, does not determine the "need" for a subsidy. The basic judgment which led the United States Government to undertake both the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Program was that the Europeans could not afford to pay for the food, raw materials, fuels, machinery, and later the military equipment, which they had to import from the rest of the world in order to live, produce, invest, trade and rearm.

Nor was this a purely economic judgment in either case, any more than it was a technical judgment as to a shortage of military equipment or of some particular commodity. It cannot be said that either economic recovery or rearmament in Europe was physically impossible without foreign aid. If the Europeans had sufficiently reduced their own standard of living, pursued deflationary fiscal and credit policies, forced the transfer of resources first into export industries and then later into military production, and maintained the whole apparatus of wartime controls, they could perhaps have rebuilt their economies. But it would have imposed greater sacrifices than most of them had to undergo in wartime. And, coming on top of the war, it would have destroyed the hope of a better future. There are few experienced observers who believe that the social fabric of Europe could have stood the strain. It is in this sense that the Europeans "needed" (and still need) more than they could "afford." The gap that has to be filled with a subsidy is the difference between what the Europeans may require to accomplish the broad purposes of recovery and rearmament, and what they can afford to pay for under prevailing circumstances. In all such cases, the basic judgment is political no less than economic or technical.

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IV. THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN REARMAMENT

The next step, then, must be to consider the cost of subsidies involved in rearming Europe (the NATO bloc plus Germany), and the circumstances that determine what the Europeans "need" in order to rearm and what they can afford to pay for.

The general magnitude of the rearmament program of the Western European countries was defined with reasonable accuracy by the Temporary Council Commission of the NATO Council a year ago. If the Europeans were to pay their own way completely, they would be spending, roughly speaking, at the rate of 15 billion dollars per annum by the end of the calendar year 1952. This rate might rise slightly higher in 1953 and 1954 and, thereafter, would begin to taper off slightly on the basis of present plans. Even at its peak, this rate of expenditure would be equivalent to some 12 percent of the gross national product of these countries. Actually, current schedules call for European military outlays to reach an annual rate of some 11 to 12 billion dollars by the end of 1952, which on the average will constitute some 7 to 8 percent of the gross national product. This program, which allows for substantial American aid, will permit the standard of living (per capita consumption) to be at least maintained at pre-Korea levels, except in the Netherlands and probably the United Kingdom.[1] It will also allow capital investment to continue at about the pre-Korea rate, with curtailment of some segments of civilian investment to make room for requirements of the defense program.

What is actually happening, then, and on present plans will continue to happen, is that the European contribution to Western rearmament is coming almost entirely out of the production increase that has occurred since the advent of the Korean War. If, however, the Europeans paid the whole cost of their rearmament, including that of equipment produced for them in the United States, they would have to cut their living standards drastically and reduce their non-military investment even more sharply.

Can it be said then that this is what the United States is "buying" with its subsidies, and, if so, are the advantages thus acquired worth the price? To take the second half of the ques-

[1] In Denmark, also, a reduction seems to be necessary but this results primarily from the country's general economic condition rather than from the burden of rearmament it is assuming.

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tion first, a very cogent case could be made to the effect that the subsidies are well worth while from the standpoint of the interest of the United States if all they do is to make rearmament easier for Europe, that is, to prevent a serious cut in the standard of living and to continue to broaden the economic base of the European countries. After all, the Communists still get nearly a third of the popular vote in France and Italy; neutralism of one kind or another is widespread in France, Germany and Britain; and rearmament is popular nowhere. The majority of seasoned observers affirm that rearmament would be politically impossible if it were made more painful for the masses of consumers. Moreover, much of the investment that is going forward is in such basic industries as transportation, utilities and steel, which are "defense supporting." Then, too, only long-sustained increases in the total output and productivity of the European economy hold out any hope for a Europe that is both strong and self-supporting.

A judgment as to the value to the United States of continued subsidies does not, however, depend mainly upon whether the Europeans could "afford" to reduce their standard of living or their rate of investment, or on whether it is in our interest to make it unnecessary for them to do so. To discuss the question in these terms implies that, in the absence of any help from the United States, the Europeans would be confronted with a difficult but relatively clear and understandable choice between rearming adequately and continuing to live reasonably well. In fact, however, the alternatives, defined by institutional and economic circumstances, would be much less clear. Even if the Europeans collectively were willing to reduce consumption and investment to an extent that would enable them to pay the full cost of their own rearmament, they most likely couldn't swing it. Rather, they and we would find that institutions susceptible only to slow change, together with circumstances beyond their control, such as United States tariffs, would prevent them from achieving their objective.

This may be most easily seen by considering what steps the Europeans would have to take in order to assume the whole burden of their own rearmament, say at the end of this year. Two major operations would be imperative. First, the European governments would have to lower consumption and investment by approximately 6 billion dollars a year (about 5 percent of their

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gross national product) below presently planned and expected levels in order to divert enough resources into military channels. And this operation would have to be accomplished in the face of reasonably full employment (except in Italy and Germany), a high level of production, high profits (at least before taxes), and rising consumer incomes. Second, the Europeans would have to enlarge their dollar earnings by some 300 percent, since the major military expenditures they would be required to assume are those which are now being borne by the United States Government.

Consider the first of these operations. Broadly speaking, the only way it could be accomplished would be by some combination of higher taxes (to reduce consumers' disposable income), tight credit (to discourage capital investment), direct controls (producer or consumer rationing, or both), and inflation (either repressed or open). Quite aside from politics, the institutional obstacles which block this approach remain formidable. In some of the NATO countries, the machinery of income tax collection is not yet as efficient as could be desired. Taxes already on the books are by no means fully collected, especially among the upper brackets and in the agricultural sector. A heavier tax burden would therefore magnify the existing inequities and intensify social discontent. As it is, tax collections in Italy and France, for example, amount to some 20 percent and 28 percent respectively of gross national product.

In northern Europe the machinery of tax collection is efficient. But there the tax burden is already crushing for all income brackets, in large measure the result of the heavy costs for social services, war-induced debts and damages. These outlays, many of them to cover such quasi-contractual obligations as pensions and interest payments, could not be cut down much more rapidly than the fiscal machinery could be reformed in other countries. And with the burden of taxation running 25 percent in Norway to 35 percent of gross national product in Britain, it is difficult to see how more revenues could be raised without crippling the incentive to produce.

The other available measures—high interest rates and tight credit—are already in effect in the countries under consideration, though this policy has only recently been adopted in Britain and something more may be expected from its use there. In Western Germany, too, it would no doubt be possible to curtail private investment by stringent financial measures. But broadly speak-

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ing, little further can be accomplished in this way. Any new substantial cuts in private investments would demand the more rigorous use of direct controls. To be sure, the barriers that hinder further curtailment of private investment by direct controls, and public investment by budget cuts, are not institutional in character. In part they are economic considerations: the necessity to maintain basic plant and equipment and to expand at least military production and the export industries. In part they are political considerations: the pressure for at least a modest amount of housing and the less defensible pressure to continue some rather unessential war reconstruction. But, at best, the savings theoretically possible would be only a fraction of the added military burden that would have to be assumed.

For these reasons, then, there is comparatively little that European governments could do to reduce the demand for goods and services in their countries in order to make way for larger military expenditures. Nor should this be surprising. Any such achievement would require a more austerely orthodox policy than any free Power would find it feasible to pursue except in war.

The truth is that consumption and investment could not be cut back nearly enough except by a combination of inflation and direct controls, as in wartime. But to use these devices is to run two hazards. The first is that inflation, even if inhibited by direct controls, eats away at the social fabric, especially in countries which have witnessed a spectacular rise in prices within the last few years, and whose citizens have lost confidence in their own money.

The second and fatal hazard is that this method of curtailing investment and consumption thwarts any movement to carry out an operation indispensable to Europe if it is to finance its own rearmament, namely, to expand appreciably its earnings of foreign exchange. The whole problem of the European economies, while they are rearming, is to shift resources not only away from domestic consumption and investment but into exports. But ten years' experience since the war (not to mention the teachings of economists for many generations) merely validates the precept that domestic inflation impedes exports.

Assuming, however, that the Europeans could contain inflation as a prologue to raising exports, is any such venture likely to prove feasible? The answer is conditioned by three economic circumstances. The first is the massive size of the necessary changes

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in Europe's balance of payments. In 1951–2, the Western European countries had exports to the United States of about 1.6 billion dollars. Their imports were very close to four billion dollars excluding military equipment furnished under the Mutual Security Program. Their balance of payments deficit with the United States was about 2.3 billion dollars, leaving out the deficits of the associated monetary areas (chiefly the sterling bloc) and still excluding the cost of military equipment. Moreover, Western Europe's dollar deficit with areas other than the United States is customarily substantial. Merely to close this gap with the United States alone within one to two years would require about an 80 percent increase in earnings through exports and the provision of services. To close this gap and, at the same time, to earn the five billion dollars plus per annum required for several years to pay for military equipment would entail an increase of nearly 360 percent in dollar earnings. Any such change is beyond the realm of possibility, at least without a major revision in United States commercial policy, and a European resumption of the same kind of triangular trading pattern which prevailed during the "century of stability," from 1815 to 1914.

A second set of circumstances has to do with the behavior of world prices since Korea and, more generally, with the state of markets here and abroad. It will be recalled that prices of raw materials rose dramatically in the first six months after June 1950. The consequence was a drastic deterioration of the terms of trade for most of the West European countries. But this inflationary world climate in the last half of 1950 and the early part of 1951 had its favorable side as well. During that period European exports, in physical volume, increased some 25 percent to 30 percent. Yet this did not suffice to make up for the deterioration in the terms of trade, let alone to close the gap between foreign exchange earnings and foreign exchange expenditures. In more recent months, prices of raw materials have come down, while markets for manufactured goods have softened. Although the terms of trade have improved again, they remain less favorable than before the Korean War and, in the light of today's world economic environment, the expansion of exports is bound, at best, to be a slow, difficult process.

The final set of circumstances has to do, not with whether the Europeans can "afford" to divert more output from domestic consumption and investment to export, nor with the general state of

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supply and demand in export markets, but rather with the character of the demand for Europe's exports and the ability of the European countries to supply particular kinds of goods. Almost every industrial country in Europe could afford to export more soft goods without depriving its fellow citizens. Unfortunately, however, markets for soft goods are generally saturated. In this sector, then, where the Europeans have facilities less than fully utilized, the limitation on their export earnings derives from stationary or declining demand. On the other hand, export markets would almost certainly take more of the products of the engineering industries, and more steel and other semi-finished goods from Europe than can now be made available at attractive prices and on satisfactory delivery terms. Moreover, these present trends indicate what will probably be the prevailing pattern of demand over the longer run. Europe faces increasingly stiff competition and probably shrinking markets for the soft goods that are today abundant; it is the demand for fabricated metal products that is unsatisfied and expanding around the world. But it is precisely this expanding demand that competes directly with rearmament needs in Europe. Thus, the competition between exports and rearmament for particular goods and resources, not the competition for "output in general," makes Europe's position even more difficult than it otherwise would be.

All in all, it must be concluded that, even if the first of the two necessary operations—the curtailment of domestic consumption and investment in order to free economic resources for military uses—could be accomplished with a minimum of inflation, the second operation, that of diverting these resources into exports, would still prove quite impossible on a scale sufficient to pay the full import costs of Europe's rearmament. It would, indeed, be exceedingly difficult even on a scale sufficient to pay for all of Europe's imports other than actual military supplies and equipment. In short, even if they could "afford" to live less well, the Europeans could not spend more than 12 billion dollars in their own countries for rearmament and still earn enough foreign exchange, in the face of the inevitable inflationary pressure, the adverse terms of trade, the altered character of the export demand for European goods, and the tariffs and other barriers to imports in the United States and throughout the world. American aid is valuable as an addition to gross national product. But it is indispensable as a supplement to the foreign exchange resources of

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the European allies. It alone permits them to make the largest contribution of which they are capable to the common task of rearmament. It is the key which is unlocking their efforts.

V. MAGNITUDE AND DURATION

These remarks on the economics of European rearmament have been addressed to the question of whether subsidies should be granted at all and what they can accomplish rather than to the question of how large they should be and how long they should be continued. The foregoing considerations do suggest, however, how the scale of the European effort influences the size of the gap between what the European countries need to buy from the rest of the world and what they can earn by the sale of goods and services to it. As defense expenditures rise, the level of business activity and of industrial production is pushed higher. Consumers receive more income. Larger imports of foods and raw materials are required. Inflationary pressure mounts along with the difficulty of even maintaining exports. Thus, as a European government buys for military purposes an ever-greater amount of its economy's output, part of its expenditures spill over, as it were, and take the form of a foreign trade deficit. To estimate how large a foreign trade deficit must be tolerated in order to allow rearmament to go forward would call for the review of voluminous evidence bearing on import needs and export possibilities. Since such reviews and calculations are out of the question here, only two comments will be ventured.

The first is that, if the above analysis is substantially correct, the Europeans are going to have a hard enough time earning the wherewithal to pay for their general imports, and cannot possibly afford to pay for the special military supplies they have to import from the United States. Hence, debate as to the "need" narrows down to the size of the foreign trade gap, excluding the cost of military equipment produced in America. The second comment is that the request for approximately 1.6 billion dollars to cover a balance of payments deficit of about the same size in the current fiscal year would seem to be reasonable in the light of recent experience. Most countries in Europe were able to improve their trading position greatly in 1951–52 in comparison with the first year after the outbreak of the Korean War, even while making their expanding contribution to their own rearmament. Their balance of payments deficit is expected to be only slightly larger

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in the current fiscal year despite still heavier military expenditures. But the international trading position of Britain and France suffered heavily from the impact of the Korean War and rearmament. They are the two countries which (together with Greece, Turkey and the United States) are devoting the largest proportion of their resources to rearmament. Moreover, their rearmament began in earnest earlier than that of the smaller nations and was affected by special circumstances.

The international financial position of the United Kingdom is greatly complicated by her function as banker for the sterling area. One result of this special relationship with a group of primary producers is that, although the British suffer acutely in the form of adverse terms of trade when raw material prices are high, the dollar position of the sterling area is apt at such times to be comfortable. Conversely, low raw material prices mean lowered production and living costs in the United Kingdom, but a decline in dollar earnings for the sterling area as a whole. Britain's position has worked peculiarly to her disadvantage since the Korean War. The original and dramatic rise in raw materials prices had much to do with setting off a wave of domestic inflation in the United Kingdom. Then, just as the effect of higher wages and of rearmament again was felt, falling raw material prices damaged her dollar earnings and gold reserves.

The situation of France is, perhaps, simpler. Since the war, the French authorities have not been able, except for short intervals, to control what seems to be a chronic inflation. France apparently remains more susceptible to any kind of inflationary impulse than the other countries of Europe. The rise in world prices in the latter part of 1950 promptly detonated another wave of inflation, heightened by the fear that rearmament would unbalance the budget.

Against this background, there is reason to hope that the Continental countries will be able slightly to improve their trading position; that the measures recently taken by the British Government will prevent any run on sterling and reduce the sterling area's imbalance to less than one quarter of what it was in 1951–52 (2.61 billion dollars); and that the French will be able to hold their own as compared to 1951–52, when it was very serious, indeed. Since the rate of military expenditure is expected to rise in these countries by 20 percent as a whole these seem to be reasonable appraisals.

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More perplexing is the problem of how long subsidies to the European allies will be necessary to enable them to maintain a satisfactory level of military strength. Broadly, the answer depends on two sets of circumstances: first, the pattern of the military build-up; and second, the rate at which Europe's industrial base and economic potential expand. Present official planning is founded on optimistic assumptions concerning both these developments.

A fundamental premise, of course, is that there will be no major war with the Soviet bloc and that the cold war can be continued without resort to full mobilization. On this basis, present plans envisage a build-up of armed strength in which use of resources would reach a peak within the coming year and would begin, sometime during 1954, to taper off. After a tapering-off period of perhaps two years, it is held that the annual defense outlay of the world would be stabilized at a level significantly below the peak. If this approach is realistic, the Europeans should find themselves in the not-too-distant future with declining expenditures for their military establishments, and, presumably, a rising gross national product. Under such conditions it is expected that the Europeans could steadily assume more of the cost of their own defense, and ultimately all of it.

But is this expectation realistic? One source of doubt is that unit costs of offensive and defensive armament appear to have risen sharply even since the latter days of World War II. There is little evidence to imply that this trend has since been reversed or that any explicit allowance has been made for it in NATO military plans. Moreover, the analogy between the expansion of military establishments and the expansion of, say, an industrial plant is of doubtful validity. To be sure, construction costs for such fixed assets as airfields, barracks and training sites, and the "capital" cost of military hardware such as tanks, planes and ships, account for a much larger proportion of military outlays than do the payment of troops and the procurement of "soft" goods, especially during a period of build-up. It is, however, extremely dangerous to argue that, as soon as these "non-recurring" capital costs have been covered, it will be necessary only to cover the costs of maintenance. Experience strongly suggests that the obsolescence rate of military equipment is extremely high, and that the bulk of the "capital" required to build up an effective military force goes for items which cannot be used very long,

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even disregarding depreciation in use or destruction in combat. These technical considerations would seem to have particular point under present circumstances when air forces, whose expensive equipment is notoriously subject to obsolescence, account for so large a part of total cost, and when the possibilities of guided missiles and of tactical use of atomic weapons threaten to discard even present designs.

Moreover, it is far from clear on what political assumptions or, more precisely, what assumptions concerning the behavior of the Soviet bloc, the official strategic plan is based. The grim and unpleasant fact is that the Western World is now engaged in an armaments race with the Soviet bloc. There is not the slightest doubt that up until, say, a year ago, the Communists were not only leading in the race but widening their lead. It is dubious whether, even today, the Western World has begun to close the gap. As the pace of rearmament quickens in North America and Western Europe, it is by no means certain that it will not also be quickened east of the Iron Curtain. But suppose this does not happen; suppose the Soviets are either unable or unwilling to devote any more of the output within their sphere to the military build-up than is now going into it; even on this assumption, their total military strength will continue to increase. If and as the West overtakes them, a balance of military power could perhaps be maintained with a reduced rate of build-up of Western forces, but not with stabilized military strength.

Looking at the other element in the equation, Europe's economy will continue to grow, at least during 1952, almost as rapidly as it has since the beginning of the Marshall Plan—an average of 4 percent a year. It is also predicted that about half of this increase in gross national product will be taken up by an increase in the military expenditures of the European governments. This estimate is probably a generous one, especially if projected beyond 1952. There is not much unutilized productive capacity left in the industries that face an expanding demand (notably the metal-fabricating industries), except in Italy and possibly Germany. As for growth in plant and productivity, the long-term rate for the European economies will almost certainly turn out to be less than 4 percent, especially while rearmament competes with capital investment. Moreover, the significance of any such expansion in gross national product, if it can be achieved, should not be misunderstood. A sizable portion of such an increase will

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consist of consumers' goods such as textiles, and leather goods, construction, and services of a sort that will not find their way into either military uses or export. So long as even half of the total increase must be channeled into expanding military establishments, therefore, not much of the growing total supply of goods will be available for export in the form of the commodities that can most readily find markets, *i.e.* the products of the metal-fabricating industries. Moreover, if full employment is maintained and so rapid a rate of increase of output is achieved, inflationary pressure cannot be eased decisively and much high-cost industrial capacity will have to be utilized, notably in Italy and France. Accordingly, the situation which will probably prevail in 1952–53 and beyond does not warrant the belief that the Europeans can again create internal economic conditions as favorable to exports as they were, say, in the first half of 1950, or that they can greatly improve their export performance while their military budgets are growing.

Looking at the European scene, therefore, the following is the most that can be said. If defense expenditures are reduced, or at least stabilized; if output continues to expand; if the production of the right kinds of things is enlarged; if the terms of trade do not further deteriorate; and, above all, if inflation is really contained (it will not do for this purpose merely to suppress it with direct controls as in wartime), the Europeans should be able in due course to increase their earnings of foreign exchange sufficiently to cover the cost of their general imports. (This would still exclude the cost of imported military equipment.) At least, they should be able to do so to the extent to which the present imbalance is the result of rearmament, and can be cured if the European governments adopt the appropriate policies. It is not particularly useful to try to guess just when this might be accomplished. At a minimum, it should not be expected in less than two years, that is, before the end of 1954; more likely that it will take until the end of 1955, or even longer.

It must be emphasized, however, that this result can be accomplished only to the extent that the prevailing imbalance arises from short-run factors within the power of European governments to remedy. It is increasingly clear that many causes of European foreign exchange difficulties are deep-seated and chronic, having little to do with current rearmament programs. In part they are internal: the lack of immunity to inflation, the heavy

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overloading of fiscal machinery which amplifies all the difficulties of diverting resources into rearmament, of controlling inflation, and of overcoming the shortage of capital. In considerable degree they are rooted in the obsolete political organization of the European continent. There can surely be little doubt, at this point in history, that the national state on the scale of even the largest countries of Western Europe is an unworkable institution, and one which is losing or has lost the effective loyalty of many of its members. It is economically unworkable because the financing and marketing mechanisms of the European countries fail to encourage either low cost production or a competitive, dynamic economy. It is politically and socially unworkable for the quite fundamental reason that national states of this size can no longer promise their citizens either security from external military threats, or economic well-being in the face of unforeseeable changes in the broader economic environment to which the smaller state is particularly sensitive.

But all the persistent causes of the imbalance in Europe's trade are by no means to be found within Europe. In part they have to do with the pattern of world production: the failure of primary production to keep pace with industrial production and the increasing trouble that highly industrialized nations encounter in finding complementary trading partners. And, in part, they arise out of the commercial policy and the course of economic and political events in the United States which make it difficult for the Europeans to earn dollars either directly or by way of triangular trade.

These are long-run problems and it seems unlikely that they will be solved in the next two or three years. Hence, there is at least a possibility that if the European allies are to maintain a satisfactory military posture, they will require, even after 1954, subsidies sufficient to pay for whatever military equipment they must still import from the United States, as well as to ease their balance of payments position at least up to a few hundred million dollars a year.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE HANDLING OF SUBSIDIES

Perhaps the greatest defect of subsidies is that they are thought of as charity and, therefore, tend to undermine incentives and defeat their own aims. A long-continued series of gifts from a wealthy donor to an impoverished recipient will always tempt

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the former to assume a dominating rôle. An embittered relationship is the certain outcome. And the long-continued receipt of aid in amounts determined on the basis of "need" may make it possible for a government in the aided country, a political party, or a whole nation to evade the truth about its own predicament and to postpone and avoid actions to cope with it. Today subsidies are a device for gaining objectives that have a value to the United States at least equal to their cost. It should, therefore, be feasible to make them coincide in concept and in form with what they are in fact, and thus eliminate the idea of charity.

Without seeking to set forth a full range of policies to accomplish this result, four rules of management can be suggested. All of them have been tested in some degree during the last five years. The first rule is that the relationship with the receiving government should be placed insofar as possible on a basis similar to that of a contract between a buyer and a seller. The second rule is that subsidies should usually be payments made to finance the purchase of particular goods, or the performance of particular activities that are demonstrably identified with the broad purpose to be served. The third rule is that a subsidy should customarily be made in the form of a contribution, presumably matched by contributions from other sources, to a common enterprise, in the management of which the United States would share. And the final and most important rule is that, wherever possible, subsidies should be channeled through such international institutions as the O.E.E.C., the European Payments Union and the emerging European Defense Community which American policy wishes to strengthen. The meaning of these rules is, perhaps, reasonably clear, but they could all do with a word of explanation.

To grant subsidies on something closer to a contractual basis will be bitterly resisted on the ground that the arrangement would be inflexible, and that it would be a means of imposing the will of the United States on its allies. But this argument evades a fundamental issue. Either foreign aid is simply a form of charity, given in the hope that the recipient will make good use of it, or it is, as generally represented, a payment for which benefits will be received. If it is the latter, then it is given in the expectation of some specific performance on the part of the recipient to promote a particular result—recovery, rearmament, or whatever. There is a decided advantage in arriving at a lucid advance understanding as to the obligations undertaken by both parties. The con-

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tract should be freely negotiated (its terms should certainly not be fixed by statute) and remain firm for at least a year at a time; the payment of the subsidy by the United States should depend only on whether the recipient meets its freely-assumed obligations. One incidental advantage from such an arrangement would be that the amount of the subsidy, even though it would of course reflect "need," would not be adjustable with every change in the economic climate; less of a premium would then be attached to actions tending to increase "need." The basic argument, of course, is that a contractual relationship is a dignified and self-respecting one, while a charitable relationship is not.

The second rule assumes that subsidies will continue to be in some way given in kind. So long as this practice is followed, there is a real advantage in identifying a subsidy with specific transactions. Under the Marshall Plan, the United States financed general imports into the European countries. This was a logical procedure because the acute shortage of foreign exchange was probably the decisive limiting factor on economic recovery in Europe. But most of the funds went to purchase items quickly consumed, such as food stuffs and raw materials, so that the ephemeral and apparently charitable character of the whole enterprise was unduly stressed. Although these commercial transactions obviously helped Europeans to eat and produce, they did not have any particular connection with such highly desired results as the lowering of trade barriers, sound financial policies, and the unification of Europe.

By contrast, one method by which the United States is currently providing its allies with foreign exchange is through the off-shore procurement of military equipment produced in Europe. Instead of focusing attention upon aid as an increment of foreign exchange by financing import transactions, this technique identifies it with the increment to the country's output of goods and services, more particularly of military hardware. There is a danger that the aid furnished through military procurement will obscure the considerations that determine how much assistance the receiving country requires in order to carry out its rearmament program. Although this is a peculiarly effective means of supplying vitally-needed foreign exchange—since it allows the Pentagon to stimulate and exert some influence over military production in Europe—off-shore procurement could not be justified if the European governments had the foreign exchange and

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the internal revenue to fulfill their NATO commitments, even when somewhat scaled down. Like other forms of aid, off-shore purchases are fundamentally a means of closing the financial gap between what the Europeans need and what they can pay for. However, this process has the great merit that it does identify aid with visible military transactions, which symbolize in tangible form the way in which the United States is assisting European defense. It would be equally valid to apply the same principle to funds that are being used to finance general imports, under the title of "defense support." This is precisely the change in procedure I am proposing.

The third rule, that subsidies take the form of contributions to common enterprises, is in a sense being currently applied in the Mutual Security Program. After all, this consists of American contributions to the common enterprise of rearmament. But the mutuality of this situation would be dramatized more fully if it were thoroughly understood on both sides of the Atlantic that each member of the coalition is making a defined contribution of men, money, and other resources, in the light of corresponding contributions by the other members.

The fourth rule is the most important and the most promising. By channeling aid through appropriate international institutions, the United States can often give it the form of a contribution to a common enterprise, can sometimes reduce the amount to achieve a particular end, and, above all, strengthen immensely the institutions involved without added costs or sacrifice of important alternatives. As American policy toward Europe has been redefined and clarified over the last three years by the sweep of events, by successive acts of the Congress, and by decisions of the Executive branch, it has gradually become plain that a continuing objective is nothing less than the unification of Europe: on the economic side, the creation of a single market and the pooling of Europe's resources, and on the political side, the creation of a single military establishment and ultimately a federal union. In view of the growing importance of this objective, the the E. P. U. was supported and buttressed by channeling E. C. A. funds through it. An even more promising opportunity to apply the rule may materialize in the course of the next six months. If the European Defense Force is actually established, it would be only appropriate to channel through it all, or nearly all, aid extended to its members. Funds available for off-shore procurement

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of military equipment in Europe, or for "defense support," might well be turned over to the proper agency of the European Defense Community to finance military supplies and equipment in accord with a program worked out with the United States Government. Decisive action by the United States along these lines might within a few months' time bring about the centralization of military procurement for the six countries of Western Europe. This would encourage quantity production at lowest cost. Few steps within the realm of practical politics hold out such promise of reducing the price of European rearmament. And, in the process, the centralization of military procurement would contribute immeasurably toward the economic unification of Europe.

As the events of the past three years have unfolded, it has become ever more apparent that no British Government will go far toward joining the British economy with that of the Continent, or any distance at all toward political federation. Gradually this British attitude has come to be both understood and accepted on the Continent and in the United States. Accordingly, aid to the United Kingdom could not be channeled through any instrumentality of European union and particularly, of course, not through the E. D. C. of which the United Kingdom is not a member. The United Kingdom presents a separate problem.

In this connection, it may be suggested that the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the sterling area, require strengthening in certain respects. In the light of the experience of Britain and the sterling area since World War II—on the whole unhappy—it may be that the management of sterling and the supervision of the relationship between sterling and the dollar should be more than ever before recognized explicity as common enterprises. The United States is inevitably concerned with both to such an extent that they might conceivably be carried on by a single institution. If such an institution were to be set up, some or all of the aid required by the United Kingdom might be channeled through it.

The rules here proposed would define a rather new pattern for the management and handling of aid to the European allies of the United States. Many of the changes suggested are, in a sense, changes of form. But if they brought people to think differently about the nature of international subsidies, to look at them less as charity deserving of gratitude, and more as payments for benefits to be received, we would all be better off.

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OPERATION REWRITE

The Agony of Soviet Historians

By Bertram D. Wolfe

FOR over two decades, Soviet historiography has been in steadily deepening crisis. Histories succeed each other as if they were being consumed by a giant chain smoker who lights the first volume of the new work with the last of the old. Historians appear, disappear and reappear; others vanish without a trace.

Originally, only party history was subject to rigid prescription. Then Soviet history was added. Latterly, the area of command performance and commanded conclusions has spread outward to America and Asia and the wastes of Antarctica, backward to the Middle Ages, to Byzantium, to the shadowy origins of the Slavs and the pre-dawn of the Kievan state, to China's earliest culture. One day a given statement of events or interpretation is obligatory. The next it is condemned in words which seem to portend the doom of the historian who faithfully carried out his instructions. If it is a pronouncement of Stalin which he is following, all the more severely must he condemn himself—of course, without involving the Leader in his "self-criticism."

Often the central personages of an event become *unpersons,* as if they had never existed. The Civil War must now be rewritten as if there never had been a War Commissar named Leon Trotsky. The Soviet theatre, once the subject of so many histories, is historyless once more, until somebody contrives to write a new version without a trace of the great innovator-director, Vsevolod Meierhold. On February 15, 1951, *Pravda* accomplished the feat of "commemorating" the tenth anniversary of the Eighteenth Party Conference, in which Voznesensky delivered the main report, without so much as mentioning the name of the reporter!

Today the Balkarians are missing from Volume "B" of the new edition of the "Great Encyclopedia;" the Volga Germans have become an *unpeople;* and the Crimean Tartars, having been expelled from their centuries-old home to a region under the Arctic Circle, have had the place names of their former habitations extirpated, and are now being subjected to the shrinking of their

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historical rôle in the Crimea to the point where they are gradually becoming an *unpeople,* too.[1]

During the past spring even objects began to become *unobjects,* as *Pravda* and the regional press from February to May reported a grim and thoroughgoing purge of scores of local and national museums all the way from Lithuania to Kazakhstan. The Lithuanian museums were rebuked for failing to show the influence of Great Russian culture and the struggles and longings of their peoples for the extinction of their independence, while the Kazakh museums were condemned for the nostalgic splendor of their daggers, guns, harnesses, bridal costumes, and for failing to display any objects showing Great Russia's civilizing influence and the "progressive" character of her annexation of Kazakhstan.

It would require many volumes to give an account of this continual retroactive rewriting of history. The present article aims to give some notion of the scope of this vast *operation palimpsest,* to seek the "line," or rather some of the fragmentary and frequently contradictory lines, discernible in the revisions; to seek the reasons, or a rationale, for what seems to contain an element of the personal and irrational as well; and to ask what these tamperings with the historical record portend concerning the present and immediate future intentions of the régime. History has become a "weapon," an arm of propaganda, the essential function of which is the justification of the changing policies of the Soviet Government through reference to the "facts" and "documents" of the past. The penchant for making every change in foreign relations or domestic policy historically retroactive serves as a vast though distorting glass through which the observer may see these policy changes magnified. It is that which makes *Voprosy istorii* (*Questions of History*) undoubtedly the most interesting and revealing of all present-day Soviet publications.

Macaulay once said that his idea of hell would be to have to listen to fiends endlessly misquoting history and be unable to correct them. But in the Soviet Union, the historian himself must do the misquoting. His own point of view is neither consulted, nor, except by the accident of coincidence with the line of the moment, ever likely to find expression. The textbook writers and lecturers under the limited absolutism of the last Tsars could easily be identified as liberal and democratic, as in the case of a

[1] *Cf. Pravda* and *Izvestia,* June 4, 1952.

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Platonov, or as conservative and monarchical, as in the case of an Ilovaisky, or as Marxist, as in the case of a Pokrovsky. But under total state absolutism, history, as all of culture, has been "nationalized" and there are no individual viewpoints or private judgments or pluralistic approaches. Tarlé, specialist on Napoleon, is ordered to rewrite his principal work in such fashion as to "prove" that Napoleon himself burned Moscow (no doubt to make it untenable as his winter quarters!). The liberal-democratic Vipper, who first wrote on Ivan the Terrible in the early years of the century, is charged with bringing his book of 1922 "up-to-date" and glorifying the protagonist.

From my experience as a student at Moscow University in 1939–41 [writes S. V. Utechin] I know that the late Professors K. V. Bazilevich and S. V. Bakhrushkin held a negative attitude towards the present régime. Yet in their volumes we find no traces of views different from those professed by Stalin. Thus the personal political opinions of the authors do not necessarily coincide with, and may even be contrary to, the views expressed in their books. These reflect not their political biases . . . but their understanding of the party line.[2]

As the great editing process embraces more and more of the remote corners of the earth and earliest past, there are no longer safe and neutral topics. Nor does the historian enjoy the right to pick his period and theme, nor the right of silence where he cannot in good conscience speak. As in music the politician-critic or the Supreme Critic in the Politburo tells the composers what and how and in what style to compose, so in history. *Voprosy istorii* bristles with menacing strictures upon historians for picking remote, neutral, sharply delimited or apolitical subjects; for neglecting fields which have been been given priority in Party directives and the Historical Plan, for drawing their own conclusions or failing to find in the materials the conclusions predetermined for them.

It is suggestive both of the hazards in the field and the real feelings of the historians that, despite urgings, dangled prizes and repeated threats, no one has yet been found to complete a single volume or a single serious article in the field of the history of the Party and the régime, though Stalin himself first suggested it in 1931, has ordered it at regular intervals since, and forced it into the place of top priority in the Five-Year Plan for Soviet Historians adopted in 1946. Fifteen years after the task was first as-

[2] S. V. Utechin, "Textbooks on History. Soviet Studies," Vol. iv, No. 1.

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signed by the Dictator, the lead editorial in *Voprosy istorii* (No. 8, 1949) warned that the failure to produce the ordered works creates a "completely impermissible situation" which "it would be completely wrong to look for objective circumstances to explain." This stubborn silence, continuing up to the moment in which I write, constitutes the most eloquent page in present-day Soviet historiography.

II

In the twenties, not a politician but a professional Marxist historian, M. N. Pokrovsky, was the virtual dictator in Soviet historiography. He represented a consistent general line ("history is politics projected into the past") and made life difficult for fellow historians who did not accept it. But he held to professional standards, had regard for documents and evidence, though at times he wrestled mightily with them to compel them to yield what he sought. And as a historian he had enormous prestige, which was further enhanced by Lenin's preface to his "Short History of Russia," praising it warmly and insisting that it become a textbook and be translated into other European languages.

But in 1931 his excessive respect for the facts of Party history came under Stalin's personal scrutiny. In 1934 he was posthumously purged—he had the luck to die in time—along with all his works and disciples. At about the same time, Ryazanov, Russia's outstanding Marxicologist, whose headstrong, self-directed devotion to Marxist documentary scholarship closely resembled Pokrovsky's attitude toward history, suffered a similar posthumous fate.

Pokrovsky was accused of being anti-national and anti-patriotic (he shared Lenin's internationalism and disliked Tsarist wars); of neglecting actual events, dates, facts, periods and personages in favor of generalized sociological schemata (until then considered a hallmark of Marxist historical interpretation); of being "anti-scientific" and "anti-Marxist"; of "underestimating" Lenin (he wrote: "Whenever Lenin differs from me I blindly accept his view; he can see ten feet deeper into the earth than any of the rest of us"); and of underestimating Stalin (which was undoubtedly true and the immediate though not the only explanation of his downfall).

At first it seemed to historians that a new line might emerge which would put pluses where he had minuses, and offer them

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considerably more freedom for examination of sources without regard to Marxist interpretive schemata. But alas, life was not to be that simple. Though Pokrovsky had been condemned for neglect of concrete historical facts, ere long *Voprosy istorii* (No. 12, 1948) was to give warning that "the proper historian" must be free from "objectivism" and from "an exaggerated attachment to facts," and at home in the citation and application of the "theoretical generalizations" and dictates of the Party line. Now it was not a single, simplicist, recognizable line like Pokrovsky's, but a continuous bombardment by *ad hoc* fragments of lines, changing with each political shift or change in mood, frequently internally contradictory, constantly being altered and even suddenly reversed.

Apparently these fragments issue from Stalin's latest pronouncement or some earlier one exhumed from context after four decades, or from the quotations from Lenin or Marx or Engels which adorn their promulgation. But study of such texts will not help the historian, nor is there any real defense in an umbrella of quotations, for in any vast and historically evolved sacred scripture you can find quotations for any side of anything. To quote yesterday's Stalin may today be "talmudism and scholasticism." The historian must divine the Dictator's coming pronouncement, for his latest word is always the last word in history even though Marx, Engels, Lenin and yesterday's Stalin all be united against it. A sudden reversal in Stalin's relations with Germany or England or America is pushed backward retroactively so that the present enemy is absolute evil, and though yesterday an ally, must always have been an enemy. All books, articles and documents that testify to the contrary must be consigned to the Orwellian "memory hole" to be consumed in flames, or must be "rectified" and brought up to date without any mention of the fact that there was ever an earlier version.

Not only changes in relationships, strategy and tactics, even changes in the Dictator's awareness of the nature of his own régime, or his subjective identification with some deed of a figure of the past, say an Ivan IV or a Marshal Kutuzov, can require a complete retroactive revision of the figure thus honored. Such revaluations cannot be deduced by the historian from a study of sources, but only by sensing the reactions of the Dictator whose attitude toward history has been summed up by Orwell in the formula: "Who controls the present, controls the past."

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III

Stalin first entered historiography through the field of personal and party history. In January 1924, one week after the death of Lenin, he chose the occasion of a Memorial Address to predate by some four years the beginning of their personal acquaintance.[3] At the time it might have seemed merely a faintly ghoulish example of the natural human inclination to reshape the past nearer to the heart's desire. But when one remembers that Lenin had just called for the removal of Stalin as General Secretary, and when one contemplates the subsequent revisions that carried Stalin from "loyal disciple" to "best disciple" and then "only loyal disciple," and on to "faithful companion-in-arms" (*soratnik*) and "wise guide and counsellor" and more than equal partner, one cannot but be struck by the meticulous attention to detail and long-range planning implied in this first little retouching of history.

A Napoleon, a Trotsky, a Thucydides, a Xenophon or a Josephus may wait to turn his energies into the writing of history until defeat has deprived him of the opportunity of making it. But Stalin engaged in writing history as one of the means by which he climbed to power. That explains the ruthless political utilitarianism, the pugnacious factionalism or *partiinost* which he has impressed upon it. That is why first "rotten liberalism" and then "objectivism" were to become the gravest of historiographical crimes. History was one of the "weapons" with which he fought his way to power, and he enlarged the scope of his revisions with every increase in the actual power drawn into his hands.

There was much to revise. First there was that personal symbol of the Revolution and the régime: the duality-unity, *Lenin-Trotsky*. Mountains of books, newspapers, pamphlets, decrees and documents had to be consigned to the "memory hole," mashed to pulp, or brought out in "corrected" editions, in order to substitute for *Lenin-Trotsky* a new duality-unity, *Lenin-Stalin*.

Then there were the other close associates of Lenin, glorified as "Old Bolshevism" in the struggle with Trotsky, and then themselves destroyed. To obscure all traces of their actual deeds and substitute nameless and monstrous evils that would justify

[3] For the evidence, see the writer's "Three Who Made a Revolution." New York: The Dial Press, 1948. p. 424–7.

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their murder is another task that Stalinist historiography has never ceased to concern itself with. With notable impartiality Stalin has barred foreign and domestic accounts, pre-Stalinist Bolshevik histories, Stalinist histories written to order by Knorin, Popov and Yaroslavsky, the footnotes to the Second and Third Editions of Lenin's "Works," the "Great Encyclopedia," and all the telltale passages in the letters, writings and speeches of Lenin, and of Stalin himself. There is a mass of Lenin-Trotsky correspondence at Harvard that can never be published in the Soviet Union. There is Lenin's "Testament." Typical of Stalin's self-censorship is his omission from his "Collected Works" of his tribute to Trotsky published in *Pravda* of November 6, 1918, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

For the foreign observer, the most important document that Stalin has omitted from the corresponding volume of his "Works" is a letter he wrote Lenin in 1920, criticizing the latter's "Theses on the National and Colonial Question" because they failed to provide an intermediate or transitional form for the annexation of new Soviet states, like a "Soviet Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania," which have never formed part of the old Tsarist Empire and therefore may object to immediate incorporation in the Soviet Union. This early foreshadowing of the future "People's Democracies" can be found, however, as a footnote to Lenin's "Theses" in the Second and Third Russian editions of his "Works," Vol. XXV, p. 624.

The present writer was in Moscow during the first six months of 1929, when on central command every periodical and paper in the Soviet Union broke out with a picture of Stalin on the front page. This was the beginning of the Stalin cult. At first it seemed to me wholly "rational". Having just eliminated Bukharin, the last of the close comrades of Lenin, Stalin had now to become "Old Bolshevism." But a number of circumstances have since caused me to conclude that there is an irrational element also.

First, there was the fury of the purges, with the arrest, execution or reduction to unskilled slave labor of millions: the neutral, the indifferent, the innocent, the loyal, including entire technical, bureaucratic and military layers desperately needed for the enhancement of the very power of the state. It may be urged that such random terror was "needed" on the principle: "If you want to make your enemies afraid, begin by cutting off the heads of your friends." And that total state power in a populous state can

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spend a few million lives on the process of completely atomizing society so that every particularized atom depends absolutely on the state and no man can depend upon any other. Still, it is hard to believe that so many millions were required, or that the state had so greatly to weaken itself technically in the process.

Second, there is the insatiable and unappeasable appetite of the dictator for the enlargement of the incense, the trembling obedience, the worship, to the point where he is now the "Coryphaeus" of all the arts and sciences (history of course among them), and is increasingly being endowed with the attributes of a living god.

Third, there was the unexpected discovery while going through the pages of *Zhizn natsionalnostei* (*Life of the Nationalities*—Stalin's personal organ when he was Commissar of Nationalities) that Stalin had retroactively inserted two minor "prophecies" into one of his articles when he included it in his "Collected Works." And more startling still, the discovery of an item headed, "Greetings to Comrade Stalin," with the following (slightly abbreviated) text:

> The Conference of National Sections . . . sends you its greetings and declares its conviction that by following firmly along the path pointed out by you for the solution of the national question . . . we will create throughout the world a united, brotherly Communist family which we will teach to appreciate those great merits which belong to you—the leader of the oppressed peoples.

Here is the beginning of that *potok privetstvii* (flood of greetings) which has filled the columns of all the Soviet papers and journals for these many years. But the date was December 24, 1920! Lenin was still alive and in leadership, and, by general consent, it was Lenin who had pointed out the solution of the national question and who was the leader of the oppressed peoples of the world. Stalin was still outranked by five or six of Lenin's associates and had neither expropriated their deeds, nor executed them. Thus the craving for flattery and the need that "the world appreciate his great merits" preceded by almost a decade the "rational" motivation of the Stalin cult.

In 1931 Stalin issued his first public directive on the spirit of the new historiography, in the form of an angry open letter to the editors of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* (*Proletarian Revolution*) charging them with "rotten liberalism" for having printed a "discussion article" on the problem of why Lenin had continued to

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admire Kautsky and the Orthodox-Marxist majority of the German Social Democracy until he was shocked by their stand on the war of 1914. *Bolshevik* (No. 22, 1931) published Stalin's Open Letter with its own appropriate editorial gloss, headed: "Give the Study of the History of Our Party a Scientific Bolshevik Footing!" All the earlier histories, from Shlyapnikov's to Yaroslavsky's and Popov's, were attacked. "There must be a thorough housecleaning in all book, textbook and journalistic literature dealing with the history of the Party. . . . The ruthless struggle against every manifestation of rotten liberalism must be intensified. . . . The significance of Stalin's letter far transcends the gateposts of history. . . ."

The Dictator next turned his attention to a close supervision of a new history of the Civil War which was to eliminate all trace of Trotsky—except as a secret agent of the other side. Then he began to dictate all the details of the now renowned "History of the Communist Party: Short Course." On January 20, 1946, *Pravda* reported that Stalin was himself the author of this strange work of historical falsification, endless self-quotation and self-glorification, and that it would appear as Volume XV of his "Collected Works."

But even Stalin's mighty name has not protected the "Short Course" from the ravages of retroactive obsolescence. Thus the first edition had substituted for a number of *unpersons* the new chief purger, Yezhov, as the "preparer of an uprising of the soldiers on the Western Front in Byelorussia."[4] It soon developed that Yezhov was only 16 at the time, and, moreover, that the chief purger must himself be purged. Stalin's "Short Course" keeps appearing in revised editions as the greatest, dullest and most mendacious best seller in the history of literature. But he himself has streamlined the Great October Revolution further and further, until the latest version to appear, in the Chronology in the back of the corresponding volume of his own "Collected Works," actually reads:

Oct. 24 (Nov. 6, New Style)—Lenin arrives at Smolny in the evening. Stalin briefs him on the course of political events.
Oct. 24–25—Lenin and Stalin lead the October uprising.

Whether it be wholly "rational" in terms of the rationale of the total state and the absolute ruler, or whether there be also an irrational element, it should be clear that we are dealing with

[4] New York: International Publishers, 1939, p. 206.

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the most striking example in all history of a man who has succeeded in inventing himself. It takes total organization and total power—not propaganda skill, but the union of pen and sword in a single hand—to do so complete a job. Once the total state has concentrated in its control not only all the means of production of material but no less of spiritual goods—all the modes of expression, communication, criticism, thought, feeling, all cheers and boos, all love and hate, all paper, ink, type, loudspeakers, microphones, cameras, cinemas, montage and cutting rooms, theatres, walls, schools, churches, streetcorners, all books, magazines, newspapers, leaflets, caricatures, pulpits, chairs, lecterns, meeting halls, all import and export of and traffic in ideas—it becomes possible to reshape the public past nearer to the heart's desire. Having worked so efficiently in personal and party history, this spirit and method were now applied to general historiography.

IV

Since the beginning of the thirties, Stalin's policies have determined with steadily increasing rigor and detail the character of Soviet historiography. His letter of 1931 on "rotten liberalism," his brief dogmatic remarks of 1934 on what a Soviet history text and a modern history text should be; the successive liquidations of the two professional journals that preceded *Voprosy istorii;* the spiritual trauma of the purges—all serve as urgent reminders to the historian that "Stalin is the Creator of Soviet Historical Science" (title of article in No. 2, 1949). Yet, if we except his "History of the Communist Party," all his historical writings, directives and overworked *obiter dicta* which are supposed to serve as guides to historiography would not together make a single chapter. How, then, does the Soviet historian divine what is expected of him? And how shall the observer deduce from the twists and turns of the historiographical line what the real policies and intentions of the Kremlin are?

An especially revealing moment for the examining of these questions is the end of World War II. Dictatorship thrives on war, and total dictatorship thrives on total war on two fronts: against its own people and against the outside world. Hitherto it had offered three justifications for the cruelty, ubiquity and perpetual strain: 1, it was necessary to crush the enemy within; 2, to protect the land of Socialism from a completely hostile world; 3, and it was justified by the fact that it was already pro-

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ducing an incomparably more glorious life than that beyond its borders. Now all three justifications were suddenly called in question, and the régime was faced with an acute, all-embracing crisis:

(1) The internal enemy had been officially liquidated some time ago, in the late thirties, when it was proclaimed that classes had been abolished, that Socialism had been achieved, that every one loved the Government and the Leader. The "Stalinist Constitution" was supposed to have institutionalized this new state of affairs.

(2) The theory that the Soviet Union was surrounded by a completely hostile world in which it could find neither friends nor allies but only enemies collapsed the day Hitler attacked and—perhaps contrary to Hitler's expectation and Stalin's—Churchill and Roosevelt called upon their peoples to give unstinting support to the Soviet Union. The Soviet people noted with warmth that they had friends and allies. They heard Stalin himself, on the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1941, proclaim that "England and the United States of America possess elementary democratic liberties . . . trade unions . . . parties . . . parliaments." They saw that the Kremlin was summoning them not to defend the dictatorship but the Fatherland and democratic freedoms. Confidently they looked forward to the dawn of a new day in return for their unstinting sacrifices.

(3) As in 1813, once more the many-peopled Russian armies entered the outside world, and felt its impact. The whole fictional world of evil and misery without, and of superiority and perfection within, fell to pieces. Either the dictatorship had to relax, or new enemies and new superiorities had to be synthetically created.

Out of this crisis came Stalin's address to his electors on the inseparability of war and capitalism and the need to continue the strain-and-storm tempo to prepare for future wars; Zhdanov's attacks on the permeation of the "world's most advanced" music, painting, literature and philosophy by "servility to everything foreign," "rootless cosmopolitanism," "kowtowing to the West," lack of *partiinost* and *ideinost* (party spirit and high level of ideas, literally *party-ness* and *idea-ness*); the "revival" of the Comintern; the rejection of Marshall Plan aid by Molotov who, while his régime hesitated, took 89 advisers to Paris, in the end only to advise him on how to say *niet*.

In June 1945, exactly one month after V.E. Day, *Istoricheskii*

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zhurnal (meaning, simply enough, *Historical Journal*), which had naturally been edited in the spirit of the Grand Alliance, was informed that it had been unequal to its tasks, had lowered the level of historical scholarship, and was forthwith liquidated in favor of a new journal to be called *Voprosy istorii*, or *Questions of History*. The "questions" or "problems" it has had to handle were those of this spiritual reconversion and rearmament.

V

The first problem was to make the Soviet people forget their most recent and greatest experience. They must forget, or press down into the unverbalized, unthought, unfelt unconscious, the memory of the fact that their Leader had joined in a pact with Hitler, which touched off the war. Since the *Vozhd* had made one of the greatest mistakes in history, the extravagant cult of his infallibility and wisdom must now reach new and unheard-of heights. The memory of lend-lease, the memory of the titanic joint effort and the embrace on the Elbe, of England's valiant holding out alone during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact—so many memories had to be forgotten, or rather, transformed into their opposites.

A sample will serve. The collective history text on the "History of the U.S.S.R.," edited by Pankratova, in its 1945 edition quotes Joseph Stalin on the Normandy landing:

> A brilliant achievement. . . . The history of war knows no other enterprise like it for breadth of purpose, grandiose skill, and masterful execution.

One year later the book had been replaced by a new edition in which the passage reads: "On June 6, 1944, Allied forces accomplished a landing in Northern France."

And the latest approved history text, that of textbook prize-winner, Shestakov, describes the Normandy landing in these terms:

> England and the United States, in the course of three years of war, dragged out in every way the opening of a second front. . . . But when, after the gigantic victories of the Soviet Army, it became clear that the Soviet Union might alone defeat the enemy, occupy the territory of Germany and liberate all Western Europe, including France . . . in June 1944, the English and American armies left England and landed on the coast of Northern France.[5]

Every such revision of history has its *resonance effect*, spilling over into a score of unexpected places, reverberating backward

[5] Moscow: 1951, p. 277–8.

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into the past, so that the enemy of the moment must always have been the enemy. Especially must the high points of alliance and friendship be turned into sinister and hateful acts. And every such revision is the product of *multiple determination.* Thus the Russia-won-the-war-alone-against-a-Hitler-Anglo-American-Imperialist-conspiracy version of World War II inevitably reverberated into the hate-America campaign. But the latter campaign had many additional causes and implications.

It was the United States that had contributed the greatest help and evoked the greatest warmth. It represented the greatest power. Its productivity was the envy and admiration of the materialistic, technocratic official culture. Its conduct in the Philippines and Latin America, above all in war-ruined Europe (like that of Great Britain in India) was the startling refutation of the Lenin-Stalin dogmas of "monopoly capitalist imperialism" and of "capitalist encirclement." And the living refutation, no less, of the dogma that total statism was the most productive system. America represented the possibility of social reform without revolution ("reformism"), a land of plenty and freedom, visibly achieving an expanding economy and an ever greater measure of social justice and labor-farmer welfare, without the liquidation of entire classes.

The war ended with the Soviet Union as the only Great Power astride the Eurasian land mass, with a power vacuum to the west, and a power vacuum to the east of it. The United States represented the only possible obstacle to the rapid expansion of the Soviet Empire into both vacuums. America sought to restore a balance of power by restoring Europe, and—a little more hesitantly and uncertainly—by reconstructing and restoring a free Asia. Not only was its postwar use of its unprecedented power a reproach and a refutation. Increasingly, it was the main obstacle to the march of Soviet power to world conquest, as America moved from the blind illusions of the Grand Alliance to the sadder and wiser policy of "containment;" from containment to "defense of the free world from positions of strength;" and then to collective defense of Korea as a victim of aggression. The Truman Doctrine stood between the Soviet Union and the Dardanelles; the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact blocked the road to Western Europe; American troops formed the backbone of the United Nations armies holding the narrow waist of Korea.

The slow development of America's postwar policies began to

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inspire hope in all those who dreamed of ultimate liberation. It offered refuge (a little too niggardly) to escaping fighters for freedom. And when it decided that it would not be a party to the forced repatriation of those who had escaped or been taken prisoner, it adopted—almost unwittingly—a policy which makes the Soviet armies and all auxiliary armies potentially unreliable. In this writer's judgment, the decision not to return the Chinese and North Korean prisoners by force will prove to be the turning point in the great conflict between slavery and freedom.

All of these elements, and others like them, enter into the calculations of the Stalin régime, but none of them can be so much as mentioned in overt expression. The vocabulary of *newspeak* and the "researches" and "documentation" of Soviet historians must be employed to make each of these look like its opposite, and to envelop the whole concept of America in hatred. It is sufficient to look at the list of books that are praised and awarded Stalin prizes, to see the volume and the titles of the articles in *Voprosy istorii,* or to note that the articles vilifying the United States are criticized only because they do not go far enough.

If it were an individual instead of the head of a great state and its passive members that were making these statements, ranging from assertions regarding bacteriological warfare to those about castration of colored peoples, we would regard it as pure pathology: loss of memory of recent events, loss of the reality principle, persecutory delusions. But there is "method in his madness," as proved by the fact that while Stalin's Ministry of Hate is filling all the earth with its roars, his Ministry of Love is cooing in a tiny whisper in the Moscow *News* . . . in English.

VI

No field of historiography is now exempt from this inexorable process of retroactive reëditing. The early Middle Ages must be revised to predate by three or four centuries the origins of a high Great Russian culture and of a centralized state. The Varangian theory has to be rejected, not on the basis of the evidence, but because it implies that the Great Russians did not know how to set up a powerful centralized state of their own, except by conquest from without. The new total state is very sensitive about this matter of a "centralized, powerful state." That which the democratic and earlier Marxist historians regarded as oppressive has now become "progressive." It is no longer permitted to sug-

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gest that this great state arose in the course of the defense of the Eurasian plain against outside invasion, nor that bondage in its wide and sparsely settled lands arose through political imposition, so that the recruiting sergeant and tax collector might know where to find the peasant. Ivan the Terrible must become a progressive and heroic tsar because he enlarged the Russian lands, strove to take the Baltic, set up the *Oprichnina* which Stalin recognizes as an analogue of the G.P.U., purged his opponents and even faithful servitors and son in ways which in his heart Stalin also recognizes, and because he completed the centralization of the state and the absolute power of its ruler.

Soviet Byzantine scholarship has to break with Western, in order to refute the idea that the declining Empire was "rigid, static and obscurantist," in order to show that the countries of southeast Europe, "which have embarked on the path of the People's Democracies," had an early, "progressive and original culture." Soviet historians must discover "the influence of the Slavs on the history of Byzantium." They must "expose" the Ottoman conquest of Byzantium in 1453 and show that "the Turkish assimilators are the most brutal of all assimilators who tortured and maimed the Balkan nations for hundreds of years." Indeed, "the very fact that the 1953 Congress of Byzantine scholars (on the 500th anniversary of 1453) is being held in the capital of Marshallized Turkey" is evidence enough that it will serve "American imperialist and Pan-Turkish aims." After all, Istanbul is but another name for Constantinople, and that for Byzantium, always the Tsargrad of imperial dreams, and the gateway, to boot, to the Mediterranean and the Near East for the Stalinist Empire.

If Turkey or Iran is slated as victim of the next forward move in the Near East, then Lenin's friendship with the new Turkey and denunciation of Tsarist aspirations in Iran must be buried seven fathoms under the ground. The influence of the high Iranian civilization upon the Tadjiks must be denied, or, as has actually been done, reversed. So must the influence of the Turks upon the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union. Only Great Russian influence remains, even if it has to be invented. Adding to the multiple determination of the process, there is the restlessness of these Soviet Iranian and Turkic Mohammedan peoples, the growth of their national feelings, the specter of Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Iranianism as possible counterfoils to Pan-Slavism.

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The history of the Balkans and other "People's Democracies" is also being rewritten in the Soviet Historical Section of the Academy of Sciences, and particularly in the Slavic Studies Section. Bulgaria is getting a new look. Non-Slavic Albania has "longed for centuries for liberation from the Turkish yoke and has long sought the friendship which now binds it to the Soviet peoples." Rumania's animus toward old Russia is being retroactively transformed, and her language being considered for honorary Slavic citizenship. Tito has become the eternal traitor, and in 1941 was simultaneously serving Hitler and the Anglo-American imperialists.

Two successive editings of Czechoslovak history have been scrapped, and the third, only a year old, is already under fire. The Polish historians are in continuous torment. Poland's culture must of course be decisively influenced by the Great Russian, but not by Rome or the West, while all trace of Polish influence upon Great Russian culture is being deleted or equipped with a minus sign. "The task of scientific history is to relate events truthfully," the Poles are admonished by *Voprosy istorii* (Nov. 4, 1949) "and to show that the responsibility for the policy of hostility toward Russia in the past rests not with the Polish people but with the governing classes." In all the partitions, the Russian share of Poland was justified.

To the "memory hole" have been consigned all the works of Marx and Engels on the menace of Russian absolutism, imperial expansion, Pan-Slavism, in favor of the restoration of Poland "with the boundaries of 1772," in favor of Shamil and Georgian independence. After 15 years of suppression, Stalin published his secret attack of 1934 on Engels' article "On Russian Foreign Policy." But Marxism is still needed as an ostensibly invariant philosophy to refer to in vindicating changing policies, so for the most part this censorship proceeds in absolute silence. With the retroactive purging of Ryazanov, no Marxist scholar dares continue the publication of these articles in the *Gesamtausgabe*.[6]

In 1934 Stalin could still rebuke a textbook for failing to brand "the annexationist-colonializing rôle of Tsarism . . . the Prison-House of Peoples;" its "counter-revolutionary rôle in foreign policy . . . as the international gendarme;" and for failing to show the influence of Western thought upon the democratic and Socialist

[6] This autumn these suppressed writings will furnish material for a book, edited by Blackstock and Hoselitz, entitled "Marx and Engels on the Russian Menace."

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revolutionary movements in Russia. To quote the 1934 Stalin in Russia in 1952 would be to take one's life into one's hands.

Now Great Russian nationalism is inextricably blended with "Soviet patriotism." Internationalism is for use abroad, and is defined by Stalin as "unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union." At home it is "cosmopolitanism" and "servility to all things foreign." Nationalism of any other variety than Great Russian is "bourgeois nationalism" and is fatal. A Sosyura may not "love the Ukraine" except he remember to love above all its yearning for annexation and the Great Russian imprint upon its culture. With each revision, the Balkan states move longingly another step toward incorporation.

Each of the "autonomous republics" is rewriting its history, revising its poetry, remaking its memories. Heroes become anti-heroes (Shamil, Kennessary); insurrections against tsarism until yesterday celebrated are today execrated; epics become anti-epics ("Dede Korkut") or the versions that have lived so long in oral tradition and are the very national memory of illiterate peoples are purged and reissued in "new authentic texts."

> The expurgation of the epic ["Manas"] should be strictly scientific and principled. It should take into account all the historical circumstances in the life of the people. This demands a suitable selection of variants, songs and episodes, a selection of which the fundamental principle must be the preservation in the epic of all the best elements inherent in the past of the Kirgiz people.[7]

Even so did Orwell picture a functionary in his Ministry of Truth whose task was to "produce garbled versions—definitive texts they were called—of poems which had become ideologically offensive but which, for one reason or another, were to be retained in the anthologies."

Thus the great operation rewrite which began with Stalin's obliteration of his contemporary political and personal history and the invention of a new past for himself has spread outward through the boundaries of the Old Russian and the New Soviet Empires, and backward to the beginning of recorded time. The process is vast and all-embracing, even as the total state is total. But the immediate aims are simple enough:

To strengthen the power of the state over the minds of men and make it ever more complete and absolute.

To enlarge the power of the Leader and the cult of his infalli-

[7] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 27, 1952, 2.

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bility and grandeur by identifying him with every mighty tsar and military leader, with every hero of thought and deed, with the deepest historical memories of the people over whom he rules, for his omniscience, omnipotence, omnicompetence and infallibility are the very fulcrum of all the levers of totalitarian organization and power.

To destroy the critical sense, the historical perspective, the possibility of objective check or comparison from outside the system.

To "justify" the global ambitions and "demonstrate" the inevitable global triumph of the total state régime as well as its inexorably intensifying total organization within its own borders and its empire.

To strengthen its centralization by the increasing Russification and Stalinization of the "autonomous" units of the "federation" and the "sovereign People's Democracies" of the empire.

To root out all memories of comradeship with recent allies and as far as possible all friendliness and all common human fellow-feeling for the peoples who have been selected as the next victims and for those selected as the long-range enemy.

To counteract the war-weariness and the weariness with the unending internal war on the part of a people who have been kept unremittingly on the stretch for over a third of a century.

To provide, in the form of a synthetic national glory and glory of the state and system, *ersatz* satisfactions as a substitute for any real fulfillment of the revolution's promises.

To close the eyes of Soviet citizens and conquered subject peoples to the shabby and cruel realities that the régime inflicts upon them and to close their ears to the peaceful, friendly and attractive message of the outside, non-totalitarian world.

To prepare the next steps in the long-range aim: the total conquest of the world.

By an examination of each sudden historical revision or reversal one can deduce what the next tactical objectives of the Kremlin are, even though not the tempo of its moves—for into the actual moves themselves enter other calculations of power and of relations of forces that reside in the non-totalitarian world.

We can, however, deduce from the spirit and sweep of the new Soviet historiography that there will be no relaxation in the cold and not-so-cold war of the total state on its own people, on its neighbors, and on all the peoples of the earth. The unending war

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of nerves of which the rewriting of all history is a significant segment grows sharper not gentler, more reckless not more cautious, more inclusive not less.

As long as all the more spacious cities of the world have not been reduced to slums and rubble, Stalin's 1947 address proclaiming the 800-year-old Moscow the only city of the world free of slums is in danger of objective refutation. As long as anywhere in the world there is more freedom, more happiness, more comradeship and love, or simply a higher standard of living and higher productive power, Stalin cannot make good his boast that the Soviet system and way of life are superior.

Indeed, as long as anywhere in the world there is a lone surviving copy of any document which he has consigned to the "memory hole," or a single historian writing and pursuing research in freedom from the "guidance and control" of the total state, there is always the danger that world history, Russian history, Soviet history, Party history and the personal history of Joseph Stalin may once more be reconstructed, and that History itself, embodiment of the human memory and consciousness of self, may revive out of the ashes of its works.

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GERMANY'S DUAL AIM: UNITY AND INTEGRATION

By Walter Hallstein

WHEN the Government and Parliament of the German Federal Republic commenced their labors in September 1949 they set as their goal the achievement of freedom, welfare and security for all of Germany. In normal times this very general objective would not have seemed anything out of the ordinary; but in view of Germany's special position after the collapse of 1945 it acquired a very special and concrete meaning, and it became the basic principle governing all the measures of the Federal Government, domestic and foreign.

If such an objective were to be realized, the causes of Germany's downfall had to be correctly understood. It is clear that the attempts to carry out an exclusively nationalistic policy, both before 1914 as well as before 1939, ended in crushing defeat. In both cases Germany chose to manœuvre herself into isolation, after which spreading tensions led to war. Each time Germany paid for this policy with a complete collapse, involving heavy losses, human and material. Indeed, under the totalitarian régime of the National Socialists the catastrophe reached such proportions that the German people seemed on the brink of total destruction. The National Socialist attempt to overbalance the surrounding political and economic forces required greater resources than Germany possessed, and ended in terrible failure.

History's lesson was clear; and we were ready to take it to heart. The demand that Germany join in a community of nations whose ideals she shared and whose interests she approximated was accepted by the general public in Germany soon after it was explained by a few farseeing statesmen. Later the decision found concrete expression in Article 24 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, which envisages a transfer of sovereign rights to international or supranational bodies, as follows:

(1) The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions.

(2) In order to preserve peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to those limitations of its sovereign powers which will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.

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(3) For the settlement of international disputes, the Federation will join a general, comprehensive, obligatory system of international arbitration.

All the German Parties, except for the few Communists, joined in the vote of the Bundestag on July 26, 1950, expressly demanding the formation of a European federal state and empowering the German Federal Government to direct its policy toward realizing this aim. It stated:

A resolution shall be submitted to the Council of Europe demanding that a supranational federal organization be created for Europe, which is to base itself on universal, free elections and which shall possess legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

It further demanded:

That the supranational Federal organization shall be granted the authority required 1, to bring about economic unity on the basis of social justice; 2, to make possible a joint European foreign policy that will serve world peace; 3, to create and secure the equality of rights of all European peoples; and 4, to guarantee the basic rights and human freedoms of European citizens and to put them under legal protection.

This formulation of German political will corresponded to similar events that were taking place in other European countries. As happened after the First World War—but this time with incomparably greater force—political leaders as well as the general public demanded that rigid and outmoded nationalism be renounced. Technical and social progress, and the example of large-scale unions formed elsewhere in the world, underlined the need of new solutions. A European solution could be meaningful, however, only if Germany were included—a statement questioned by no one. Relations with Germany were nevertheless the source of many difficulties for other states. Memory of the National Socialist totalitarian régime, the horrors of the war and the staggering amount of destruction stood in the way of the immediate realization of the great plans. In spite of this, the strength of the arguments advanced by leading European statesmen with equal idealism and ingenuity justified the hope for success. Germany, for her part, was ready to make an active contribution to the common effort and to seek in the future a better destiny in union with other nations.

II

But the world to which Germany wanted to belong was split. Conflicts of ideology and policy among the Allies, which had been

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covered up by the war, came into the open soon after hostilities ended. Since each of the four Great Powers held a zone of Germany under occupation, the growing conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers found concrete expression in a line of demarcation which split Germany. At first glance, therefore, the intention of incorporating all of Germany into a community of friendly nations seemed to have been frustrated, for each zone had practically no choice but to coöperate *nolentes volentes* with the respective occupying Power. In the arena of discussion, nevertheless, the question arose: Which of the great blocs would Germany side with if she could make her decision freely?

In thought, every individual German was soon faced with the choice between East and West, just as the German state had to make a choice in practical policy. The Federal Government and the German Bundestag, the lawful and only freely elected representatives of the German people, had made the legitimate claim to act on behalf of the 18,000,000 Germans in the Soviet occupation zone who had no way of freely expressing their political will. The three Western Powers expressly recognized this claim, notably in the communiqué of the Foreign Ministers issued at their conference in New York, September 19, 1950:

> Pending the unification of Germany, the three Governments consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.

Thus the Federal Government in Bonn had to make its decision with a feeling of responsibility for all of Germany, independently of the necessary collaboration with the three Western occupation Powers. It had to choose which of the two great communities of nations now taking shape Germany belonged to in light of her history, way of life and obligations. This decision could only be in favor of the free community of Western nations and the democratic principles upon which it is built. German communities and provinces have an old, deeply-rooted democratic tradition, only temporarily suppressed by the National Socialist régime. The Constitution of the Federal Republic once again establishes the unlimited validity of basic rights. German culture is a part of what is called Western civilization. It was quite natural, therefore, for German statesmen and political leaders both to wish and to be able to make a choice that would

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tie Germany to those nations that stood for the same libertarian ideals as they did. The fact remains, however, that this decision was—and is—a difficult one for German political leaders to make, for it carries the risk that it will sharpen the separation between East Germany and West Germany, and that for a while it might force East Germany even more tightly under the yoke of Communist totalitarianism.

III

Understandably enough, then, some people in Germany looked for an alternative course. Actually, the thought of joining the Eastern bloc was never seriously considered: too many Germans have personally experienced the meaning of Communism. The Soviet attempt to Bolshevize East Germany by force has made the German people fully immune to Communism, and aware of the aims of Soviet foreign policy. Nearly everyone now knows that freedom, prosperity and security are the antithesis of what is found in collaboration with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the idea of German neutrality has undoubtedly exercised a certain attraction on many Germans who hoped in this way to overcome the division of the country. It became more and more clear, however, that this hope was based on a fallacy. For if Germany is divided, not as a result of a domestic conflict but as a result of the tensions among the Great Powers, then the split could not be ended by any efforts which Germany herself might make toward neutralization. The most important factor would continue to be a general relaxation of tension in the international situation.

But beyond that, a neutralist rôle would also prevent Germany from establishing solid bonds with other members of a real community of nations. Thus a goal generally recognized as right would be abandoned in the hope of mollifying the Soviets. Neutralization would throw Germany back once again into isolation, and under conditions, moreover, in which she would lack the strength to protect the liberty of her citizens and the freedom of her territory. There has been talk of armed neutrality as a means of meeting this objection. Germany would have to be extraordinarily well armed indeed to protect her neutrality by force; but this very armament would in itself induce Germany's neighbors to rebuild a united front against her.

In my opinion, a neutralized Germany would certainly be an

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unfree Germany. The East would not permit Germany to remain in a position where she would be at liberty to decide to join the West with all her human and economic potential. Even more, as the London *Times* realistically wrote, the West could not allow Germany to retain freedom of action to carry her great potential into the Eastern camp. The upshot of "neutrality" thus would necessarily be recourse to one scheme or another that would leave Germany controlled from outside. In other words, neutrality presents no solution compatible with freedom. And from whatever direction control was exerted, Germany would be driven, against her will, to renew a policy which Germans know from experience to be catastrophic.

Finally, but far from least, the neutralization of Germany would make European integration impossible. Perhaps this is the reason the friends of the Soviets propagandize so strongly for it. Not much imagination is required to see what consequences would follow a failure of the plans for integrating Europe. There would inevitably be a general relapse into outmoded nationalistic policies, after which, divided and weakened by rivalries, the Continent would lie as open to Communist subversion as to direct Communist attack.

IV

Recognizing all this, the German Federal Government has planned and developed its foreign policy to assist European integration. From the outset, its best energies have been directed to bringing about a united Europe which, in turn, is to be firmly bound to the Atlantic community. The Government has been especially active in collaborating in the two great plans which will form the foundation of the future European federation, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community. In this it has been supported by a majority of the German Bundestag and by preponderant public opinion in Germany. The fact that the Federal Republic was still under an occupation régime seven years after the end of the war stood in the way of its full membership in those organs.

Partnership is not possible without freedom. Democracy consists of self-determination both at home and abroad; and limitations on that right always constitute violations of the democratic principle. Germany seeks freedom, for only so will we be able to assume the responsibilities which we wish to accept in the world

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of free nations today. None but the free can carry responsibility.

For this reason, the signing in May 1952 of the German-Allied Contractual Agreement to lift the occupation is a further step—perhaps the essential one—on the road to the incorporation of Germany into the free world. Throughout the West, not only statesmen, but that famous character, the man in the street, recognized, or at any rate felt, the significance of the event. If anything else were needed, this is shown by the fact that the forces of opposition were promptly mobilized.

Opposition was, of course, mobilized in Germany also, where misgivings have been expressed even in the ranks of the governing coalition. There is apprehension of the Russian reaction. There is fear lest the division of Germany become permanent. There are doubts as to whether the Western World is capable of sustained action. There is skepticism concerning the plans for integration. And people are weary of the occupation. The original drive that set the policy of integration in motion has slackened. The gap between intention and fulfillment—as happens so often when men strive for a goal—is still wide. It is hard for words and plans alone to create new realities or to modify old ones. Postwar actions still embrace remnants of wartime policies which were based on enmity and directed toward destruction and subjugation. Obstacles are being removed, one by one, but even today Germany's advances toward freedom now and again come up against a barrier left standing from the days of unconditional surrender. The doubts about present policy that one hears in Germany are, in part, a symptom of this period of transition.

By now, however, there has been talk enough. Europe must realize plans by action. That is exactly what the German-Allied Contractual Agreement, the Schuman Agreement and the European Defense Community are doing. When the treaties come into force Germany will be promoted into the ranks of partnership with the free world. She is ready for it.

V

The Contractual Agreement itself is voluminous and not free from inner contradictions. It could hardly be otherwise, for it covers three developments—an agreement liquidating the state of war and the occupation; a pre-peace treaty; and an alliance. A political development which normally would find expression in

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three separate agreements spread over several years is here embodied in one agreement. Some of the contradictions arise from the fact that the contract must embody remnants of the occupation and control-commission legislation, since the participation of the Soviet Union in a final peace treaty is not attainable. Thus the agreement reflects the Germany reality, still weighed down with problems.

It is a useful instrument, nonetheless, to give reality to the solemnly proclaimed goal which the Federal Republic and the Allies together hold—namely, that the German Federal Republic is to become a member of the European community on a basis of equality, and that a completely free and united Germany is to be restored in a peaceful manner.

The Contractual Agreement and the agreement concerning the European Defense Community should be ratified as soon as possible, in order that European political, social and economic conditions can be stabilized. The speed with which they are ratified will do much to determine the valuation placed upon the movement for European integration by public opinion in Britain and America. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union is trying to prevent or delay ratification; the Soviet Government will certainly continue to obstruct it. We have seen from experience, however, how often the U.S.S.R. is frustrated by its own provocations, manœuvres and blackmail. This time again we may hope that Communist efforts will be self-defeating.

The building of the Schuman Plan organization and the European Defense Community will demand extraordinary efforts from all the participants. The Federal Republic is ready to do its full share in this work, although at home it must still carry great burdens in connection with the work of healing the wounds of war. Simultaneously it will do all that it can to promote the process of integration in other fields, and to complete the effort of unity by the establishment of a political organization in Europe. It knows that in this it sees eye to eye with those representative of everything that is best in the Western World.

Doubtless a feeling of solidarity will be created by the mere fact of collaboration in great tasks. Thus will the German people know that, at last, after long years, they have found welfare and security in a world-wide federation of free nations. And, on the other hand, the rest of the world will have evidence that the new democratic Germany is a capable and reliable partner.

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VI

In the immediate future the Federal Republic will not be able to do more than fit itself into the structure of rights and duties which the free world has erected for the fulfillment of these great goals. But the Federal Republic will try to act as deputy for all of Germany. Before too long it hopes to be able to make the full contribution of a reunited Germany to the peaceful coöperation of nations. Though we Germans do not deceive ourselves as to the difficulties in the way, we think our hope has sound foundations. The Federal Government very early in its career suggested a practicable method for bringing about German reunification: free elections, under international control, for an all-German constituent national assembly. In no other way can the slavery in the East Zone be kept from spreading its grip over the whole country; and in no other way can freedom again be brought to the Germans of the East Zone.

In these years of rebuilding, the Federal Republic has prepared spiritually, politically and economically so that from the first day of peaceful reunification every citizen of Germany can live free from fear and need. It further has taken care that the German-Allied Contractual Agreement should lay a firm foundation for the future of all Germany. Thus it was agreed that the Peace Treaty which will eventually be made with reunited Germany will be the result of free negotiations; and further that a united Germany will have, as a minimum, the same status that the Federal Republic will acquire after the German-Allied Contractual Agreement has come into effect.

Naturally, a satisfactory solution of the question of German unity depends on the attitude of the Soviet Union. Patience as well as firmness will be needed to convince the Soviet leaders that a reunited Germany, which is a member of the community of free nations, can have normal relations with Soviet Russia. Moscow need have no fear, for example, that a reunited Germany will harbor aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union; on the contrary, Germany will be concerned with raising the standard of living in both states through an intensive exchange of goods. The essential structure of the European community, as well as of the Atlantic community, ensures that both of them can follow peaceful aims only and can harbor no preparations for aggression—in a word, can prepare only for defense. Strength for defense is needed; indeed it is reasonable to believe that the real

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cause of the latent danger of war today is the crass disproportion of military forces which began in 1945. An adjustment in the relationship of forces is an essential precondition for the maintenance of peace. After examining the situation, the Western Allies—who had guaranteed the security of West Berlin and the Federal Republic—came to the conclusion that the participation of German forces would measurably strengthen the defense of Europe without changing the purely defensive character of the Allied military system. The Federal Republic accepted this view and did not deny the ensuing Allied request. Today the German public is giving this policy increasing support. Because the Government did not wish to arouse any doubts as to its peaceful intentions, it has opposed the creation of a national German army and favored the participation of the Federal Republic in an integrated European army. This decision should also be appreciated in the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union ought to recognize that Germans will never acquiesce in the attempt to impose Bolshevism on all or part of Germany. Russian political leaders should further understand that Germany cannot afford to be neutralized, isolated, encircled and dominated. She would like to share the lot of those who, like her, seek freedom, prosperity, security and a better future.

That is why we accept and stand by the German-Allied Contractual Agreement. We are no longer alone. After the bitter experiences through which Germany has passed in the brief span of one generation we understand the full force of this statement.

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RUSSIAN MANPOWER

By Eugene M. Kulischer

THE closely-guarded secret of Russian population trends has been slightly unveiled recently. The total population of the Soviet Union was stated to be 200,000,000 at the end of 1949. Then, on November 7, 1951, the anniversary of the Communist Revolution, L. P. Beria[1] gave in the usual cryptic Soviet form some indication of how the population is developing. By analyzing this and other postwar information in the light of what we know about the prewar population we are able to do considerably more than merely peep through the Iron Curtain. The information as to birth rates and death rates revealed by Beria—the first to be given out since before the war—suggests a trend at odds with that supplied in Soviet propaganda and one which may in the long run modify the economic and even political picture in Russia. On the other hand, the age and sex structure of the current population points to a forthcoming period when the supply of human effectives will be favorable for Russian aggression.

The yearly net increase of the Russian population, according to the Beria statement, amounts to more than 3,000,000. "Mortality has been halved as compared with the prewar year of 1940." Beria emphasized the difference between the endeavor of the "imperialist cannibals" in the "capitalist camp" to reduce the birth rate, and Comrade Stalin's discovery that "people are the most precious capital."

A 3,000,000 natural increase of a population of 200,000,000 would mean a 15 per thousand excess of births over deaths. The last disclosed prewar figure for the Russian death rate is 20 per thousand in 1938. If we use this figure, and assume that the present death rate is half as high, it would be only 10 per thousand; that is, it would be among the lowest in the world, about the same as in the United States. "He that believeth shall be saved." Quite contrary to Beria's intention, this assumption would also reveal another incredible figure. If the excess births over deaths is 15 per thousand and the death rate is 10, then the birth rate would be only 25, approximately the same as that of the capitalist cannibals of the United States.

[1] Beria is a Deputy President of the Council of Ministers and one of the most powerful members of the Politburo.

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What is the solution of the riddle? Is it to be sought in the story of Sonichka and the oranges? Sonichka returned from a children's party and said that seven children had been present. Katia's mother had provided three oranges, she continued, and Katia had divided the oranges in such a way that everybody received half an orange and one-half was left over. Quite a riddle, of course, but the answer was simple: Sonichka was lying. I do not think the Beria speech should be interpreted in this way: Soviet spokesmen are more sophisticated. The best liar, said an English judge, is not the man who invents but the man who adapts. Let us see if we can discover the adaptation.

Beria does not compare the present death rate with that of 1938, about which we have some information, but with the 1940 death rate, which was never disclosed. There are several indications that mortality in 1940 was substantially higher than in 1938. In 1938 the food situation was favorable, due to the outstandingly good harvest of 1937; in 1940 it became worse, and farming and the possession of livestock by individual members of collectives was restricted. We have prewar vital rates for Kiev. Even here, where food shortage was certainly less felt than elsewhere on the average, mortality showed a rise of more than 6 percent between 1938 and 1940. Besides, the losses of the Soviet-Finnish war must be taken into account. It would hardly be an overestimate to assume that the 1940 death rate went up to 23 per thousand. According to Beria, mortality of that year has now been "halved"—a very general statement, probably intended as an approximation. Approximately one-half of the above estimate of 23 per thousand could mean a death rate of 11, 12 or 13.

A death rate of 13 per thousand is quite credible for Russia today. There has undoubtedly been a certain improvement in medical facilities, and, as elsewhere, medicine is likely to save lives almost irrespective of general living conditions. Primarily, however, what we meet in Russia is the well-known phenomenon of a sudden drop in mortality after a heavy blood-letting—a condition which may be only temporary. Hardships of the war and immediate postwar periods produced a certain natural selection, and the decline of the birth rate automatically reduced the weight of infant mortality upon the general birth rate. Thus, there has been a reduction of three population groups which mainly furnish clients for the graveyard: the sick, the aged and the infants.

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A death rate of 13 per thousand would attest a marked decrease in mortality, but the significance of this in the Soviet Union should not be exaggerated. Mortality went down in all European nations. The death rate of the Soviet Union would still be the highest in Europe, with the exception of Rumania perhaps, which reported (for the last time) in 1945 a death rate of 20; and perhaps in Jugoslavia, which had a death rate of 13.1 in 1950. When combined with a natural increase of 15 per thousand, a death rate of 13 shows something else—a birth rate of 28 per thousand. This, too, is much lower than before the war. The ratio of less than four men to five women of procreative ages brought about by war, and the imprisonment of millions of men in concentration camps, may have contributed to the present low birth rate. Essentially, however, the decrease of fertility reflects rapidly progressing industrialization, and a more rational approach to family life.

In spite of all the efforts of the Soviet Government to increase the birth rate, Russia persistently goes the way of all westernized nations, with 45 births per thousand on the eve of World War I, less than 40 in 1930, around 35 in the later 1930's and less than 30 at present. The decrease in fertility is beginning to outstrip the decrease in mortality, so the rate of population growth is already somewhat slowed down. In 1939 Stalin boasted, "At present we have every year a net population increase of about 3,000,000; this means that every year we increase by an entire Finland." The natural increase also amounts to 3,000,000 at present, but the percentage is smaller, for the Soviet Union has more territory and a larger population. If continued, the trend could not fail to have social, economic and even political effects, slowing down the increase of Russian military and civilian manpower and making more favorable the ratio between population and developed resources.

II

But that is a long-run consideration. The significant question now is not the total size of Russia's population today and tomorrow, but the amount of military and economic manpower it includes. The first step in evaluating that is to find out how the population is distributed according to age and sex. No information of this kind has been revealed since the 1939 census, and to work it out we must resort to population "projection"—a method originated for predicting future population which consists of ap-

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plying to each age group a rate of survival, and adding the number of newborn expected yearly. The method was first used in England, and after having been elaborated in Germany spread over Europe and America like a disease. Werner Sombart used to say: "Never predict for less than 50 years, and then your mistake will not be revealed." "Projections" of future populations are always fallacious, for the reason that demographic trends constantly change in a way that can never be completely foreseen. What "projections" can help us do, oddly enough, is to understand better the past and the present.

This is particularly apparent in the case of Russia. By projecting the 1939 Soviet population (including the population of territories annexed after 1939) to 1950, we can calculate the size of war losses and thus gain a better understanding of the composition of the present population. Had there been no war, the Soviet population in 1950 might have reached 225,000,000 or more. The actual 1950 population was reported to be 200,000,000; thus we may estimate that war losses were around 25,000,000 to 28,000,000. If the 3,000,000 loss which has been reported as due to migrations is subtracted from such an estimate, we may conclude that the remainder expresses the military and civilian mortality and the deficit in births caused by the war.

General Skobelev, who conquered Central Asia for the Tsar in the nineteenth century, was once dictating a message congratulating His Majesty on the capture of the fortress Geog-Tepe: "We lost 27 commissioned officers and 800 noncoms and privates," he said, glancing at his papers. "The enemy lost 30,000." His aide-de-camp looked at him in perplexity: "But, Your Excellency, the enemy did not have 30,000 troops in all." "So what?" the general retorted. "Do you pity the infidels?" A similar attitude is often taken toward Russian losses in the Second World War, and criticism of fantastic figures exceeding the theoretical maximum of 28,000,000 is rejected as an expression of misplaced sympathy—not for the victims but for their rulers in Moscow. Let us keep our estimates conservative, not out of pity for the infidels, but out of regard for logic and common sense.

What might the minimum estimate be? Stalin has referred to 7,000,000 war losses, and the Soviet historian Eugene Tarlé later specified that that figure referred to military losses. It was given in March 1946, and may or may not have included all of those who died from wounds or in captivity. Civilian losses, according

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to scattered official and semi-official data which do not cover the whole field, add up to 5,000,000. The impact of war on population appears not only in the increased number of deaths, but also in the reduced number of births as a consequence of mobilization. For World War I the birth deficit in Russia has been estimated at 6,000,000, and the net deficit of infants for World War II would be at least as high. The minimum figures of losses may therefore be summarized as follows: 3,000,000 migratory; 7,000,000 military; 5,000,000 civilian; and 6,000,000 birth deficit. By subtracting these sums from the derived total of 25,000,000 to 28,000,000 war losses, one obtains the relatively small number of 4,000,000 to 7,000,000 losses to be added to the above totals in various categories.

Military losses occur among men who are in the flower of their manhood. The Russian birth deficit is reflected in the 1950 population, mainly in the reduced number of children from five through nine years old. After having deducted these and other war losses from individual age-sex categories of the 1950 projected population, one obtains a corrected version of what is called the "age and sex pyramid." It reveals several interesting peculiarities. Men and women of 18 through 45 years of age—the main reservoir of military and civilian manpower—may be analyzed as a group. Although hardest hit by war casualties, the group numbers more than 85,000,000, or about 43 percent of the Soviet population. The United States has about the same percentage (42 percent) of its total population in these ages (63,000,000 in absolute figures). There are many more old people in the United States than in the U.S.S.R.; but the usually higher proportion of children in the Soviet Union was reduced by the wartime birth deficit.

The impact of war on this main reservoir of Soviet manpower is also evident in the ratio of men to women in the group. There are 129 females for each 100 males, or more than six women for every five men. (Women constitute half of the labor force, and since the men are continuously siphoned off into the cities, farming in Soviet Russia is on the way to becoming a woman's job.) The picture is different, however, when men of prime military ages, 18 through 25, are singled out: there are nearly 16,000,000 in the U.S.S.R. as against 9,000,000 in the United States. The young men in this group in 1950 were born in 1924–1931. The Soviet figure reflects the high fertility of the period of the New

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Economic Policy, and most of these men escaped the slaughterhouse of war.

With proper respect for its limitation, the projection method may be employed to estimate future population, remembering always how hazardous are predictions of upward or downward fluctuations of fertility rates and of forecasts about changing mortality rates. But the youngsters who will be 18 through 25 years old in three or five or ten years already exist today; and since in Russia (as in the Western World) their death rate is quite low, their numbers can be foreseen in advance with reasonable accuracy—if catastrophic changes do not occur!

In contrast to 1945, when the 18 through 25 age group in the U.S.S.R. had been decimated, the present group has been only slightly reduced in numbers as a result of military casualties. In a short time the 18 through 25 group will be entirely free of losses from this source; but the gain will be counterbalanced by losses from another source—the lessening of the birth rate during the lean years of collectivization. This will be most sharply felt in 1955. Then begins another upward swing, when the high fertility of the period between collectivization and World War II will raise the numbers in this age group. The peak year will come in less than ten years—1960–61—when nearly 19,000,000 Russian boys will be of prime military age. After that the number will decline, since those born during World War II will then be maturing.

After the technological progress in military science in World War II there was a tendency to minimize the importance of numbers in assessing military strength. The war in Korea has shown how important numerical strength is in any reckoning of military capabilities. Certainly it is wise to remember that the latter part of the 1950's may offer a time of great danger of Russian aggression—possibly the time of greatest danger. The supply of men in the prime military ages in the Soviet Union will then begin to approach its peak, and the Soviet rulers will be able to look forward to adding large contingents to the Russian armed forces in the succeeding three or four years. In the same period the Western armies will inherit the meager cohorts of the depression years and the result of the low fertility of the prewar years. Nor must we forget that only very few of the Russian troops who by then would bear the brunt of the fighting would with their own eyes have seen life in the West and shaken hands with friendly Amer-

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ican G.I.'s. This will be the generation thoroughly indoctrinated and imbued with hatred for the capitalist monster.

III

To what degree is this huge reservoir of manpower indicative of the economic and military strength of the Soviet Empire? Various persons contend that it is less formidable than it seems, first, because a large part of Russian manpower—a much larger part than in the West—is swallowed up in the production of food; and secondly, because superiority in numbers, if any, is more than offset by inferior quality. But we must beware of wishful thinking.

It is true, of course, that the percentage of the Soviet labor force employed in agriculture is much higher than in the West. The point, however, must be qualified in two ways. First, a relatively smaller part of the Russian labor force is concerned with the production of the less essential goods and services for civilian consumption than is the case in the West. This means that a larger part of the non-agricultural labor force can be devoted to Soviet economic and military ends. Second, not all who are employed in agriculture are actually needed for food production. Before and after collectivization there was always "hidden unemployment" in the Russian village. Even in 1940, according to an official estimate, the "surplus" of labor in the collectives amounted to 5,000,000 persons. War and industry have now absorbed this surplus; probably for the first time since the seventeenth century there is no agrarian overpopulation in Russia. But, in recent years, mechanization and technological progress have more and more freed manpower for non-agricultural employment, and this trend can be intensified in the future.

Is Russian manpower inferior in quality? An upper layer of manpower in all countries is loosely described as consisting of all those who work primarily with their brains. The total number of these "brain-workers" in the United States has been estimated at 1,500,000. No corresponding figure is available for the Soviet Union, but certain categories may be compared as follows:

	U.S.A.	*U.S.S.R.*
Engineers	400,000	300,000 (est.)
Physicians	209,000	180,000
Scientists	175,000	150,000
College Teachers	200,000	

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Though the numbers are lower in the Soviet Union, the differences are not overwhelming. Certainly these figures do not reflect the imagined gulf between a Western civilization based on scientific reasoning and a traditionally half-barbaric Slavic Orient. The Soviet Union inherited the Russian intelligentsia, whose intellectual and moral standing was very high. Under Communist pressure it has been greatly corrupted, but it has preserved and developed the essential scholarly and technical qualifications. Pre-revolutionary remnants could transmit their knowledge to their more numerous successors in scientific institutions and the army. A decline of quality is certainly in progress, but the lethal grip of Communism on Russian minds will probably not really be felt until the next generation of "brainworkers."

The actual weakness in the structure of Soviet manpower is not an inadequate supply of brain-workers at the top, nor an insufficent reservoir of unskilled labor at the bottom. It is a shortage in the middle layer, particularly a lack of skilled workers. This, too, is an inheritance from old Russia. Even when the Russian economy required only 1,000,000 or so skilled workers they could not be found; and there are not enough of them now when Russia needs 20,000,000 or 30,000,000. For it is not only industry which needs mechanics; today, almost every soldier must be a technician. And only agricultural machinery, operated by skilled workers, can curtail the need for manpower in *kolkhozes*. Moscow propagandists boast that the Soviet Union uses the most modern machines everywhere: in canal-building, road-making, mining, etc. Even making allowance for what Saltykov-Shchedrin called "administrative exaltation," the demand for trained mechanics to handle this machinery must be great.

The Soviet Government tries to meet this demand; trade, railroad, mining and factory schools turn out about 500,000 graduates yearly. But we may well be skeptical when we are told that, in addition to these boys and girls, "qualifications" of 7,000,000 factory and office workers were "raised" in 1950 by means of individual and brigade apprenticeship and course training. To speak of "raising qualifications" can mean anything. The level of general education is undeniably being raised; almost the whole of Soviet youth is enrolled in the seven-year school course. But in spite of all the efforts of the Soviet Government, and of some substantial achievements, the shortage of skilled workers remains a weak point in the Soviet economy.

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And yet, strange as it may seem, the need of broadening the middle strata may be a factor of political strength in the Soviet system. Less than one hundred years ago the French people, politically among the most advanced, endured the despotic and corrupt rule of Napoleon III for 20 years. His international adventures were certainly not glorious enough to obscure the reality of the internal situation, and to attribute his acceptance to the efficiency of his police organization seems superficial. The slogan, *enrichissez-vous,* could have lured but a fraction of the nation. Yet industry and commerce were expanding, and although living conditions of the masses—the rural and urban proletarians—were still very hard, great opportunities for achievements were open to individuals in the disinherited class. The existence of a chance to move up into a socially and economically higher group does much to explain the political attitude of the masses, not only under Napoleon III, but also under Josef I of present-day Russia.

In the "classless society" of the Soviet Union living conditions of the respective classes are much worse than before the Revolution especially for the intelligentsia and the skilled workers; but they are so for the class as such, not for all its members as individuals. Only a portion of the class are old-time intellectuals, semi-intellectuals and artisans, or their children; the overwhelming majority have risen from the social bottom. For those who aspire to a higher standing there is still ample opportunity to climb the social ladder. A peasant boy or girl becomes an electrician or a bookkeeper, perhaps even an engineer, and finds ready employment. Will he or she not welcome the better living conditions and higher social standing, and support the system which made them possible? There are certainly hundreds of thousands, probably millions, in Russia who are delighted to find that they have thus attained a superior status.

But there are others who are mortal enemies of the system. The existence of the concentration camps suggests how greatly the government fears them, and how numerous they are, though here too we shall be able to estimate the strength of our opponents better if we keep our feet on the ground and our heads out of the statistical clouds. The number of inmates of concentration camps, or "forced laborers," in the Soviet Union has been fantastically exaggerated. In the famous issue of *Collier's* Arthur Koestler referred to a total of 15,000,000 to 20,000,000. A total of 12,000,000 is usually given as a rather conservative estimate.

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"Do you pity the infidels?" Dare anyone doubt that Stalin would hesitate to put away 12,000,000 or even 20,000,000 men? Before we answer, let us think what that would mean for the social organism. All reports suggest that Soviet deportees include not more than 10 percent women and probably fewer, and relatively few people aged 50 years and more. The number of males in the working ages of the population of the U.S.S.R.—that is to say, more than 18 and less than 50 years of age—can be calculated at slightly more than 40,000,000; when we subtract the members of the M.V.D. and the regular armed forces, the figure would be around 35,000,000. The assumption that there are 12,000,000 forced laborers ("only" 12,000,000) leads to the amazing conclusion that every third male of working age is in a concentration camp. There is also another social aspect of such a fantastic assumption—the drop in fertility it would entail. At the peak of Russian mobilization during World War I, when 14,000,000 were in the army, the birth rate dropped by more than two-fifths. What would have been the effect of childbearing in Russia—not only after but even before World War II—if 12,000,000 men had been excluded from family life?

An indirect approach to a plausible estimate of the number of forced laborers is to attempt to gauge the full complement of "deportees," including those in concentration camps, by comparing election data with figures on the general population. In contradistinction to age-sex distributions based on the projection techniques, this method is often a very inaccurate one—as are all calculations relying on residual quantities. Nevertheless, it may be employed here with caution, since our purpose is to indicate roughly the size of a classification which includes the inmates of concentration camps as merely one of its components. From the total adult Soviet population (those 18 years of age and over) for 1947, 1950 and 1951, let us accordingly subtract voters registered in the elections of 1947, 1950 and 1951. Since registration is compulsory, this yields the number of non-voting adults—about 13,000,000. In order to obtain the number of deportees (in and outside of concentration camps), three other groups of non-voters must be excluded: aliens (about 0.5 percent); persons omitted in the process of registration (say 1 percent); and the insane, ordinary criminals disfranchised for five years, and persons under investigation (altogether about 2 percent). The remaining non-voting population for each of these three years amounts to

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about 9,000,000 persons—a total which includes not only inmates of concentration camps, but also deportees who were never in concentration camps and those who have served their time or have been pardoned. A Russian D.P. recently recounted how,[2] after having been in a concentration camp and while legally still a deportee and disfranchised, he registered with the G.P.U. and worked as a high school teacher and then as a bookkeeper in the local coöperative administration. In still other cases, the original sentence is to an assigned domicile and disfranchisement. Deportees of this kind were particularly numerous after the war, when masses of returned prisoners of war were "pardoned," with the obligation of expiating their "treason" through assigned work.

How many, then, of the residual 9,000,000 mentioned above really are forced laborers living in the notorious concentration camps? A pure guess would be 5,000,000; it seems the maximum compatible with the mass of deportees to be found outside of concentration camps throughout the Soviet Union and with what we otherwise know about social and demographic conditions there. An estimate of the 1940–1941 camp labor force has been thoroughly worked out by Naum Jasny, on the basis of the secret 1941 Plan which listed capital investments to be carried through by the N.K.V.D. (now the M.V.D.) and its main camp organizations. Mr. Jasny arrived at a total of 3,500,000 concentration camp inmates used for work. This calculation excluded completely disabled inmates and those en route to camps or from one working place to another. As for the changes which took place since 1941, huge numbers of deportees are reported in all categories; they may or may not outnumber those liberated to be enlisted in the army. If we allow for these special factors, we get results which are not inconsistent with the guess which puts the number at nearly 5,000,000.

But this is an astounding and shocking total, which tells a great deal about the limitations of the peasant boy-and-girl success story in the U.S.S.R. At the end of the nineteenth century, George Kennan (the great uncle of the present American Ambassador to the Soviet Union) visited Siberia, and his description of the life of political deportees and exiles caused his readers in Europe and America to shudder. In comparison to the conditions in present Soviet concentration camps, the life of these earlier deportees was an idyl. Their number, in all categories, never sur-

[2] *Novoy Russkoye Slovo*, September 7, 1951.

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passed 100,000—that is, 2 percent of the present number of apprehended and convicted enemies of the state.

In many quarters there is a tendency to depict the whole concentration camp system as a huge profit-making enterprise and a pillar of Soviet industrialization. It has even been said that deportation is regulated primarily by the needs of the government for labor. If so, the existence of millions of slave laborers would be no proof of anti-government feeling of the Soviet people. But is it so? The idea that a government would expect to profit by deliberately maintaining a mass of unpaid workers is plausible only for those who have no idea of the rudiments of political economy. Slave labor is much less productive than labor performed under economic incentives. The same writers who emphasize the profits of the slave-holding M.V.D. put the productivity of a slave worker at less than half of that of other Russian workers. The Soviet Government knows very well that it is much more profitable to use economic incentives than brute force. Long columns of advertisements in the Soviet papers ask for engineers, bookkeepers, foremen, technicians, workers belonging to the so-called "first six" categories who, according to a decree of 1940, can be sent wherever they are needed, even against their wishes. Why does the state attempt to lure them by higher wages? The Soviet overlords are too refined to rely on mere force in order to squeeze the highest product out of the worker.

An unlimited supply of slaves is the prerequisite to a large-scale slave economy, but the Soviet supply is by no means unlimited. The Soviet rulers do not suppose they are profiting when they employ engineers for woodcutting. Use of forced labor may be helpful economically for such work as gold-washing and lumbering in the notorious Kolyma and other subarctic regions, which free labor will not undertake. But such tasks would require only a fraction of the actual number of slave laborers. Millions have been sent to concentration camps not because they are needed there, but because the Soviet rulers would rather take the economic and social loss of having them behind barbed wire than run the political risks of permitting them at large. Undoubtedly some are seized who are innocent—"to encourage the others." The willingness of the Soviet Government to weaken the labor force shows how conscious Stalin and his acolytes are of the anti-Communist feelings among the Russian people and their dread that these feelings may be expressed in actions.

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NEW INDIA

By Chester Bowles

AFTER centuries of inertia, Asia today is wide awake and on the move. From Cairo to Manila, vast populations only recently emerged from colonialism are struggling to take shape as modern nations. Some Westerners find this new situation both bewildering and unpleasant. Some diplomats, indeed, confronted for the first time with the task of assessing the impact of their policies on Asia, find themselves yearning for the "good old days" when the European's word was law. But there are other Westerners—and I believe them to be a substantial majority in America—who look to this new Asia with hope and expectancy. They see developing there a democratic opportunity for hundreds of millions of their fellow human beings who have long been denied the right to choose their own governments and the means to achieve a better life.

The challenge to us is to reaffirm what is best in our long liberal tradition. By pursuing sympathetic, intelligent and patient policies the West will find it possible to work with most of the Asian nations on the basis of mutual respect and understanding in the building of a more stable world. By shirking the task of understanding Asia, and by refusing to recognize the realities of 1952, the West will surely alienate a vast continent and may eventually bring about its own downfall.

Even if we show the best of intentions we shall encounter many pitfalls. For years to come, fundamental differences in the cultural backgrounds of Asians and Americans and in their ways of life will make it difficult for each side to understand the other. Some Western visitors to India, for instance, still see only the Rudyard Kipling–Katherine Mayo land of tiger-hunting maharajas, sacred cows and cobras, against an endless backdrop of tradition-bound, poverty-stricken humanity. But for the visitor who looks below the surface there is a new and immensely exciting India—a five-year-old democracy of 360,000,000 people, working earnestly and with considerable success to solve their country's staggering problems. The outcome of this great Indian effort will profoundly affect the world in which we live. Indeed, the success or failure of the effort being made in India and other Asian countries to create an alternative to Communism in Asia

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may mark one of those historic turning points which determine the flow of events for many generations.

In China 500,000,000 people are working under a ruthless Communist dictatorship to increase Chinese food production, expand Chinese industry, strengthen the Chinese armed forces and indoctrinate Chinese youth with an aggressive Communist faith —all in the interest of an alien imperialism. A revolutionary challenge such as this cannot be met successfully with slogans, or with vituperation and threats. It can be met over the years only by the example of other Asians who are able to demonstrate in unmistakable terms that democracy not only guarantees the rights of the individuals, but also provides the most practical and quickest means to raise the living standards of the people.

Thus the future of Asia, and eventually the world balance of power, may rest on the competition between democratic India on the one hand and Communist China on the other. If democracy succeeds in India, regardless of what happens in China, millions of Asian doubters will develop new faith in themselves, in their ancient cultures, and in the ideals of the free world.

II

What, then, is the outlook for the future of democracy in India? What, to begin with, has the record been since India won her independence five years ago? An objective study of this record must convince any unprejudiced observer that the new Indian Republic is off to a remarkable start.

During the five-year period India has set up a democratic state which guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of religion to all citizens and freedom to vote to all men and women over 21 years of age. The Indian Constituton has drawn generously from the Constitutions of the United States and of other Western countries. The Indian judiciary generally follows Anglo-Saxon systems of jurisprudence.

To organize the Indian Republic was in itself a tremendous task. When the country became independent, five years ago this past August, there were nine partially self-governing provinces and four small centrally-administered provinces. In addition, there were 584 princely states. Of these only Kashmir, Hyderabad and Mysore were of significant size, while 202 had areas of less than ten square miles. Although theoretically responsible to British officials, many of the petty autocrats who previously

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ruled these states held the power of life and death over their subjects. In most of them there was little to differentiate the ruler's private bank account from the public reserves.

These feudal relics are now gone. Mysore, Hyderabad and Kashmir were established as separate states in their entirety. All of the former princely territories, covering an area of 588,000 square miles with a total population of more than 100,000,000 people, have been merged with each other, or with the former provinces, or otherwise integrated into workable administrative units. India now consists of 28 states which have much the same relationship to the central government as the 48 states of our American Union. The maharajas have been paid off with lifetime pensions, which although sizable by ordinary standards amount to a small fraction of their original princely incomes. Democratic institutions have been broadly established.

This extraordinary transition was accomplished largely by persuasion and with almost no violence. Kashmir, still torn between India and Pakistan, remains a sore spot. But it is a tribute to the wisdom of the princes and Congress leaders alike that there were not 50 Kashmirs.

Last winter India held her first nation-wide election. One hundred and six million citizens cast their votes. This is a higher percentage of those eligible to vote than is likely to go to the polls this year in our American elections. They came by bullock cart, by bus, by truck and on foot, and the women voters were as numerous as the men. There was free speech, and some of it very free indeed. Yet violence was rare, and there was no scandal.

Democratic assemblies based more or less on the British parliamentary system were elected in all of the states. A central government was chosen, made up of the House of the People, similar to the British House of Commons, elected by direct vote, and the Council of States, elected by indirect vote, mostly by the members of the state assemblies. Jawaharlal Nehru, as the leader of the majority party, was chosen Prime Minister. The President, whose powers are similar to those of the President of France, was elected by the combined vote of all members of the state and central assemblies.

India's success in unravelling a feudal-colonial complex involving 360,000,000 people, speaking a hundred different languages and with strong religious differences, and turning it into a united, effective democracy in five years' time will go down in history

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as a spectacular achievement. The bulk of the credit belongs to the Indian leaders and the Indian people. But most of them would be quick to grant a generous share to British public servants such as Lord Mountbatten, and to those many princes who peacefully turned over their power and authority to democratic governments.

The democratic organization of the new Indian Republic is only one chapter in the story. The record of parallel achievement in the economic field is all the more remarkable because it has been accomplished with only a moderate amount of foreign aid. Since 1947 the Indian Government has coped successfully with a refugee problem substantially greater than the one faced in Western Germany and involving five or six times more people than that which arose in the Near East. There has not been a penny of outside assistance. Today the great majority of the 8,000,000 refugees from areas which are now part of Pakistan are self-supporting. Only a relatively small minority are still receiving assistance from the Government and only 72,000 remain in camps —a figure which is being rapidly reduced.

The Indian rupee, valued at approximately 21 cents, is sound. During 1951 the Indian Government incurred new debts of $105,000,000; but in the same period it retired $180,000,000 of outstanding internal debt. Public works costing far more than this were paid for out of income. Future economic development will be guided by the new Five Year Plan, first presented in draft form a year ago. Because India's biggest problem is food, this plan properly places its primary emphasis on increased agricultural production.

India's huge and rapidly-growing population has often suffered from a shortage of food. Her history records many famines. In 1943, 3,000,000 people died of famine in a single province. The partition of colonial India between the Republic of India and Pakistan in 1947 involved the loss of extensive agricultural lands and made the food problem even more critical. Now, however, government officials are confident that by 1956 India can raise enough food to support the growing population, and at a higher dietary level. They point to the facts that the density of population is far less in India than in Italy and only a little more than half that in Great Britain, Germany and Japan; and that the annual population increase on a percentage basis is no greater than that in the United States, and substantially less than in Puerto

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Rico or Japan. Pilot studies have demonstrated that with India's year-round growing season, she can, if need be, double her food production once modern agricultural techniques and sufficient irrigation water are made available to the peasants.

And yet the hard, practical problems of the immediate future cannot be ignored. Some 50,000,000 tons of grain, in addition to other foods, are now required yearly to supply the average Indian daily diet of 1,800 calories. Last year India was able to produce only 45,000,000 tons because of the failure of the monsoon rains, and had to import 5,000,000 tons from abroad. More than half of this grain came from the United States, part of it paid for in cash, part by a loan. In the present year substantial imports again are necessary. This means that simply in order to maintain her present inadequate diet India must continue to spend some $600,000,000 in foreign exchange, which might otherwise be used to build up her steel industry, expand her transportation system and provide new factory jobs for Indian workers.

The Indian Five Year Plan boldly sets out to meet this challenge. The aim is to attain an annual production of 10,000,000 additional tons of food by 1956, and also a substantial increase in cotton. If these goals are reached, the average daily diet can be improved, food and cotton imports will no longer be necessary, and foreign exchange can flow at a much higher ratio into industrial expansion.

One of the first steps in increasing Indian food production is to provide the farmers with greater incentives, and in this connection the first effort being made is to give millions of them ownership of the land they till and to free them from the grip of the money lenders. For several years land reforms were held up by court disputes over what constituted adequate compensation for the landlords. In April 1952 the Indian Supreme Court handed down its decision and now the state governments are free to move rapidly ahead. Intense opposition from strongly entrenched and politically powerful landlords will, however, continue. If the Congress Party is to retain the confidence of the peasants, this opposition will have to be squarely met.

New lands are also being rapidly opened up for cultivation. Several million acres, long unused because of deep-growing weeds, malarial conditions or for other reasons, will soon be adding substantially to India's food supply. But the major increase in food production is expected to come through better use of land

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which is already under cultivation, and here the opportunities are very great.

Indian farmers have always made much poorer use of fertilizers than have the Chinese; their seeds often are of low quality; and hundreds of billions of gallons of water which could vastly increase food production on parched lands are being wasted for lack of adequate irrigation systems. In many villages farming methods remain much as they were before the British occupation. These problems are being tackled by the new Indian Government to the limit of its resources, supplemented by American Point Four assistance. All over the country, teams of agricultural extension workers are demonstrating what spectacular increases in food production are possible through modern methods of tillage, adequate fertilizers, improved seeds and better use of water.

The village-to-village program which is now unfolding is said to represent the biggest combined attack ever attempted anywhere on low agricultural production, disease and illiteracy. On October 1, 1952, the central Indian Government, in coöperation with the states, is scheduled to open up 55 community development areas, each containing on the average 200,000 people, or a total of 11,000,000. If sufficient financing is available, the program will be expanded to cover one-third of all the villages in India in the next four years.

One hundred village workers are assigned to each of these development areas. This means an average of one worker for each three villages or for each 1,800 people. These village workers, 3,000 of whom are just completing their training, will work with the villagers to increase agricultural production, improve sanitation standards, eliminate malaria and establish schools and adult literacy classes. To each development area, in addition, there will be assigned 22 specialists in engineering, education, public health and the various phases of agriculture to back up the village workers in their respective fields. More than 50 American extension workers are now actively engaged throughout India as consultants in the planning and development of this huge program. One hundred thousand tons of fertilizer purchased with Point Four funds will soon be available. American jeeps, D. D. T. for malaria control and steel for the production of improved tools by village blacksmiths are being put to work.

As I write, the exact amount of American aid for the present fiscal year remains undetermined. It is hoped that 55 more devel-

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opment areas, including an additional 11,000,000 people, can be opened up early in the coming winter, and that sufficient American supplies and technicians will be available to help carry this great program forward. But no one can accuse the Indian Government of sitting back and letting Uncle Sam carry the load. For every dollar of American aid going into this community development program, there are eight dollars in Indian rupees.

Another major part of the Indian agricultural effort is to increase irrigation. Present plans call for 8,000,000 acres of newly-irrigated land from major river valley developments by late 1956, plus another 8,000,000 acres from tube wells, improvements of present irrigation systems, additional shallow wells, storage ponds and other sources.

Three groups of big dams modelled on our T. V. A. or Boulder Dam systems are now being built at Damodar, Hiarkud and Bakhra-Nangal—the last-named alone to irrigate 3,300,000 acres annually. This is 70 percent more than is serviced by Grand Coulee, at present the largest irrigation system in the world. Point Four funds will provide bulldozers, pumps and other essential equipment for many of these irrigation projects. They also will help with the tube well program; our 1952 budget provides for 2,000 such wells to be dug, mostly in the great Gangetic basin of north India, each of them to irrigate an average of some 400 acres. They will pay for themselves in six or seven years. As in the case of the Community Development Program, this American contribution will be a small but essential part of the total investment.

Additional United States funds are going into an all-out campaign against malaria. The Ministry of Health and the Rockefeller Foundation estimate that there are 80,000,000 cases of malaria in India and more than 1,000,000 deaths each year. According to the experts, almost all of this human misery, to say nothing of the drag on India's productive capacity, can be wiped out in four years. The cost will be $23,000,000 for D.D.T., jeeps, trucks and spray machines and an equal amount in rupees for Indian labor and materials.

If sufficient American aid is made available by Congress, and if India continues her own present intensive effort to solve her great problems, there is every reason to hope that the great goal of the Five Year Plan—agricultural self-sufficiency by 1956—will be achieved. If it is, the new India will also have taken a long for-

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ward step in the world-wide struggle of democracy against Communist totalitarianism.

III

Even so, there are many urgent problems which will still remain unsolved, and one of the most important of them is the course of India's future industrial development. As Indian agriculture moves forward toward the Five Year Plan goal, fewer people will be required to raise the food needed to feed India's huge population. These workers will then be free for roadbuilding, construction, village industries, mining, and factory work in Indian cities. The transition will call for most careful planning. Foreign exchange totalling some $600,000,000 annually, now being spent for foreign food, must be largely diverted to industrial development. New capital, domestic and foreign, must be coaxed into constructive investment. New industrial managers must be trained. Here again there is every reason to be hopeful.

In the eighteenth century, at the time of the British occupation, India possessed a textile industry, technical skills and a level of artisanship that placed her in many ways well ahead of Western Europe. In the nineteenth century, under pressure from British manufacturers, the industrial development of India was first curtailed and finally brought almost to a halt. One hundred years ago it was actually against the law for an Englishman to buy apparel made from Indian cloth. The basis for the modern Indian industrial plant was laid just before the First World War. Since then industrial development has moved forward gradually until today the statistics show that India is the eighth largest industrial country in the world. In view of her vast population, however, these particular statistics only emphasize how far she still has to go.

India is rich in natural resources. Her iron ore deposits are among the largest and purest in the world. She is one of the world's largest suppliers of manganese and mica. But her steel production is only a little more than 1,000,000 tons. Almost every major city in the country is short of industrial power. Her jute industry is her biggest dollar earner; but though it is the largest in the world, many of the plants need modernization.

Considerable progress is already being made in meeting these shortages. The many multi-purpose river valley projects now under construction should result in increasing hydroelectric ca-

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pacity by two-thirds by 1957. Nearly one-fourth of the entire budget of the Indian central government is now being expended on these projects; and the total sum is expected to reach one billion dollars over the next five years, practically all of it to be coming from current revenue. Similar progress is in view in other fields. A plan is now under consideration by the World Bank which could increase India's steel production 70 percent by 1955, with the possibility of an additional 350,000 tons in that same period. The Indian railroads which were badly run down at the end of the war are being rehabilitated; and the program of modernization is being helped by a $33,000,000 loan from the International Bank. India's oil resources are at present very small, but there is some hope of future development. Meanwhile, one American oil company and one British group have completed contracts to build two large modern oil refineries in India, and a contract with another American company is under discussion.

Although the opportunity for future economic growth is great, once the present food deficits have been eliminated, the precise pattern of development is by no means clear. In theory, at least, most Indian leaders would prefer an economic system based on democratic Socialism. But in practice there are few who believe that Socialism could actually work in India except under the thumb of a dictatorial government, which would be no more welcome in India than in the United States. The preference of the average Indian leader for Socialism originates in the fact that the kind of capitalism which he considers as an alternative is not the incentive system which has been developed in the United States, but a European cartel monopoly concept based on high prices, wide profit margins and limited production. For this reason they believe themselves faced with a choice of evils, and this has resulted in a certain degree of confusion and contradiction in Indian industrial economic policy.

Fortunately, more and more Indian leaders are beginning to recognize that our American system of private enterprise is both far more efficient than Socialism and infinitely more socially conscious than the cartel capitalism which they have seen introduced from Europe. American businessmen who have visited in India in the last few months have seen tangible evidence of this new understanding. The three oil companies, which are now building refineries in India, for instance, were given 25-year guarantees against nationalization, and offered other inducements which

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would scarcely have been considered a year or two ago. Many observers believe that the Indian Government could afford to go further in offering practical inducements to new investors, domestic and foreign alike. Recently there has been considerable interest in the concepts introduced in Puerto Rico, where tax moratoriums on new investment and other inducements have resulted in rapid industrial development.

One possibility recently under discussion is the closer integration of the Japanese and Indian economies. Japan has a steel industry producing 6,000,000 tons annually, but at present is now forced to purchase much of her iron ore in the United States, which of course makes costs extremely high. India would gladly sell Japan substantial amounts of iron ore and some pig iron; indeed, as much as 5,500,000 tons of iron ore could be exported to Japan annually. What is needed is a rail link from an important source of iron ore in Orissa to the seacoast, plus the development of port facilities to handle the loading.

One thing, at least, is certain about India's future economic development. Whatever the system which emerges during the next few years, it will not be an imported carbon copy from America, Russia or any other foreign country. Another prediction which seems safe is that if political stability continues, India will develop a mixed economy, which, while borrowing generously from our American experience, will involve considerably more planning and tighter controls over the flow of capital. Most Indian government leaders are convinced that this is necessary in an underdeveloped country struggling to put its feet on firm economic ground. But side by side with this conviction is a growing belief that increased incentives to foreign as well as Indian investors must be a basic part of the plans for future development.

IV

India's new economic strength, however, is not to be based solely on new steel mills, new railroads and new power. Because transportation and housing are so inadequate, much of the industrial development must be decentralized and kept close to the villages. The need for small-scale industrial developments and coöperatives in rural areas will become increasingly apparent during the next two or three years as the effort to strengthen agriculture begins to pay dividends in the form of increasing food production.

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Pilot studies in many parts of India have indicated that substantial increases in food production will be readily attainable within three or four years in those areas where more irrigation and commercial fertilizer can be provided, along with better seeds, better methods of planting and improved simple tools. Since most Indian villagers are not now getting enough to eat, some of this increased food production will be consumed by the cultivators and their families; but a major portion will be available to the cultivators in increased purchasing power, and in many areas this amount will be further increased through the new land reform programs which assure the cultivators a higher proportion of each crop. But this increase in food production will not be automatic. It can be assured only if the cultivators are given the incentives to produce the extra food made possible by modern techniques. If the incentives are lacking, the use of more modern techniques will merely reduce the number of hours spent by the cultivators in the fields.

This possibility has been clearly recognized. Studies are now under way in many villages, and as the community development program proceeds, knowledge of how to meet this challenge should rapidly increase. The answer lies largely in making more consumer goods available in the village bazaars at reasonable prices. There are tens of millions of Indians who have never owned a pair of shoes or a change of clothing. The market for new cooking equipment and simple comforts is almost unlimited.

Many students of the Indian economy believe that a sizable share of the increasing incomes of India's cultivators, and their energies during the off-seasons, can also be channelled into building roads, schools and hospitals. Those of us who are responsible for the Point Four program in India firmly believe that the labor and drive for this kind of local capital expansion must be provided by the villagers themselves. Every effort will also be made to build up local industry. Shoemakers and other village artisans and tradespeople will be urged to form coöperatives to handle their buying and selling. Small textile operations and cottage industries will be widely encouraged. To a large extent, the Indian Government is treading virgin soil, and answers to the problems that appear can be found only as the program proceeds. With this in view, plans for five of the 55 development areas which are opening this fall call for experimental work in local industries, coöperatives and the building of schools, hospitals and homes.

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The principal responsibility for building the new India is clearly that of the Indian leaders and the Indian people, and this fact they fully accept. Indeed, it can be said that no people on earth have ever done more within limited resources than the Indian people have done since the birth of their new nation. The human material is here; the physical resources are here. The will to move ahead and to accept the challenge of Communism is also here. However, without a moderate amount of American aid each year for the next four years the objectives of the Five Year Plan are likely to prove unattainable.

We can be certain, I believe, that American resources spent in India will be used, not to perpetuate feudal institutions, but to build a modern democratic nation. This is vitally important, for if democracy is to survive in Asia, our efforts must start not at the top with the fortunate few but in the villages with the hungry millions. We must work in such a way that Asian people will come to look on democracy not just as a desirable but abstract goal, but as the most practical way to get things done.

American aid in Asia or anywhere else will be so much more money down the drain unless the local conditions are such that the program of aid has a reasonable chance for success. It is sheer waste to aid a nation which fails to establish a fair and equitable tax system, or an underdeveloped agricultural country which lacks the courage to establish land reform which gives the cultivators the right to till their own land. American money which strengthened only the upper income groups of revolutionary Asia would be not only wasted but would have a positively dangerous effect, for it would destroy the faith of the people of Asia in our American democracy.

Moreover, aid money spent simply for anti-Communist objectives has a hollow ring in Asia, for it points logically to the conclusion that if the noisy Communist minorities did not exist the interest of the United States in the welfare of Asian people would disappear. Nor, again, should we give aid in the mistaken belief that lasting friendship can be bought with dollars. Our primary objective must not be to develop gratitude in Asia toward America, but to create confidence in democracy as a vital force, and confidence among the people that under democratic government they have the ability to meet and solve the huge problems which confront them.

For this reason the methods which are used to increase produc-

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tion in Asian countries are almost as important as the production itself. Many argue glibly that the elimination of hunger in Asia will automatically bring about the defeat of Communism. This gravely oversimplifies the problem. Most revolutions are led not by hungry peasants but by frustrated middle-class intellectuals who have never known hunger in their lives. Living standards in India must certainly be improved, and with all possible speed. Unless this primary objective is achieved, the present democratic government will sooner or later be swept aside and the stage set for another devastating Communist victory. But India must do more than feed her people better. If democracy is to survive and grow, tens of millions of Indians must also be inspired with a dynamic new faith in the future and a sense of personal participation in building that future. In Jawaharlal Nehru, fortunately, India has a leader extraordinarily well equipped to provide the vital spark.

University students present both an opportunity and a problem. At present, there are 250,000 students in 800 Indian universities and colleges. Most of them receive a strictly liberal arts education (a hand-me-down from British days), and leave their universities with little practical training for the great battle of life which is in progress all around them. Except for the small minority who have received technical training in engineering, agriculture and public health, they find good jobs almost impossible to obtain. Thousands of recent graduates earn no more than eight or ten dollars a month. This produces frustration and many new converts to the Communist faith.

The Indian Government, which is keenly aware of this separation of the young intellectuals from the people and their problems, is now making every effort to close the gap and to develop a broad sense of democratic participation. Volunteer groups are being organized for road building and other construction work during vacation periods. Within the next few years some 60,000 young men and women, mostly college graduates, will be recruited as village workers to carry on the rapidly expanding work of the community development areas. As the program develops, the need for public health experts, welfare workers, doctors, engineers and other specialists should be almost unlimited.

In spite of every effort, however, the social problems of India seem more likely to grow than diminish in the coming years. The gigantic shakeup of Indian life, Indian attitudes and Indian tra-

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ditions which is taking place is unloosening powerful forces. Most of them are good, but some are inherently explosive. The very success of the development program will in itself create new conflicts and new difficulties. They must be met with practical good sense, cool judgment and courage if India is to emerge a mature, stable democratic nation from the growing pains of her present strenuous effort.

V

What America does or fails to do in her relationship with India is clearly of the utmost importance to the outcome which I have been describing. It is also clear that whatever program we develop in the United States must receive the understanding and support of Republicans and Democrats alike. We cannot afford the luxury of a separate Asian policy for each major political party. We must develop a policy on which the great bulk of our people agree.

In adopting that policy and putting it to work we must understand that we cannot determine by our own efforts what will happen in Asia in general or in India in particular. In the new Asia the tides of hope, fear and conviction run deep and strong. We cannot control these tides. Asia will develop in her own way and the final dominant influences will be Asian, not American and Western. What we can do, however, is to understand the forces which are at work, and to seek patiently and sympathetically to strengthen those which are moving in democratic channels.

Soviet propagandists are now intensifying their campaign to establish Russia and China as the logical leaders of revolutionary progress in Asia, and it would be foolish indeed to minimize the effectiveness of their effort. In the *Listener,* a publication of the B.B.C., for May 24, 1951, Arnold Toynbee described the Soviet appeal to Asia in the following terms:

> Yesterday I [Russia] was an old-fashioned peasant much as you are today. Like you today, I yesterday lived depressed, ignorant, hopeless, and tame. I was lying then as you are still, under the heel of a privileged native minority which was itself the creature of the Western masters of the world. But look at me now! See how I have pulled myself up by my bootstraps. And what I did for myself and by myself yesterday, you can do yourselves tomorrow if only you will take my advice and follow my example.

For those many Asians who are sophisticated enough to challenge the sincerity of the Russian interest in Asia's welfare, the propaganda spotlight is centered on China—which, it is claimed,

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"is now moving rapidly forward toward the dawn of a new day after centuries of exploitation by Western oppressors." In most of the Asian countries the Soviet Government works closely with local Communist party groups which are already well organized, particularly among the depressed classes and in the universities and colleges. The Communist purpose is first to discredit and then to undermine and destroy any government which seeks to develop an independent policy.

When Soviet strategy demands it, the local Communist Party will embark on open rebellion, as it did in many parts of India in 1948. But the Communist leaders are also familiar with Lenin's advice: "A tough, disciplined Communist minority needs no more than 10 percent of the popular vote to bring about the downfall of any democratic government. If there are five parties, you should work side by side with four to destroy the fifth. When there are four, ally yourself with three and destroy the fourth. When there are three, combine with two to destroy the third. And when there are only two, victory is in your hands."

India is a special target for the Communist effort because of her strategic position, her rich natural resources and the size of her poverty-stricken population. The Communist Party in India is well organized and amply financed, largely through the sale of Soviet literature. In the recent all-India elections, by far the largest in the history of the democratic world, it polled 6 percent of the total vote and established itself as the strongest opposition party in terms of elected representatives. Today, with Lenin's advice in mind, these Communist representatives for the time being are assuming a benign and patriotic look and are generously offering to work with "other democratic forces in pursuit of the ideals of the common man." Side by side with this the Communist cultural offensive continues, as does the attack on American "warmongers" and "imperialists." Every instance of racial prejudice in America, every Western failure to solve the problems and conflicts of colonialism, is exploited to the full.

The importance of this new and intensified Soviet effort in Asia should not be underestimated. Communist propaganda is particularly effective because in their hearts most Asians, non-Communists as well as Communists, still mistrust the West; and like many others before them, Asian nations are more conscious of the familiar dangers of the past than the yet-to-be experienced dangers of the future. There is, in consequence, a continuing

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bitter fear of the rapidly dying nineteenth century imperialism and a tendency to underestimate and to rationalize the danger of Soviet twentieth century imperialism—the real threat to their independence. But this is the situation with which we must deal, and we must approach it with imagination and realism.

The Soviet Union seems much more clearly aware than we have been so far that for Asia to become Communist would mean not only a drastic shift in physical power between the Soviet bloc and the Western democracies, but the broad deterioration of democratic morale in all parts of the world. Lenin made the blunt prophecy: "For World Communism, the road to Paris lies through Peking and Calcutta." His successors show the same belief that if they can overrun Asia they can build what Stalin has called "the road to victory in the West."

There is no reason why the challenge should not be met with confidence. If India's great democratic effort succeeds, if similar efforts suited to the needs of each country are pressed vigorously by the leaders of Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Ceylon, Burma and the Philippines, and if these efforts are supported by patient, understanding policies on the part of the West, the next few years may see the emergence of a non-Communist Asia that will be both dynamic and democratic. That can swing the preponderance of world power in the direction of peace and freedom.

The road for American policy-makers working toward this goal will often be a rocky one. Many Americans who are deeply conscious of the crisis which confronts the free world are irritated by Asia's talk of "neutralism" and by the rebuffs which occasionally come our way from uncertain new governments which are still hopeful that Communism may turn out to be not as dangerous as we know it to be. But impatient criticism will only lead to equally impatient retorts. The situation calls, as I said at the beginning of this article, for a display of some of the best qualities in the American tradition: understanding and respect for the rights of others; humility in the face of strange ways and new problems; courage to remember that, in spite of the cynics, a little idealism mixed with the practical represents not weakness but strength; willingness to persevere in the face of difficulties. With these qualities, and with intelligence and imagination, we can, I feel sure, contribute to building an Asia that will have confidence in democracy and that will practise democracy.

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NATO'S GROWING PAINS

By Charles M. Spofford

ANYONE who sets out to comment on the problems of NATO might well keep before him Dryden's lines to Lord Chancellor Hyde:

> How strangely active are the arts of peace,
> Whose restless motions less than war's do cease!
> Peace is not freed from labour, but from noise;
> And war more force, but not more pains, employs.

The North Atlantic Treaty has been in effect for upward of three years. During this period NATO, the organization created under the Treaty, has been in restless motion toward its goal. And today because of NATO, and the pain and labor it has both suffered and caused, we are considerably nearer that goal—the safeguarding of the security of the North Atlantic area.

Rapid and effective organization on the military plane coupled with great leadership have stiffened military strength on the continent of Europe and substantially improved the position over that of three years, two years or one year ago. This strength, which now can be seen and felt, has brought a return of confidence that the defense of Western Europe is practicable—an intangible which is fundamental to the whole effort. The political unity of the alliance, which now extends from the North Cape to the Black Sea, has nullified, so far as its members are concerned, the Soviet tactic of dividing and absorbing which accomplished the destruction of Czechoslovakia. And, of importance beyond the present emergency, the North Atlantic Powers have found a means of bringing Germany into the circle of Western democracies; and by supporting and encouraging the European Defense Community, which is closely associated with NATO, they have made a major and, it is to be hoped, lasting contribution to the union of Western Europe.

But while many problems have been solved, many remain. A great deal of the labor and the pains of the Treaty organization went to prepare the decisions of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February of this year. The Lisbon decisions were widely accepted as most important concrete steps forward—as indeed they were. But the decisions also carry important implications apart from the question of how far they have been or will be car-

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ried out, and on the analysis which is made of these and on the answers worked out will depend in considerable part the direction of NATO's future development. Since NATO can grow only by its ability to serve those it represents, stocktaking should always be in order. The purpose of these few pages is to consider one—but not by any means the only one—of the major areas in which NATO policy should be clarified over the next few months.

II

Someone has said that NATO has Federal responsibilities and is attempting to meet them through a Continental Congress—a not-inaccurate way of describing both elements of its problem. The Treaty organization has developed in response to the pressures of the tasks seen to lie ahead. It has been and is a flexible instrument, capable of adapting itself to problems as they arise. A fundamental fact apt to be overlooked is that except for the command functions vested in the military, no individual or agency of NATO up to the Council itself has any delegated power or authority. NATO is therefore not an administrative organ except in a very limited sense. It is rather a mechanism for formulating combined international plans; for obtaining agreement among the Treaty partners in support of these plans; and so far to only a limited extent for stimulating national action to carry out the agreed plans.

The key to NATO's progress and the measure of its problems lie therefore in the tasks it has set for itself. These have developed more in response to the pressure of events than according to plan or blueprint. The aggression in Korea injected both realism and urgency into its operations and provided the impetus for decisions which have very largely set the pattern of its development ever since. Thus it was undoubtedly the outbreak of hostilities in Korea which led to the Council's basically important decision at Brussels, in December 1950, to set up, in being and in place, integrated NATO ground, air and naval forces. This decision required in turn the creation of the NATO commands over the forces of the Treaty partners and the constitution of the international NATO command structure. The decision had important political implications as well, since it made some solution of the problem of German rearmament inescapable and touched off the negotiations on the series of thorny issues wrapped up in the delicate but pivotal task of bringing Western Germany back

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into close and peaceful relations with the North Atlantic Powers.

The Brussels decision to set up the integrated ground, air and naval forces had equally important, if less direct, repercussions in the economic field, since the Treaty partners thereby obligated themselves, whether explicitly or not, to supply them with equipment and facilities; and in the commanders and their staffs there were very articulate claimants whose duty it was to make known to the Treaty organization the expanding list of their requirements. As the projected costs of raising, training and equipping these forces were totaled up, the dimensions of the gap between the planned requirements and the resources available to meet them became apparent (mid-1951). This problem was tackled by a temporary committee of the Council (the T.C.C.) of which the "Wise Men" were the nucleus. The resulting study went to the Lisbon meeting of the Council, and upon the basis of it the Council fixed the levels of forces to become available during 1952, deferring for later consideration the programs for other years and the assumptions on which they would be based.

Under the spur of emergency, the military agencies of the Treaty met and solved their distinctively military problems with relatively little difficulty. And, indeed, in spite of the fact that the process of bringing various points of view into agreement was necessarily slow, the Council cleared its first great political hurdles successfully. In both the political and military spheres the problems were attacked as they arose.

It is fair to say, however, that the economic problems were more generally avoided than attacked. It is therefore in this field that NATO's record is least impressive. To be sure, there was agreement on formulas for sharing the administrative costs of military and subordinate headquarters and the construction of common air fields and telecommunications (known as infrastructure), but these facilities did not involve heavy amounts in comparison with the over-all commitments, and agreement was reached after long negotiations ending in the Council itself. In more important respects where NATO plans pointed up the need for funds, the organization sheered away from making the necessary decisions. During 1951, the Defense Production Board made an effort to work out plans for combining European production facilities, in order to narrow the equipment gap. The plans depended upon funds being provided from national sources, which would have involved the raising or resetting of priorities within

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national defense budgets. The Board's recommendations were not acted upon. In early 1951 proposals were made that a Finance and Economic Board should undertake studies and make recommendations in the broad field of economic mobilization. However, there was reluctance to give these functions to the Board and as a result it limited its efforts to an analysis of the impact of rising defense costs. In the fall of 1950, when scarcity of raw materials became a problem for virtually all of the Treaty partners and a severe one for some, a NATO agency to coördinate the policies of Treaty members in this field was established. With the setting up of the International Materials Conference, however, the effort to deal with raw materials in NATO was abandoned.

These early and abortive ventures of NATO into the economic field are unimportant except as a matter of history, since in the process of reconciling NATO requirements and resources the "Wise Men" raised in their Committee virtually the whole range of economic problems of the Treaty members. The agreement reached at Lisbon merely fixed the forces which each partner was to raise and train in 1952. But to lay the basis for this agreement and at the same time assure, as the Committee undertook to do, that the economic and social foundation in each country should remain sound and healthy, the Committee reviewed the national accounts for each and made recommendations to governments on a series of necessary economic measures to support the defense buildup and avoid undermining the various national economies. The Council's action at Lisbon on the T.C.C. report was therefore of significance in three respects: it set the size of the forces each member was to contribute in 1952; it recognized the link between the requirements for troops and the measures necessary to safeguard the economic base in each case; but it left these measures entirely to national action.

The execution of the Lisbon agreements, as the time approaches when the divisions and groups are to be trained and equipped and ready, has involved each of the major Treaty partners in domestic political problems which have served to focus attention on the difference between promise and performance. It is easy to see why domestic political controversy should arise, since defense expenditures of the kind and size called for by the Lisbon agreements can very easily become involved in the crossfire of three sets of powerful political conflicts which operate in

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each country: the perennial contest between guns and butter; the difficult question of finding a balance between internal effort and external aid; and, in the case of certain members, the problem of allocation of resources between NATO and non-NATO commitments. Since NATO commitments have become almost the dominant factor in national budgeting and economic planning, they are likely targets for political attack.

The aftermath of the Lisbon Conference is also important in another respect. If measures to ease the economic strain caused by the defense buildup are within the realm of national action only, then NATO has created pressures which it can do nothing to relieve. In the long run this will accentuate the political difficulties, since public opinion is less likely to accept the burdens imposed by NATO defense plans if there is no collective effort among the Treaty partners themselves to cushion the impact of the burden and deal with the related economic and social problems.

NATO may therefore have reached a critical stage in its development. In its advance toward its military objectives it has uncovered most of the hard economic questions but has avoided dealing with them. Since the solutions adopted for economic questions will determine the base on which military development will rest, the method by which these problems are handled will also determine NATO's future. Thus far the Treaty organization has moved largely in response to events, but it is now at a point where we must decide whether or not NATO is to serve as the central agency for handling the common economic problems of the Treaty partners which underlie the defense effort.

III

What are the practical possibilities that NATO can make an effective contribution in the economic field? Can governments be assisted in finding solutions to their present insistent problems within the NATO framework? Would it be to the advantage of the United Kingdom to attempt to solve through NATO its problems of terms of trade and dollar balance? Could France get help through NATO in solving its budgetary problem and rebuilding confidence in its currency? Can the United States work through NATO to find devices to supplant its heavy commitments for overseas aid and to deal with the longer range problem of raw materials which it eventually will have to face? Can

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NATO be used to help Italy remedy her problem of overpopulation?

On the record to date one would hesitate to venture an affirmative answer to these questions. As we have seen, the Treaty partners have so far been reluctant to deal with economic problems in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. The tendency has been to regard matters in this field either as suitable for national action only, or as coming within the province of other international agencies. This has led to unilateral and bilateral action in many cases, rather than multilateral action in NATO. But with the strengthening of the international organization by the appointment of Lord Ismay as Secretary General, these tendencies to look for solutions outside the treaty framework should diminish; and the placing of the North Atlantic Council and its Secretariat in Paris, at the side of the Organization for European Economic Coöperation (O.E.E.C.), should make for much closer association with the latter organization. This might make possible the substantial merger of the two agencies—a step which may well be indicated if NATO is to be called upon to deal extensively with problems in the economic field.

Since the United States economy, by any standard of measurement, represents well over two-thirds of NATO's total resources, closer economic collaboration under the North Atlantic Treaty will depend on the willingness of the United States to adapt its economic policies and its methods of administering them to that end. Through the programs of military and economic aid to its treaty partners, the United States has made a massive contribution in direct grants of dollars and equipment. A real move toward collective action in NATO in the economic field will probably involve further contributions, but of a different nature. The United States can, for example, take two important steps in this direction which call for no new transfer of resources. First, so long as it continues its foreign aid it can administer it more directly as an element of NATO plans and put less emphasis on bilateral arrangements. This is possible within the present framework of Mutual Security legislation and should be facilitated by steps recently taken to centralize in Paris, and in the office of Ambassador Draper, both the administration of the aid programs and United States representation in NATO. Thus dollar aid might be used to prime the production pump in Europe, not solely through bilateral grants and off-shore procurement by the

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United States, but by multilateral arrangements bringing in European resources.

The United States should also do everything possible to define the extent and duration of its aid programs. The prevailing lack of certainty makes difficult any firm long-term plans in which United States aid is an element. Conversely, so long as there is a possibility of aid dollars, European officials will naturally be reluctant to spend their defense funds or contribute to multilateral financing arrangements. The factor of certainty is very important.

Several possible areas in which closer economic collaboration may be feasible are suggested by the report of the T.C.C. to the Council at Lisbon which was based on the over-all study of the "politico-economic" capabilities of each Treaty partner to support its contribution. The Committee recommended to NATO governments that they should take all practical measures in promoting the following objectives: 1, to encourage general economic expansion; 2, to increase production of scarce raw materials and to control their use as may be necessary to conserve supplies and insure that defense requirements are met; 3, to prevent inflation by adoption of necessary sound fiscal, financial and monetary policies; 4, to facilitate labor mobility among NATO countries, and to alleviate manpower shortages in defense industries; 5, to adopt measures to improve the equitable distribution of the internal burden of defense in the NATO countries; 6, to maintain essential imports through a satisfactory solution of balance of payments problems, in particular by increasing the dollar earnings of European countries.

Of these six recommendations, the first, third and fifth would seem to call mainly for national action. The other three, however, are appropriate for international action and suggest areas for inquiry, consultation and possibly intergovernmental agreement through NATO.

The satisfactory solution of the balance of payments problem through increased dollar earnings leads directly into the field of trade restrictions and tariffs. This will indoubtedly become one of the major issues to be worked out between the United States and its European NATO partners as the necessity for substituting trade for aid becomes greater on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States has dealt with its tariff problems through its network of reciprocal trade agreements and, latterly, under the

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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Within this general framework, however, NATO seems a logical forum for these important negotiations. The problem of dollar balances is, in a sense, a NATO preoccupation, since it has been accentuated by the impact of defense expenditures. Restrictions on East-West trade, which have curtailed efforts to ease the payments pressure by dealings east of the Iron Curtain, have also been a direct concern of NATO. The treaty machinery with its close, informal method of consultation—particularly if augmented by the experience and know-how of the O.E.E.C.—might be most helpfully used. The range of negotiation might be broadened, for example, by tying agreements on tariffs in with the annual NATO review of economic capabilities. In this manner economic *quids* could be balanced, not only against economic but also military *quos,* an interesting possibility.

The T.C.C. recommendations also stress the need for the increased production of scarce raw materials, and their control in the interest of meeting defense requirements. Here again the problem has been accentuated by the defense buildup, and by the competition for available supplies which in 1950 and 1951 caused trouble to most of the Treaty members. The problem in NATO would be one of harmonizing the policy of the NATO partners; it would not exclude the possibility of resorting to pooling, joint purchasing or like arrangements in support of combined production planning, if and when NATO production planning should become a reality.

The problem of labor mobility was also given careful attention by the T.C.C. Surplus manpower is an acute problem with several Treaty partners, particularly Italy, and manpower shortages exist in others. Several bilateral arrangements among the NATO powers have been made. Since in this case manpower problems have been accentuated by the defense buildup, and since they represent critical domestic problems for several of the Treaty members, common NATO action in this field might also be indicated.

In venturing these suggestions I realize that I am proposing to put on NATO's agenda a series of the most sensitive political and economic problems facing the NATO Powers today. But this may and should be an advantage, for the record shows that the Treaty organization has gained strength when it had the courage to deal with knotty problems, and lost strength when it evaded

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them. The ability of the Treaty partners to collaborate and reach solutions in the area of these vitally important issues is the real test of the Treaty machinery. Fortunately, it is flexible and adaptable, handicapped neither by rigid voting procedures nor the veto. Both within the permanent Council and the ministerial groups there has been a high degree of mutual confidence and a capacity to adapt national points of view in dealing with varied, complex and demanding problems.

IV

The most important questions raised by the above suggestions, however, are not the willingness of governments to commit economic issues to NATO and NATO's competence to deal with them. The whole range of relationships of the Treaty partners to non-NATO nations and to other international groups is also involved. They are aspects of one question: how, at this juncture, can the growing necessities of international dealing be most effectively organized?

The answer may turn on the emphasis we give to what might be called the extensive as against the intensive method of seeking international coöperation. Is it better to establish a common pattern of dealing among many, or to concentrate on solving serious issues with a few? The answer may also turn on the emphasis we give to the functional as against the geographical approach to international organization. Is it preferable to create a group on a world-wide basis dealing with specialized problems in a particular field, or to deal in a limited area with all interrelated matters—economic, political and military?

Obviously no clear-cut solution is possible. But in studying this problem, especially as it affects NATO, it is perhaps relevant to note how much the growing interdependence of the nations of the free world has broadened the area of international collaboration. In the realm of defense, NATO's experience shows that political, economic and military problems are inextricably caught up in one another—that defense is indivisible. Since it is an axiom that a common denominator in the way of common frontiers, extensive trade relations and common cultural background make for closer collaboration, the varied but interrelated problems thrown up by the pressures of today can be better handled where the common denominator is greatest, that is, regionally as in NATO. The difficulty, of course, is that regional organiza-

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tions comparable to NATO in strength cannot at present be visualized in other areas; but this should not deter us from strengthening the vital North Atlantic area as quickly and effectively as possible. It goes without saying that emphasis on regional organization does not exclude looser arrangements over wider areas. And equally should it be clear that friendly relations with each nation do not mean that the United States can or should follow the same pattern with respect to each area or enter into the same type of relationship with every one.

Emphasis on regional arrangements should not prejudice or be harmful to the United Nations. The primary function of the United Nations is to provide a world organization in which security can be maintained, if not immediately through world-wide collective action, then through mediation between various groups and the provision of a forum in which these groups may compete for the support of others and of world opinion. If effective regional organizations develop within the framework of the U. N., the world organizations will eventually be strengthened. Long before there was any thought of NATO it was a respectable theory that the United Nations should be supported by regional organizations which would "screen out" local issues and thus serve as a sort of corps headquarters in support of the universal or general headquarters which the United Nations provides.

The real question, perhaps, is whether there is any alternative to progress in the direction suggested. If the assumptions upon which NATO policy has been based are correct—that collective strength is required to correct the existing disparities in power between the free nations and the Soviet bloc; that effective collective strength means strength in being; that strength in being cannot be had without the heaviest demands upon national resources; and that measures to meet these demands and to cushion their economic impact are not within the individual control of any one of the NATO partners but require collective action —then, unless NATO is prepared to venture further into the economic field and to control the economic pressures it has in part created, it may not outlast the emergency. On the other hand—to put the question in more constructive terms—if, through effective collective action NATO can help ease the strains upon the members of the coalition during the next few critical years, a basis will have been laid for future close association, which could turn out to be the most lasting and most important

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result of the whole tremendous effort toward Western defense.

This idea is, of course, as old as the Treaty itself. In fact, Article II obligates the parties to do just what the logic of developments under the Treaty now seems to require them to do, that is, to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and . . . to encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." The thesis I have sought to express was well stated by Lester B. Pearson, present Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, in *Foreign Affairs* for April 1949, just at the time of the signing of the Treaty. Mr. Pearson wrote:

> In the past, alliances and leagues have nearly always been formed to meet emergencies and have dissolved as the emergencies vanished. It must not be so this time. Our Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must build up habits and desires for coöperation which go beyond the immediate emergency. By ministering to the welfare of the peoples of its member states, it must create those conditions and desires for united effort which make formal pacts unnecessary. Threats to peace may bring our union into being. Its contribution to welfare and progress will determine how long it is to survive.

It is in the tradition of the democratic states centered about the North Atlantic to develop the fiber of their institutions through growth and seasoning—in other words, through adjustment to change. Labor and pains are the price of stability as well as of peace. The complexities of the present problems should not make us despair of the possibility of achieving an Atlantic community of closely-linked but sovereign democratic states. If we believe that we are living not only through an era of crisis and possible destruction, but through one of the potentially constructive periods of history, then the question of the future of NATO offers a magnificent challenge to the statesmanship of the North Atlantic Community. In meeting that challenge we shall test our greatest secret weapon—the strength and flexibility of our common political institutions.

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TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BEGINNINGS IN AGRICULTURE

By S. L. Mansholt

Ce pays, l'Europe
—Jean Monnet

IT must be hard indeed for non-Europeans to understand why such a vital development as the integration of Europe does not advance more rapidly, and why the conception of "national sovereignty" exercises such power over European minds when few people in Western Europe still believe that any state can solve its problems on a national basis. Deep-seated national habits, scars of old wars, differences of religion, race, social and cultural traditions cannot be swiftly surmounted. The present writer (whose views, of course, do not necessarily represent in every detail those of his Government) certainly does not believe that the psychological and social differences between the northwestern nations of Europe and the Latin group, for example, make unity impossible; yet it is a mistake not to be aware that barriers of many kinds still exist between European states.

However, Europe is growing more and more aware that there is no alternative to voluntary unification, unless it be subjection to Soviet rule. The Second World War revealed structural changes in politics and economics—clear to some farsighted men in 1919—which made the national state logically a thing of the past in Europe. Without the aid of the United States, the Western European countries could never have escaped economic ruin after the Second World War. But the O. E. E. C., through which dollar aid was extended, provided only a method of consultation among European nations; the divergencies among these national economic systems remained wide. It is, therefore, not surprising that the two supra-national plans for integration which have reached an advanced stage—the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community—have been realized outside O. E. E. C. After the failure of the so-called Stikker Plan, which called for integration in all economic fields inside O. E. E. C., it seemed advisable to go forward on a more moderate scale, seeking economic and political integration more or less simultaneously, but restricting the effort to certain sectors.

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It is the great merit of French statesmen like M. Schuman and M. Pleven that they understand how closely economic viability and political stability are related. The formation of the European Community for Coal and Steel, and of the European Defense Community, have laid the foundation for a unification of Europe through institutions to which the participating states transfer a part of their national sovereignty. The development of these two "communities" is especially heartening since they offer hope—the only hope, I believe—of reconciling the old antagonism between France and Germany; and when national armies have been integrated, and a European Army has come into existence, German militarism will no longer be a threat to Europe.

The Governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have agreed that in certain matters which directly affect their economies national sovereignty can be overruled by an international authority. But the process of European unification will not come to a halt with coal and steel, or with defense; indeed, it may well be that the treaty establishing the Defense Community will not be ratified by the national parliaments unless Europeans are convinced that it is part of a forward movement which will really consolidate Europe.

Much thought has already been given to plans for harmonizing interests in the field of agriculture; but before discussing this logical next step, it would be well, I think, to note briefly here certain new aspects of the problem of political organization. The French Government has just made the interesting proposal that the Assembly of the Community for Coal and Steel be instructed to study the possibility of creating a European political assembly. There may be objections to this on the grounds that the six Schuman-Plan countries would seem thus to substitute themselves for the Council of Europe, but they will be in a better position to canvass the possibilities of political integration than is the Strasbourg Assembly, whose members include many countries not participating in the Schuman Plan and the Defense Community. I believe that it is of primary importance that a nucleus be formed of European states which see no objection to surrendering part of their national sovereignty to organs of a supranational character. That does not in the least mean that the supra-national European community should become exclusive; any state should be free to enter the community and to adhere to it. But at present it is difficult to imagine that Sweden, Greece or

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Turkey, for example, would wish to adhere to the Schuman Plan, or to a politically federalized group of states. No political federation has ever existed in which the participants remained completely free to run their national economies.

The interesting picture with which we seem to be presented, in other words, is a development of integration in Europe along two lines: a direct line of unification by a group of six countries, and a line of coöperation—that is to say, coöperation between the integrated group and those states which retain full sovereignty. Some of the countries belonging to the second group—the United Kingdom in particular—desire to establish a relation of association between themselves and the integrated community. The position of Britain with regard to continental Europe has often been the cause of great anxiety on the Continent, but has often been misunderstood. During the war Britain was a symbol of the European ideal of freedom and democracy in the eyes of the people of occupied Europe—almost the only democracy in Europe not under enemy control, the nearest neighbor, whose voice was heard in every home and hiding place. London, the seat of the governments-in-exile, was the cornerstone of Europe. It seemed inconceivable then that Britain would detach herself in any way from European affairs after the war; but it should be added in fairness that very few continental Europeans fully understand the importance of the Commonwealth relationship to the British. On the Continent, people incline to think in terms of written constitutions, and those who do not know what the Commonwealth means in terms of economic and cultural coöperation, and as a working community among several English-speaking countries, do not easily find the key to this British secret.

Recent developments, however, have somewhat alleviated the anxiety about Britain's loss of interest in the Continent. In September 1951, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, the United Kingdom and the United States stated at their meeting in Washington not only that they considered that Europe belongs to the Atlantic community, but also that the closest possible association should be established between a continental European community and Britain. This declaration was followed by statements in the same vein by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in Paris and Washington, and the British Government has subsequently made it clear that Britain will relate herself to the European Au-

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thority for Coal and Steel. Of perhaps even greater importance is the guarantee which the British Government has offered to the European Defense Community; and it is noteworthy that Britain supported the Preparatory Conference on the organization of European agricultural markets held in Paris last March. The change in attitude of the British Government is of great importance to Europe, and is especially welcome to the northwestern countries which feel themselves akin to Britain. The Continent is prepared to accept the fact that Britain, by virtue of her Commonwealth relations, cannot participate in any transfer of sovereignty to European supra-national bodies. And if the United Kingdom Government now really desires to aid the process of European unification, and shows its acceptance of European responsibilities by associating itself with the European community, much has been gained. Governments, press and public in Europe are watching closely the development of Britain's policy.

II

As I have said above, a next step along the road to European unity is the beginning of integration of agriculture. Support for this, as for other moves, has come from the United States. Shortly before the Paris Conference on agricultural integration began its discussions in March of this year, Paul R. Porter, the Director of the European office of M. S. A., issued a statement warmly commending its objectives. This was followed by General Eisenhower's first Annual Report to NATO, in which he called the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community historic advances in European coöperation and added that plans of the same nature for agriculture, electric power and a system for standardizing money "would serve as practical laboratories for the development of that full political and economic unity which alone can make Europe self-sustaining and secure." The United States Congress urged more efficient use of European resources, through "a centralized European procurement program," in the Mutual Security Program for 1953. Many Europeans, however, wondered whether the United States intended to take back with one hand what it held out with the other, through legislation restricting imports of farm products from Europe. If European political and economic integration is to be carried further, protectionist tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic will have to be overcome—a result that can be achieved only if the protected

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interests see that they will ultimately gain from European unity.

The need of integration in this field is incontestable. During 1949 and early 1950, a situation like that of the thirties began to develop in Europe, with agricultural surpluses in some countries and scarcity in others. Rising tariffs kept imports at a low level, thus protecting producers, but also keeping prices high for consumers. The rise in population in Europe, and the necessity of raising—or at the very least maintaining—the standard of living, makes an increase in food production imperative, particularly since the problem of the dollar balance remains unsolved. Because of uncertainty about markets and prices, however, European farmers refused to produce more food. They will raise larger crops only if they can be sure of outlets for them, and they cannot count on that unless the vicious circle of national tariffs is broken. Integration of European agriculture is the plain answer. The creation of a large area without trade barriers would provide for greater stability in markets and prices, would tend to redirect production to the areas most suited for various products and to bring higher production at lower cost. In this respect, integration in agriculture is based on the same principles as industrial integration.

Agriculture, however, has many special aspects. Nature causes inescapable variations in the size of crops from one year to another, yet the demand for agricultural products is comparatively constant. Unless special measures are taken, fluctuations in price can therefore be considerable, even in an enlarged market. Furthermore, every government wants to be certain of at least a minimum quantity of food production within the national frontiers, regardless of cost. And since most farming in Western Europe is mixed farming, governments give support to many thousands of small farmers for social and political reasons; this group has special demographic importance.

Thus the application of the principles of economic liberalism, suitable for the industrial sectors of the economy, cannot be applied to farming. Under a system of free competition, a uniform price might establish itself in all countries, but only part of the farms now in operation would return a profit. In countries with a low cost of production, on the other hand, large extra profits would be made. We must not expect that a uniform European price can be set for farm products during the first stages of agricultural integration. It would be feasible, however, to determine

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at what price, or between what price-limits, the products of the various countries could be exchanged. Such a system of "European exchange-prices" for agricultural products should be based on considerations relating to farming conditions and also to the economic situation as a whole.

In fixing the European exchange price, imports from countries outside Europe should be coördinated, but integration must not make the European agricultural community a protectionist area in which national tariffs are merely replaced by international tariffs, with the consumer shouldering the cost of all the economic dislocations. The European exchange price itself must be fixed at a level to make this impossible. An integrated European agricultural community will continue to import most of the basic agrarian products exported by the North American countries. The rise in the standard of living which can be expected will create a demand for more food and foodstuffs and so both reward higher production and better utilize basic European agrarian products. Generally speaking, it will be necessary to maintain a price level which will yield farmers a profit, and this means that subsidies and levies will be unavoidable in intra-European trade, at least for the transition period. The expenditure and income involved should, in the opinion of the present writer, be charged to, and used by, a European Agricultural Fund; help for technical development for areas with high costs could come from this Fund.

III

Opposition to integration by some of the farmers' organizations in protectionist countries stems mainly from the relatively high cost of agricultural production in those countries, and the fact that they are importers of food. The need for imports makes it possible to maintain the prices received by the farmers through a system of custom duties, and they are naturally unwilling to relinquish these privileges. Protectionist countries fear the "surpluses" of the exporting countries, whereas the latter countries call these "surpluses" their exports. Within an integrated agricultural economy, surpluses would exist only to the extent that protection would create them. In Europe as a whole the annual consumption of agricultural products is, with very few exceptions, considerably higher than annual production. If the integrated community included only the Schuman-Plan countries—as it might because of the movement toward political integration in

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this group—it would be an importing area for most agricultural products; and this characteristic would be further accentuated if the United Kingdom associated itself with the continental agricultural community. Seasonal or regional surpluses are at present dealt with on a state basis, and as experience in the United States and Canada has shown, problems of this nature can be better managed by an integrated community. (The problems of the United States and Canada are even more difficult, for these countries are also exporters and their surpluses are not merely seasonal or regional.) Fear of competition from the low-cost producing countries is not a valid objection to the scheme. Problems of differences between costs of production and the general price level, and the question of subsidies, would be dealt with in the transition period, during which national agricultural policies were gradually being harmonized.

Generally speaking, all food and foodstuffs—whether in the stage of production or in final form—would be considered "agricultural" and included in the program of integration, since the ultimate aim of the whole effort is to provide more, better and cheaper consumer goods. To remind ourselves of this is to perceive more clearly the relation between integration in agriculture and in industry and finance. Since some countries are mainly agricultural and others mainly industrial, their interests in agricultural integration are not equal. It may very well be that some industrial countries will have to ask for compensations, and these cannot be given unless integration is undertaken simultaneously in other fields. Agricultural integration would exert an important influence on the cost of living, and therefore on the wage level of industrial workers, for approximately 40 percent of living costs in Europe goes for food. It is essential, therefore, that developments in all these fields keep pace with one another.

Two specific proposals for integration of European agriculture have been made—by the Government of the Netherlands in November 1950 and by the French Government in May 1951. The general objectives of the two plans are the same—to raise the standard of living and lower prices to consumers, to eliminate the impediments to trade, and to expand and specialize production. Both seek these ends through the establishment of organs of a supranational character. However, the French proposals (the so-called Pflimlin Plan) limit integration to four commodities: wheat, wine, sugar and dairy products; the Netherlands

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proposals aim at the integration of all agricultural production. Further, the French proposals make the reduction of trade barriers subject to the equalization of the conditions of production in the various countries, whereas the Netherlands' plan suggests that the gradual reduction of trade barriers go hand in hand with measures to equalize costs of production, since reduction of tariffs will promote specialization and raise productivity.

In March 1952 the French Government called a Preparatory Conference on the Organization of European Agricultural Markets, in which 15 European states participated. Most of these countries were represented by their Ministers of Agriculture, who could not, of course, take far-reaching decisions. Moreover, only a minority of the 15 countries represented at the Paris Conference could be expected to subscribe to the supra-national principle; and even among the Schuman-Plan countries, the governments which protect their farmers must reckon with opposition from the farmers' organizations. Decisions on agricultural integration which directly concern national economic interests and special consumers interests will have to be taken on Cabinet level. It was significant that only the United Kingdom, France, Turkey and the Netherlands appointed either their Minister of Foreign Affairs or of Economic Affairs as delegates, or sent a Cabinet colleague with their Minister of Agriculture.

The Conference accepted the desirability of integration of agriculture in principle, and established an Interim Working Party to prepare for another Conference of Ministers this autumn; the Working Party will submit useful data and reports; but the political decisions are the hard ones, and only governments can take them.

In spite of many setbacks, much progress has been made in the integration of Europe since the end of the war. National pride and old prejudices are bound to flare up from time to time—as, for example, when hitherto sovereign nations must decide where the seat of a supra-national community is to be located. Perhaps we in Europe may console ourselves by remembering the degree of dissension which such a question caused among the American States, when the United States of America was established. Indeed, the American States were never able to agree on a selection of one of the older cities as a national capital; but a Federal capital was founded, nonetheless, and has endured. The road ahead for Europe is long and difficult. But it is the only way out.

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THE SOVIET STATE FAILS TO WITHER

By Calvin B. Hoover

ONE could hardly imagine a less sensational headline than the title of this article. It is as though during a long, severe winter a newspaper had come out with the headline "Cold Weather Fails to Melt Snow." In Russia is a state whose ruler has greater and more unlimited power than has the premier, president or monarch of any other modern country. The state controls a greater range of human activity than any before in history. It has none of the traditional safeguards for control of the government by the people. No parliamentary opposition to the régime has ever existed. There is no protection for the individual in the courts against the arbitrary power of the state. There is an immense police force to insure internal control. The government has one of the greatest and most powerful armies of all time at its disposal. Surely it must be pure insanity to contemplate the possibility of the withering away of the Soviet state!

In the face of the complete contradiction between doctrine and reality, however, the orthodox Marxist dogma of the disappearance of the state under Communism has never been abandoned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, after a lull during the war and the immediate postwar period, the doctrine is once more the occasion of discussion and official statements of policy. One of the most comprehensive of these statements appeared as a leading editorial article in *Izvestia* of October 12, 1951, with the headline "The Socialist State—Mighty Instrument For Building Communism."[1] Other articles dealing with related subjects continue to appear in the Soviet press.

One must ask why these articles appear at all, and why they appear at this time? Why is there interest in a subject which seems to have so little to do with actuality? Indeed, why do the rulers of the Soviet state allow this subject to be mentioned, since it would seem to be so embarrassing to them? The answer must

[1] This obviously authoritative article is by a relatively unknown writer, G. Glaeserman. It is not unusual in Soviet Russia, however, for important statements of this type to appear over the names of obscure journalists, or even to appear unsigned. This article, as well as a number of others dealing with related subjects, have been excellently translated in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies. The article in question appeared in the issue of November 24, 1951.

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be found, in the first instance, in the impossibility of divorcing a system of political power completely from its ideological foundations, however fully the government controls the instruments of coercion and propaganda.

As Gaetano Mosca has pointed out in his book, "The Ruling Class," the task of governing a conquered population is made infinitely easier if the people of the country can be induced to accept the religion of the conqueror. Such a religion is bound to include divine sanction for the exercise of power by the ruling class. The modern totalitarian state, substituting its official ideology for a state religion, cannot afford to repudiate its basic doctrines as convenience might otherwise dictate. The prestige of the ruling class depends upon the maintenance both of the myth of the infallibility of the supreme ruler and of the immutability of the system's ideology. Given the powers of coercion and propaganda which the ruling class commands, arguments and rationalizations which could not maintain intellectual currency for a moment in a liberal society may prove quite adequate for this purpose. Furthermore, statements of rationalization may be intended as propaganda for particular objectives. The need to whip up support for the war economy among the Russian people no doubt explains the appearance of the Glaeserman article at this time.

That the Soviet state should have its ideological origins in Marx's and Engels' doctrine that any and all states are instruments of class domination and that when a truly Communist society had been attained the state would have wholly "withered away" is one of the most fantastic contradictions in the history of human institutions. In his Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress of March 10, 1939, Stalin cites "the classical formula of the theory of development of the Socialist state," given by Engels:

> When there shall be no social classes which it is necessary to hold in subjection—when there shall be neither the dominance of one class over another class nor a struggle for existence based on the contemporary anarchy of production, and when the clashes and the violence caused thereby shall have been done away with—then there will no longer be anyone to crush and to hold in restraint and then the need for the state authority which now performs that function will vanish. The first measure in which the state will come forward as the true representative of all society—the turning of the means of production into social property—will be its last independent action *qua* state. Little by little it will become unnecessary for state authority to intervene in social relationships and such intermeddling will automatically cease. The government of persons comes to an end; and the management of things and the

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direction of production processes take its place. The state is not "abolished" —it withers away.[2]

It is easy to understand why the doctrine that there can be a society which has none of the coercive powers of the state was essential to the Marxian concept of Communism. It seemed perfectly obvious to Marx that the existence of the capitalistic system depended upon the police power of the state, which protected the property rights of capitalists and guaranteed the functioning of a system of exchange which enabled the capitalist to extract his "surplus value" from the labor of the proletariat. Marxian Communists have been at one with the Anarchists in their designation of the capitalistic state as an instrument of exploitation which must be destroyed. It is not so generally understood, however, that their agreement with the Anarchists about the fundamentally undesirable nature of the state did not stop here. It is still orthodox Marxism, Leninism and even Stalinism that any form of the state is to be tolerated only temporarily, and that when Communism has been attained there is to be no state.

This doctrine of a society without a state has served Marxists as a device to avoid a fundamental answer to the question of who is to run the state after capitalism has been destroyed. Why should it be reasonable to expect that the rulers of a collectivist society would operate a state more in the interests of the whole population, and less in their own interests, than have the rulers of bourgeois states? Through their theory of the withering away of the state Marxists can deny that the question has reality, for they blandly assert that under Communism there is to be no state at all.

Of course, they say, a purely temporary caretaker's state has to be set up by the proletariat. For would not the capitalists, even if once overthrown, reëstablish the bourgeois state if there were no counter force to prevent this? Lenin claims that Marx and Engels foresaw precisely this difficulty. Consequently, he explains, in his "State and Revolution," "the particular power of suppression of the proletariat by the capitalist class . . . must be replaced by a particular power of suppression of the capitalist class by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat)."

[2] Most useful translations of statements by both present and quondam authoritative Soviet writers on the theory of the withering away of the state are to be found in "Soviet Legal Philosophy," by Hugh W. Babb and John N. Hazard. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.

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How long was this new state, embodying the dictatorship of the proletariat, to last? On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin maintained that "the particular power of suppression of the capitalist class by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat)" was to begin to wither away on the morrow of victory; "... the proletariat, according to Marx, needs only a withering away State—a State, that is, so constituted that it begins to wither away immediately and cannot but wither away. . . ." He goes on to say in another passage, "How can we otherwise pass on to the discharge of all the functions of Government by the majority of the population and by every individual of the population?" And still further along he says, ". . . the great majority of the functions of 'the old State' have become enormously simplified and reduced, in practice, to very simple operations such as registration, filing and checking. Hence they will be quite within the reach of every literate person, and it will be possible to perform them for the usual 'working man's wage.' "

By this device of the "temporariness" of the Soviet state, by the use of the amorphous phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat," and by a grotesque underestimate of the complexities and difficulties of administering a collectivist type of economy, Lenin evaded answering the problem crucial to all organized forms of human society—"How is the minority of men from a given society which is to rule the majority of the population to be selected, and how can this minority be prevented from developing into a tyranny?" Lenin simply took as axiomatic the right of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks under his leadership to wield unlimited power in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Neither Lenin nor Stalin felt the necessity of testing the validity of their mandate to wield this power by submitting to an election, the freedom of which could be guaranteed by any of the standard devices developed in democratic societies of the West.

II

The thoroughness and ruthlessness with which the Bolsheviks destroyed the organization of industry, the civil government and the armed forces of their Tsarist predecessors—by definition the instruments of the bourgeois exploiters—embarrassed Lenin, Trotsky and their colleagues and successors not at all in their task of erecting a new state power. The death penalty for infractions of discipline was reinstituted and used more freely in the

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Red Army than it had been in the Tsarist Army. It had to be, since the bulk of its soldiers had to be reclaimed from the dissolved masses of the old army. No one has ever expressed more succinctly the final basis upon which the discipline of armies rests than did Trotsky, in his reference in "My Life" to the task of creating discipline in the Red Army during this period: "So long as those malicious tailless apes . . . the animals that we call men—will build armies and wage wars, the command will always be obliged to place the soldiers between possible death at the front and the inevitable one in the rear."

The restoration of industrial discipline was not so simple. The application of the principle of "single responsibility and authority of the manager" was limited, so long as the managing personnel was still largely inherited from the old régime. As Soviet-trained personnel gradually took over industry, however, and the former managing personnel retired, or were otherwise liquidated, respect for authority was enforced with the same ruthlessness in this sphere of state power as in the armed forces.

In late 1929 the writer attended a conference on productivity held for worker representatives by the management of the First Cotton Textile Trust at Serpukov, a textile town not far from Moscow. At one stage of the conference workers were allowed to hand in written questions to the "praesidium" of the meeting, seated on a platform. The Director of the Trust was explaining why the last year's increase in production had not been greater. The principal cause, he said, was the activity of saboteurs. Then he unfolded one of the notes which had been handed in and declared dramatically: "We have such a saboteur in our midst at this moment!" He then read aloud the question which one of the workers had handed in. "Just before the October Revolution, when the Kerensky Government was in power, the Mensheviks urged us to work hard and produce as much as possible. The Bolsheviks, however, denounced the Mensheviks and urged us to go on strike and to do everything we could to hinder production. Now you Bolsheviks are saying just what the Mensheviks did, to work hard and produce much. What is the sense of this?" The Director then declared: "This shameless saboteur knows full well the answer to his question. The Mensheviks were urging the workers to produce for the capitalist exploiters. We Communists demand the utmost productivity from all workers now that industry is in the hands of the toiling masses." The anonymous

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"saboteur" naturally did not rise from his seat and ask, as he might logically have done, just how the toiling masses had decided that the man who denounced him was to be the Director of the First Cotton Textile Trust. The Director, in fact, as in all such cases, was no more elected by the workers of the plants in the Trust than would be the president of any corporation in the capitalistic United States. The disciplinary powers of Soviet management are, furthermore, far greater than are those of management in any unionized plant in the United States.

The coercive powers of the Soviet state are not and never were reserved for use against the former ruling class, as Marxian doctrine forecast. The Soviet state may determine the kind of work an individual has to do and the place where it must be done. Organs of the state determine wage rates, piece-work rates, and working conditions without benefit of collective bargaining by labor unions. Labor discipline is sternly enforced with the aid of the labor unions, themselves organs of the state. The state and not the workers in any plant appoints the plant management. All this is well known. In large part it is entirely logical, and perhaps indeed inevitable, in the organization and operation of a fully collectivist economy. It well illustrates the fallacy of the claim of Marxist theorists that the operation of the economy involves the administration "not of men but of things."

From the earliest times the Soviet state has never hesitated to employ extreme violence against any individuals or groups, regardless of class origin, whom it decided at the moment to designate as "enemies of the people." There are few more pathetic documents than the appeals issued by the Kronstadt sailors, in 1921, when they had set up their own Soviet. Trotsky had earlier referred to the Kronstadt sailors as "the pride and glory of the Revolution," but now he put them down with heavy slaughter, using the armed forces of the Soviet Government.

When the masses of the peasant population resisted collectivization in 1929–30 with desperate determination, their leaders, and even ordinary peasants, were treated with no greater tenderness than the *kulaki* themselves. They were often dispossessed and exiled en masse to the northern territories or to the steppes of Central Asia. Hundreds certainly, thousands probably, were shot on various charges of resistance to the state. Later, when the peasants in 1932 tried to sabotage collectivization by a kind of passive resistance, hundreds of thousands in the Ukraine and

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elsewhere were allowed to die of famine by an administrative decision of the Soviet Government. Almost every conceivable semantic device has been employed at various times to represent the current victims of the coercive powers of the state as class enemies. When peasants who resisted collectivization could not possibly be called *kulaki,* they were referred to as *podkulachestvo,* "group under *kulak* influence."

In the great purge which began in 1935 following the assassination of Kirov and continuing through 1938, proletarian or peasant origin or record of service during the Revolution or Civil War offered no protection to Soviet citizens against the executioner. Not only were scores of well known Bolshevik leaders like Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin liquidated. So also died Dibenko, a sailor who had played a great rôle in the revolutionary seizure of the Baltic fleet during the October Revolution and had been the leader in quelling the revolt of the sailors of Kronstadt against the Bolsheviks. So died Antonov-Ovseenko who had planned and led the attack against the Winter Palace which was the final act in the overthrow of the Kerensky Government. So perished countless "Old Bolsheviks," some of whom had fought at the barricades in the Revolution of 1905 and many more of whom had played heroic rôles in the Civil War. The record is clear and the evidence overwhelming. The "temporary" dictatorship of the proletariat has produced the most totalitarian state of modern times. As Stalin stated in the Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress, 1930:

> We are for the withering away of the state, while at the same time we stand for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat which represents the most potent and mighty of all the state authorities that have existed down to this time. The highest development of state authority to the end of making ready the conditions for the withering away of state authority: there you have the Marxist formula!

III

How has it been possible thus to put off, decade after decade, any application of the doctrine which was so fundamental to the thinking of Marx and Engels, which Lenin himself embraced and to which Stalin finds it necessary now and again to pay homage? How has it been possible to reconcile this failure of the state to wither at all both with current Communist doctrine and with actual events?

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The concept of the withering away of the state is only one phase of the theory of the mature Communist society. The doctrine of the withering away of the state consequently has had to be integrated with the whole theory of the way the present Soviet system relates to the future ideal Communist society. According to the official doctrine, the present Soviet system already represents a fully Socialistic economic and social system. Private ownership of the means of production has ceased to exist and the exploiting classes have "long ago" been liquidated. There exists only one class, divided, it is true, into those who work with their hands and the intelligentsia who work with their brains. If it were not for the continued existence of capitalistic countries with which war is a constant likelihood, so the theory goes, the full realization of the Communist society would await, at most, only a few more decades of increase in the production of consumption goods; then the present system of distribution according to productivity would become distribution according to need.

The need to rationalize the extraordinary contradiction between the doctrine of the withering away of the state and the actuality of the Soviet apparatus of government—"the most potent and mighty authority of all the state authorities that have existed down to this time"—thus gives official Soviet theorists no rest. Lenin, even though he continued to maintain that the state would begin immediately to wither away after the seizure of power in the name of the proletariat, confronted in August 1917 by the actual tasks of seizing and holding power, began in his "State and Revolution" the process of rationalizing the contradictions between the Soviet state as he visualized it after the triumph of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the ideal Communistic society. This he did by formulating the concept of two stages of Communism. According to Lenin, it was only in the second stage that the ideal Communist society would come into existence.

During the first stage, which Lenin called Socialism in contrast to the Communism of the second stage, the state was to continue to exist as the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat even though it would begin to wither away. Distribution would be according to productivity, instead of according to need, as it was to be under Communism. The population during this first stage would have to undergo the process of cultural reëducation essential to entrance into the ideal Communist society.

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Stalin still further developed the concept of stages. In his report to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, he described the stages which he considered finished.

> Since the time of the October Revolution our Socialist state has passed through two principal phases in its development: (a) the first phase is the period from the October Revolution down to the liquidation of the exploiter classes, and (b) the second phase is the period from the liquidation of the capitalist elements, urban and rural, down to the complete triumph of the Socialist system of economy and the adoption of the new Constitution.

He went on to speak of the then current stage:

> Accordingly, the functions of our Socialist state have changed as well. The function of military suppression within the country has subsided and died out, for the reason that exploitation has been annihilated and exploiters have ceased to exist and there is no one to suppress. In place of the function of suppression, the state has come to possess the function of safeguarding Socialist property from thieves and pillagers of the property of the people.
>
> The function of the military defense of the country against attacks from without has been preserved in its entirety. . . . The function of economic coördination and cultural education by state organs also has remained and received full development. . . .
>
> Development cannot, however, pause at this point . . . we are advancing further: to Communism. Will the state be preserved among us likewise during the period of Communism as well? Yes, it will be preserved unless capitalist encirclement shall have been liquidated and the danger of military attacks from without eliminated; of course the forms of our state will change once again with a change of the internal and external setting. No, it will not be preserved and will wither away if capitalist encirclement shall have been liquidated and replaced by Socialist encirclement.

This statement by Stalin of 13 years ago outlines the two major elements in the party line which are reiterated in the Glaeserman article in *Izvestia* and in all the recent pronouncements which deal with aspects of the withering away of the state or the attainment of the ideal Communist society. On the one hand, the failure of the state to disappear is explained on the ground that the essential preconditions to the establishment of a Communist society—first in the necessity for the liquidation of the domestic exploiting class, then the necessity for going through the stage of Socialism, and finally the necessity for the replacement of capitalist encirclement by Socialist encirclement—must all be gone through. On the other hand, a complicated system of semantics is relied upon to demonstrate that the Soviet system is steadily developing into the ideal Communist society. Glaeserman says:

> In the second phase of development of the Socialist state, after the liquida-

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tion of the capitalist elements of town and countryside, the function of military suppression within the country withered away. It was replaced, as Comrade Stalin points out, by a new function, the function of protecting Socialist property from thieves and embezzlers of the public wealth. . . . The function of the economic organizational and cultural educational work of the state agencies was fully developed and became the basic activity of the state inside the country. . . . The transition was made from restricted suffrage to unrestricted suffrage, from not quite equal suffrage to absolutely equal suffrage, from indirect to direct elections, from open to secret balloting, all of which marked a further development of the Socialist democracy. . . . This also meant a further strengthening of the Socialist state as a mighty instrument in the hands of the working people in their struggle for the victory of Communism.

Thus Soviet theorists endeavor to resolve the paradox of the steady growth in the power of the state at a time when it should be withering away by the representation, totally contrary to reality, of a diminution in the coercive character of the state, and an equally unreal representation of an increase in the control over the state by the people.

IV

One of the attributes of state power through the ages has been the perquisites which its wielders have claimed as compensation for their pains. Power itself is, of course, the most valued of all perquisites. The more absolute the rôle of coercion in the operation of the state apparatus the more welcome is the possession of authority. Yet it is rare when power is accepted by the ruling class as the sole coin of payment. During the first decade of Soviet rule, nevertheless, efforts were made to limit the financial compensations of members of the Communist Party. As late as 1930, for example, a Party member could not retain for himself more than 500 rubles per month. It is true that compensation in kind for state and Party officials, such as better living quarters, the right to a car and a chauffeur and the like rendered this limitation illusory even then. It has long ago been dispensed with; the ethics of austerity are no longer honored. The principle of higher pay for higher productivity, and for responsibility and position in the hierarchy, is accepted as fully as in capitalistic countries. It has been extended to members of the Party as well as to the whole of the "intelligentsia"—the term now used whenever the Soviet rulers feel the necessity of explaining and defending the privileges of their class.

While the Communist doctrine of "from each according to his

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ability to each according to need" has never been repudiated as a goal, what is known, quaintly enough, by the contemptuous phrase of "bourgeois leveling" is often savagely attacked. It is assiduously argued that those who produce more, and who occupy more responsible posts, have greater needs; thus it does not conflict with Marxian doctrine that they should have greater rewards. As Stepanyan quotes Stalin: "Marxism proceeds from the fact that people's tastes and needs are not and cannot be identical and equal either in the period of Socialism or Communism. There you have the Marxist understanding of equality. Marxism has not recognized and does not recognize any other kind of equality. It is time to learn that Marxism is the enemy of wage leveling." In other words, it is very possible that if the Soviet rulers some day announce that the Soviet Union has become a fully Communist society, the present great inequalities in compensation will continue.

It is interesting to note that in the *Izvestia* article Glaeserman also elaborates Stalin's declaration that the state must be retained even under Communism if the threat of capitalist encirclement still exists. He says:

> The Soviet Union is no longer isolated today; both to East and West its neighbors are countries that have been freed from the yoke of imperialism. However, it does not follow that the political concept of capitalist encirclement has lost its meaning. Comrade Stalin teaches that "capitalist encirclement cannot be viewed as a mere geographical concept." *The frontiers of the capitalist world have been pushed further away from the Soviet Union, but this world still exists and consequently the threat of a military attack on the U.S.S.R. still exists.* (Italics supplied by the writer.)

Stalin had put it even more flatly when he said that the Soviet state would not wither away until "capitalist encirclement shall have been eliminated and replaced by Socialist encirclement." Glaeserman also dutifully weaves in the needed counterpoint by reciting the educational and cultural achievements of the Soviet state, which are supposedly laying the foundations for the ideal Communist society. But he returns to the main theme at the end: "The works of the great theoretician of Marxian-Leninism, Comrade Stalin, light the road to Communism, arm the people ideologically and teach us to look constantly to further strengthening of the Socialist state—mighty weapon in the struggle for Communism."

All the current writers follow Stalin in developing the position

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staked out by Lenin that all the functions of planning and administering the whole economy may be carried on by a bureaucracy, however large, without there being any state at all. It is further claimed that neither the administration of the criminal law by the present Soviet state nor its administration in a fully Communist society, by which men are punished for crimes of violence, theft and the like, really represents the functioning of the state.

Even Pashukanis, one of the principal authors of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, who believed that law as well as the state itself would have withered away when a Communist society had been attained, admitted that "certain crimes against personality and so forth will not disappear." He maintained that such crimes should be regarded "*per se* as a task of medical pedagogy." In 1937 Pashukanis was denounced as an "enemy of the people" and disappeared. One wonders whether the type of "crime" for which he presumably forfeited his life would be prevalent in an ideal Communist society and whether its treatment would in such a case be considered a "task of medical pedagogy" rather than as a task for the secret police.

The argument is hardly compatible with the doctrine that crime is the product of capitalism but it does illustrate the incredible convenience of Marxian terminology in solving political, economic and social problems. By definition the state is an instrument of class oppression. By definition class oppression has disappeared. Hence the state disappears as well, even though the functions carried on by the bourgeois state and other enormously important added functions are still to be carried on. The contradictions between the present Soviet system and the ideal Marxian Communist society are in essence the same as those between the present Soviet system and anything which non-Marxian Socialist philosophers of the nineteenth century would have considered a Socialist society. There is nothing in Marxian doctrine, any more than there is in any other socialistic philosophy, which would justify the personal dictatorship of Stalin, accompanied as it is by truly oriental adulation. There is nothing which would foreshadow the current Red Army, with its measures to maintain discipline far more severe than those of any army of a modern capitalist country, with privileges and authority of the officer class over common soldiers proportionately great, paralleled by a corresponding system of privileges for the whole ruling class, civil as well as military. There is nothing which could justify or

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explain the employment of extremes of violence by the Soviet state against masses of the population who could by no stretch of the imagination be considered members of the former exploiting classes.

V

Documentation of the fundamental and all-pervasive conflict between the current practices of the Soviet state, and either bourgeois or Socialist concepts of human liberty, would be a task of unimaginable magnitude. The documentation of the charges of the United States Delegation before the United Nations in New York, on June 29, 1952, with regard to forced labor in the Soviet Union, for example, weighed 44 pounds. Such a mass of detailed evidence with respect to the coercive character of the Soviet state is fortunately unnecessary, because in any real sense the facts are not in dispute.

It is individual incidents, microscopic but highly characteristic in the immense routine of running a collectivist society of some 200,000,000 souls, which can convey some feeling of the heaviness of the hand of the Soviet state in managing its affairs. When the writer was living in Moscow, there appeared in March 1930 an item in the Moscow press to the effect that the workers in a plant in Sverdlovsk had got out of hand: "hooliganism" reached such heights that workers tossed chunks of ore into the machinery just for the fun of smashing it. A Party control commission was sent into the plant and an investigation was made. As a result several of the workers were sentenced to various terms of "deprivation of freedom." The ring-leader was sentenced to "the highest measure of social protection, shooting."

In 1945 when the American and Soviet forces came into contact in a certain sector in Germany, a conference was arranged between the general commanding the Soviet forces and his American opposite number, a friend of the writer. The meeting was to take place near a crossroads. As the American general waited, a Russian soldier in a jeep approached the crossroads from another direction. The Russian military policewoman directing traffic signalled that one of the roads was closed. The driver of the jeep failed to stop. The policewoman called out. The Russian soldier still kept on his way. The policewoman raised her tommy gun, riddled the soldier with bullets and directed other Russian soldiers standing by to toss the body into the ditch.

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The power of the Soviet state, reflected in a government not of law but of men, has, of course, continued to grow. There have been periods of some relaxation in the repressive power of the state over men. After the wholesale deportation of the *kulaki* in the very early thirties, accompanied by some of the early public spectacle trials, there was a relaxation of perhaps a year until the assassination of Kirov in late 1934. Then the terror was resumed and was continued into 1938 with a ferocity not shown since the days of the Cheka during the Civil War. When Russia entered the Second World War, the coercive powers of the state were still further extended.

First-hand experience by foreigners of life in the Soviet Union is now almost out of the question. Penalties for communicating information of whatever sort to foreigners have never before been so severe. Yet it is plain that the general character of the control of the Soviet state over the population has not changed. Some controversy over relatively innocuous subjects is indeed permitted in the current Soviet press. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* sometimes carry reviews of movies in which the dramatic critic of one paper praises the play while the other criticizes it, even when, as in a recent case, the play involves such a touchy subject as Ukrainian nationalism. These seem to reflect some slight and at least momentary relation in the monolithic control of thought by the Soviet state. They are minor details, however, which do not alter the totalitarian character of the state in any fundamental way.

It is profoundly significant that the one considerable period of relaxation of the terror and of the powers of the state in general was during the time of the New Economic Policy. It is wholly logical that this time of temporary retreat toward capitalism, from 1921 to 1928, should have been such a period, for the minimization of state power is fundamental to capitalism. By contrast the immense mass of evidence in the Soviet experience supports the conclusion that any fully collectivist society which is the product of revolution is certain to expand the power of the state over men almost without limit. Once this power has been established, it is unlikely to contract unless by another revolution.

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GREENLAND AND THE WORLD AROUND

By John J. Teal, Jr.

ACROSS the northeastern approaches to North America lies a barrier of ice, mountains and habitable land more than 1,600 miles long—as long as the eastern seaboard of the United States and as large as all the states east of the Mississippi. When traditional concepts of oceanic security were destroyed by the growth of air power, this area, which is Greenland, assumed a relationship to the United States analogous to that once held by the Atlantic Ocean, just as Alaska assumed a new rôle in the Pacific. Each is vital to hemispheric defense and serves as an important outpost.

Unlike Alaska, Greenland is the possession of a foreign nation, Denmark. The disposition of Greenland has always been of keen interest to the United States; the region was included within the limits of the Monroe Doctrine even before its full extent was known. In a very real sense, social and economic development in Greenland are linked with its climate—another way of saying that both depend upon the vagaries of a wandering body of water, the Irminger Current.

In the nineteenth century, anyone who was curious about this area would examine the blank upper portions of a spherical map of the earth, projected on a rectangular piece of flat paper, and make one of two choices to explain what was not revealed on the map: either a polar sea was hidden by the word "unexplored," or the space was occupied by a vast polar land of which the dangling Greenland was a peninsula. Ancient maps which showed Greenland divided by two east-to-west straits were dismissed as apocryphal, or the product of wishful thinking. In any case, except to the visionary, the choice was one of merely academic interest. Prolonged attempts to establish a short trade route from Europe to the Orient by sailing northward had been frustrated by ice, and Fridtjof Nansen, by crossing Greenland's icecap, had proved that no Elysian Fields existed in its center. Instead, interhemispheric commerce moved east and west in lengthy journeys around the sphere; so also had gone the major movements of mankind in their preparatory consolidation of the temperate zone where technology could develop and energy amass for the push against the big frontier, the north.

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Toward the end of the nineteenth century Robert E. Peary established the fact that Greenland was an island, thus dispersing for all time the myths of an Arctic continent. Greenland entered the atlases as a huge subcontinent of North America, the world's largest island, stretching from Cape Farewell at 59° 46′N to Cape Morris Jesup at 83° 40′N, the most central and northern piece of dry land in the world. But in recent months that concept of Greenland has been opposed by evidence that Greenland is not, after all, a single island, and that the Eskimo legend of straits which divide it into an archipelago, though not yet proven, may be true. The recent expedition of the Frenchman, Paul Emil-Victor, by taking echo soundings from the top of the inland ice, found that in many cases the bottom of the icecap rested on rocks which were considerably below sea level. His findings tend to corroborate theoretical speculations which regard Greenland as a land of which the center has been depressed by the tremendous weight of the icecap, with a corresponding elevation of mountains around its perimeter—a tectonic phenomenon similar to the effect produced by a heavy object placed in the center of a flat pillow.

The outstanding feature of Greenland is the immense glacial dome, covering three-quarters of its total area and rising in places to a height of about 10,000 feet. This icecap, as it may properly be described, comes directly into the sea, where, at several points, it forms long glacial fronts, the largest of which, located in Melville Bay, has a 187 mile sea-front. This may be one of the places where Greenland is divided. In other places it spills over through the mountain valleys at the heads of fjords, where it produces the notorious icebergs of the North Atlantic. Occasionally, between the coastal mountains and the central dome, rocky peaks called nunataks—a word given by the Greenlandic Eskimos to science—jut through the surface of the ice. These nunataks may attain considerable elevation, the highest being Gunnbjornsfjell, not far from the east coast at latitude 68° 65′N; this undoubtedly is the Kvitserk, a sailing marker for the Vikings mentioned in the Icelandic sagas.

Across the top of this icy dome, one of the coldest points in the northern hemisphere, moves a great deal of the weather which descends upon Western Europe, and sliding down from its heights to the coast are local bodies of cold air which can create violent windstorms. A measure of the economic value of Green-

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land's icecap is the fact that were it to melt, the level of the world's oceans would, it has been estimated, be raised six meters: an eventuality which would be extremely unpopular in some areas although it might be appreciated in others.

However, there are more than 300,000 square kilometers of ice-free land in Greenland. The largest concentrations occur in the regions about Peary Land in the far north, between Scoresby Sound and Germania Land on the northeast coast, and in west Greenland, which alone contains 116,000 square kilometers of ice-free land. Although the Icelandic sagas point out that Erik



the Red named the country Greenland in the tenth century as a gesture to attract colonists, the name was never retracted as unsuitable. Indeed, the area about the west coast fjord districts presents a most inviting appearance. In the Scoresby Sound district on the east coast the distance from the coast to the inland ice is more than 150 kilometers, and the areas between the many fjords not only have striking beauty but offer pasturage for immense herds of musk-oxen. Peary Land, in spite of its high latitude, is largely ice free, with rolling hills and plains. Though they cannot be described as prairies, at least they offer vast stretches of wild flowers and grasses through which flutter several species of but-

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terflies. American Sunday school songs which carried the message of Greenland's icy mountains obscured the fact that Greenland possessed ice-free land more than seven times the size of Denmark.

Access to Greenland is governed by the general rule for the Arctic regions that the eastern coasts are more given to ice than are the western. The main outlet for the ice of the Arctic Ocean is through the gap between Greenland and Svalbard, where it is carried by the east Greenland Current southward along the coast in annual amounts estimated at 26 billion cubic yards. The ice in this current makes approach by ship to east Greenland a speculative venture, and very often from the Scoresby Sound district northward ships can penetrate it for only a few weeks during the month of August.

When the east Greenland Current reaches the south it is joined by the Irminger Current, a westerly branch of the Gulf Stream, and together they double Cape Farewell and proceed northward along the west coast of Greenland where they mix with the polar waters from Lancaster Sound. As a result of this warmer Irminger Current the coast of southwest Greenland is very often ice-free throughout the year, and approach is an easy matter.

However, the admixture of these bodies of water is a question of delicate balance. In recent years the effect of the warm Irminger Current has been dominant. It has proceeded further through Davis Strait than ever before, and has wrought a revolutionary change in the economy of Greenland. In the far northwest of Greenland, passage through the narrow channels separating it from Ellesmere Island (Smith Sound, Kane Basin, Kennedy Channel and Robeson Channel) is a precarious matter and has been achieved by only a few ships, the most notable of which was Peary's *Roosevelt* under the command of the famous ice-skipper, Captain Bob Bartlett.

The climate of west Greenland, the main settlement area, is subject to large variations, but is generally mild and equable and is affected not only by the cold air of the inland ice but also by warm winds which blow in from the North Atlantic, known as Föhn winds. Thus, even in the middle of winter the thermometer may suddenly rise to well above freezing. The average yearly temperature in Ivigtut is in the neighborhood of 33.4° F., while that in the capital town, Godthaab, is 28.6° F.; north in Uper-

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navik it is about 16.5° F. However, in Upernavik the temperature has been known to reach 69.4° F.

In west Greenland one may expect a sudden snowfall at any time of the year, but fogs are seldom seen. Conditions on east Greenland, as might be expected, are not nearly so favorable to pastoral settlement, and in the main village, Angmagssalik, the average temperature for the year is in the neighborhood of 29.1° F. The highest recorded temperature is 77.5° F., which occurred during the Föhn wind.

Although Greenland stretches across 23 degrees of latitude, there seems little connection between variations in latitude and the occurrence of vegetation. In southwest Greenland the hills and valleys of the fjord districts are cloaked with grasses, wild flowers and berry bushes, but the only trees are rather low-growing willows and birches. Though the inland ice is the dominant feature of Greenland, men who have been stationed there think of the country as a habitable land.

But while the European settlers may judge Greenland by its fertility, the Greenland Eskimos center their attention upon the coastal waters: a good year is one in which there is a great deal of sea ice, and consequently many seals; a bad year one in which the ice is scarce. The action of the unpredictable Irminger Current has more and more favored the European viewpoint, and has so swept the sea ice from the coasts as to make sealing impossible. By way of compensation it has brought with its warm waters numerous fish, in particular the cod, and has forced a complete upheaval of Greenland's economic and social life. Thus, where the native hunters once looked seaward to the saddle-backed seal they now think either in terms of a fishing industry, or, turning their eyes landward to their long-ignored valleys, think of sheep-raising.

II

In west Greenland this represents a return to the original patterns of settlement. Sometime shortly before 870 A. D., an Icelander named Gunnbjorn, sailing along the northwest coast of Iceland, sighted the mountains of Greenland. There is no record that his discovery lured men eastward until 982, when the Viking Erik the Red was exiled for three years from Iceland for some hair-splitting done with a broadaxe. He decided to investigate the land reported by Gunnbjorn, and was so impressed with the fer-

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tility of the Julianehaab district that in 985 he returned with 14 ships carrying about 400 colonists with their sheep and cattle.

The colonists, after surviving an early epidemic, settled down to a prosperous pastoral life, building stone houses, large barns (one has been found with stalls for 104 cows), and living in a manner similar to that of Iceland and west Norway. Since the Sagas make very few references to difficulties with the ice, it is possible that Greenland at that time enjoyed a climate like that of the present day. Within a few years the farmers organized themselves into an independent republic with two main settlement areas: one near Julianehaab called East Settlement, another near Godthaab called West Settlement. Shortly after the year 1000 A. D., Christianity was introduced from Norway over the objections of the proud heathen, Erik, who considered it an effeminate religion.

Progress in the Greenland republic was rapid for the time. By 1050 A. D. the country had appeared in European literature, as had descriptions of North America. In 1056 the first resident clergyman arrived, and soon there were 16 churches, two monasteries and one nunnery. Trade with Iceland and Norway was active, and the population grew to about 10,000. The majority were farmers, but hunters made journeys north of Upernavik, or traveled for other reasons to Helluland, Markland and Vinland.

In 1261 the Greenland republic lost its independence to Norway. Actually, the citizens thought that they were joining a tripartite kingdom made up of Norway, Iceland and Greenland under the titular head of the Kingdom of Norway; but they soon discovered that they were to be reduced to the status of a colony, and that their trade was to be handed over to a monopoly of Hanseatic merchants located in Bergen. From that time, the New World's first republic began a period of decline. The Bergen merchants tended to ignore the Greenland trade for the more lucrative commerce of Europe, though their monopoly was at best tenuous because interlopers from England—especially Bristol—and Iceland carried on trading voyages over the protests of the Norwegian kings.

That trade continued for several centuries is known by isolated historical references and by the presence of Greenlandic falcons in Europe, the most prized bird of sportsmen, and of polar bears, the most prized gift to kings. Recent excavations have also shown that the costumes worn by the people were patterned after the

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styles of western Europe into the late fifteenth century. But by the sixteenth century the colonists had disappeared entirely.

Their fate is a great mystery. Writers in the eighteenth century attributed it to an "injurious alteration of the climate, known to have been occasioned by the straits between Old Greenland and Iceland having been many years choked up with ice," thus not only cutting off trade but also the possibilities for a successful pastoral economy. The most interesting feature of the evidence presented by these early writers is the possibility that the favorable climate of the first centuries of settlement might have been altered by a shift in the Irminger Current. This would have made it possible for the seal-hunting Eskimos, who had theretofore inhabited the coastal regions further north and on the east coast, to have descended upon the two western settlements where now the saddle-backed seals could be found in abundance.

When seamen once again began to visit the coasts of west Greenland they found the Eskimos in sole possession, and this gave rise to theories still prevalent that the descendants of the 10,000 Viking colonists had been killed off by the far fewer Eskimos. The likelihood of this is extremely slim, since, as everyone who knows Eskimos is aware, they are unwarlike, whereas the Vikings were not only militant but possessed greatly superior weapons.

In the first years of the eighteenth century, a Norwegian clergyman, Hans Egede, living in Harstad, in northern Norway, became interested in the fate of the Greenland colonists, who had, he feared, reverted to pagan practices. He conceived it his mission to find the colonists and convert them to Lutheranism. After many years of representations to various merchants and government officials he was commissioned to carry out his project by the Danish king and arrived in west Greenland on July 3, 1721, carrying for his banner the words "Christianity and Trade." This is the date upon which the history of modern Greenland begins.

But the Viking colonists could not be found. The ruins of the old East Settlement were discovered in the Julianehaab district, but it was erroneously assumed that this was the West Settlement and that the East Settlement could be found on the coast facing Iceland, toward which several unsuccessful expeditions were projected. Hans Egede was a stern man and, although discouraged, decided to remain in Greenland and convert the heathen Eskimo, some of whom, he noted, had complexions similar

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to those of Europeans. This observation has led to the most promising of theories accounting for the disappearance of the Greenland colonies. It is assumed that the colonists, cut off by trade from Europe, were forced to depend more and more upon seal-hunting, and consequently mixed with the Eskimos until, finally, they were absorbed by Eskimo culture and language. But this theory, too, presents a number of difficulties, chief among which is the fact that the colonists, if they were anything like their modern representatives on the skerries and isolated fjords of northern Norway, could not have been as dependent on European trade as the theory demands, but instead were largely self-sufficient. One can scarcely credit such an absorption of a numerous, strong and self-sufficient people into a completely primitive culture without the benefit of some very powerful external influence. Migration to the westward and epidemics may be the keys to the mystery.

At any rate, as late as the 1750's Eskimos gave accounts to the missionaries of "cannibals"—people unlike themselves in appearance, who lived in remote valleys from which they descended each spring to the coast where they murdered the Eskimos. Since it was common for Eskimos to attribute cannibalism to strangers there seems to be a fair likelihood that those Scandinavian colonists who had not intermarried, migrated or disappeared for other reasons, still hung on in remote places until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

III

The Danes, who had the governing hand in a joint kingdom with Norway—which still claimed Greenland—established missions, erected trading posts, and began a small commerce in furs, seal-skins, train oil and walrus hide. Prices paid for Greenland goods were low, while prices for goods from Bergen or Copenhagen were high. As the nomadic hunters became more and more dependent upon European commodities, they were easily exploited by merchants and the crews of whaling ships. They also proved highly susceptible to European diseases. From the beginning there were Norwegians and Danes who settled permanently in Greenland, and many of them married Eskimo wives, with the result that today the Scandinavian blending has become so extensive that one no longer can speak of Eskimos there, but rather of Greenlanders.

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Greenland was a poor colony at a costly distance for sailing ships, and before long the Danes realized that they could not hope for riches from it. They established the policy that Greenland was to be governed for the exclusive benefit of Greenlanders, who were to be prepared for eventual independence. To protect the Greenlanders from exploitation and disease it was decreed that all trading would be in the hands of a government monopoly—the Royal Greenland Trading Company, established in 1774—and that the government would close the Greenland shores to all foreigners, Danes and Norwegians alike, who did not have express permission to go there. But though this principle of the closed shore protected the Greenlanders from exploitation and disease (but not tuberculosis), it took the colony out of the main-streams of progress.

In 1814 the victorious Powers of the Napoleonic War split up the kingdom of Norway-Denmark and placed Norway under the Swedish crown, and the Viking colonies were taken from the Norwegians and given to the Danes—a transfer of New World territory from one European nation to another which took place before the United States had formulated its Monroe Doctrine. However, Norwegians continued to take an active interest in Greenland as scientists, missionaries, traders and trappers. By the middle of the nineteenth century Greenland had once again become of interest to the world, this time because of the international competition to reach the North Pole. The passage up the northwest coast between Greenland and Ellesmere Island became known as the "American route" to the Pole. The work done by these American explorers is reflected in many place-names found on the map of northern Greenland. They encouraged the U.S. Secretary of State, William Seward, one of our leading apostles of Manifest Destiny, to pursue his vision of an American Republic stretching from the Isthmus to the Pole and including both Alaska and Greenland. Seward particularly stressed Greenland's strategic position in relation to the defense of North America. In 1865, he negotiated with the Danes for the purchase of their New World holdings, and on October 24, 1867, a treaty was made with Denmark for the purchase of the Virgin Islands. The United States Senate, however, failed to ratify it.

On July 14, 1919, the Danish Minister in Oslo, Krag, informed the Norwegian Government that Denmark intended to extend her sovereignty over the whole of Greenland. The Norwegian

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Foreign Minister, Ihlen, assuming that hunting and trapping activities in northwest Greenland would not be affected, replied verbally that Norway would present no objections, but when it became clear that the Danes were proposing to extend their system of a closed shore to the whole of Greenland, Norway protested strongly. On May 10, 1921, Denmark declared her sovereignty over all of Greenland. Two years later the Norwegian Storting requested the Danes to negotiate and the Danes consented, making plain that they did not consider that their right of sovereignty over northeast Greenland was in any way at stake. An amicable arrangement was reached in July 1924 whereby Norwegians and Danes would have equal rights from latitude 60° 27′N to 81°N, and each would have the privilege of establishing hunting stations and posts for scientific or humanitarian projects; Denmark also received the right to establish an Eskimo colony on Scoresby Sound.

Another disagreement nonetheless arose in 1931 when certain members of Norway's Svalbard and Arctic Ocean Council wrote notes to their government recommending the annexation by Norway of that part of east Greenland which lay between 71° 30′N and 75° 40′N, and the Council made the request public. A month later Hallvard Devold, leader of the Arctic Trading Company's hunting expedition in this district, annexed the land for Norway with a flag-raising at the station at Myggbukta, naming the region Erik the Red's Land. On July 10, the Norwegian Government approved his action and declared its sovereignty over that part of east Greenland. The Danes lost no time in placing the matter before The Hague, and, on April 5, 1933, The Hague Tribunal decided that the Norwegian occupation was unlawful and substantiated Denmark's claim to sovereignty. Such a transfer of sovereignty over territory in the New World would, moreover, have been a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Norwegians accepted the decision in good grace and renewed their former agreement with the Danes.

The Second World War brought Greenland into the forefront of world politics. When Denmark was invaded by the Nazis in April 1940, Greenland was cut off from the seat of its government. Fortunately, the Danes had sent double shipments of supplies the year before in anticipation of such a disaster, and the Danish Minister to Washington, Henrik de Kauffmann, set up the American-Danish Greenland Commission in the United

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States to buy supplies for Greenland and to find markets for her products. An independent administration was established on Greenland by combining the northern and southern administrative districts at Godthaab, to which the two governors moved along with the elected Greenland Assembly; power to establish this Greenland Administration was derived from the Greenland Constitution of 1925, which enabled the two governors to take any steps necessary for the benefit of Greenland in an emergency. The Trade Commission later gave way to what was known as the Greenland Delegation in New York, headed by one of the governors who came to the United States. The other governor, Eske Brun, remained at Godthaab, and Greenland for the first time in its modern history had a home government.

On April 9, 1941, Minister de Kauffmann signed an agreement with the United States which placed upon the United States Government the responsibility of defending Greenland for the duration of the war, and gave it the right to build whatever military bases and installations it thought necessary. At the same time the United States reasserted its recognition of Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland. Minister de Kauffmann was promptly repudiated by the Danish Government, which was under coercion from the Germans, but his treaty was to be ratified by the Danish Rigsdag in May 1945.

The United States immediately established Greenland task units, and chose Narsarssuak as the site for a great airbase, Bluie West I. A United States Consul was sent to Godthaab, and American military activity was intense. At about this time, well before Pearl Harbor, the Nazis established a radio relay station on Cape Hold with Hope for the purpose of communicating with their submarines in the North Atlantic. This station was captured by United States forces on September 12, 1941.

When the United States entered the war, Greenland became of critical importance as a relay station for the thousands of planes which were sent to Europe, as a naval base for the vessels guarding the North Atlantic shipping routes, and as a source of weather information. So valuable was this weather information for operations in Europe and for action on the convoy route to Murmansk that the Germans made determined efforts to establish weather stations on east Greenland, particularly on Sabine Island and North Little Koldeway. To counterattack the German threat, the United States asked the Greenlanders to provide patrols, and

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the Greenland Army was formed—a somewhat unbalanced force, since it consisted of four officers, three noncoms and one private. It operated along the coasts of east Greenland, using trappers' huts for stations, and in coöperation with the U.S. Coast Guard succeeded in destroying the German installations. One of the unusual events of these operations was the capture in 1944 of the German ship, *Externsteine,* while it was caught in the ice of the Greenland Current, by the U.S. icebreaker, *Eastwind.*

Although there was very little contact between the American forces and Greenlanders, the presence of Americans and the evidence of their power and resources had a remarkable impact upon the inhabitants; they had never even imagined the things they now saw before their eyes. They were not slow in realizing their country's strategic importance to the Great Powers. They saw, moreover, that the cryolite mine at Ivigtut, the only one in the world, was essential for the extraction of aluminum from bauxite for the American war industry. In return, the tempo and efficiency of their own life was improved—not only because they had an administration located in Greenland, but also by the establishment of ports for the rapid transshipment of goods by coastal vessels. Previously the outlying settlements had received supplies but once a year. These wartime experiences had a profound effect upon the Greenlanders and influenced their postwar demands.

In 1945 when the Greenland Assembly drew up a statement to the recently liberated Danes, proposing that Greenland have a permanent home administration, with a single governor exercising increased authority and a single Assembly, it asked that the transit ports be maintained and demanded the abolition of the system of dual laws for Danes and Greenlanders. The Danes at first resisted these demands, seeking to restore the policy of the closed shore, and of government from Copenhagen, but eventually, through bills passed by the Danish Rigsdag in May 1950, all of the principal requests of the Greenlanders were granted.

IV

With the new freedom, Greenlanders of course face new responsibilities, especially in economic matters. In many respects, the new régime is similar to that of an ordinary Danish county. With the closed shore and the trade monopoly abolished, Greenlanders have entered a competitive market. They have set up a trading organization which they hope will alleviate its fluctuations. A

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new judicial system has also been introduced, adapted to the special conditions of Greenland, modernizing procedures and putting the civil rights of Danes and Greenlanders on an equal basis.

As this era begins the Greenlanders are reassessing their economic and social position. The Danish Government underwrote the cost of its administration in Greenland by the profits of the Ivigtut cryolite mines, in which it owned a 50 percent interest, but the market for cryolite has dropped seriously since the war. The old native economy was based on hunting and trapping, but the Irminger Current has forced the Greenlanders to turn to other occupations. They are able fishermen and already have a sizable fleet and a number of canneries and salting plants. The Danish Government, through the work of research expeditions, is seeking out new fishing grounds and new species for exploitation. Other resources are also being developed. In the Julianehaab district the sheep-raisers have over 20,000 ewes; and in the winter of 1951 a native Greenlander was traveling through northern Norway to learn reindeer-herding from the Lapps, with a view to introducing it to Greenland. There are also coal deposits in west Greenland which could supply the needs of local industry, marble mines, and a lead deposit in King Oscar's Fjord in northeast Greenland which offers great promise if a way can be found to transport the ore economically through the ice of the east Greenland Current.

All this requires much readjustment. Greenland is still a very poor country. In the interests of efficiency the many outlying settlements are being encouraged to consolidate; and the former Greenland hunter, an individualistic nomad, is being asked to abandon his traditions to become a working member of a community. His adjustment is being assisted by increased health services and education. What would happen, now that Greenlanders and Danes have committed themselves to this new course, if the Irminger Current changed and the ice once again moved in upon Greenland's west coast, no one is prepared to say, though the question is in everyone's mind.

Not even this, however, would in any way lessen Greenland's strategical importance to the United States. It is certain to increase. On April 27, 1951, Denmark and the United States signed a pact providing for the joint defense of Greenland, as long as the North Atlantic Treaty remains in force. This new agreement, which fully recognizes Danish sovereignty, turns over the U.S.

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naval base at Gronnedal to the Danes, marks out certain defensive areas, outlines plans for topographical and meteorological research, and relieves American soldiers from the necessity of paying Greenland taxes and customs duties.

As part of this new program the United States has pushed its construction of a huge airbase at Thule, in northwest Greenland. The process seems to have been accompanied by immense extravagance. Apparently it was considered necessary to pay $300,000 in stand-by wages, and $3,000,000 in wages en route, in order to persuade workers to go to this area; and once there, unskilled workers received up to $300 a week, and skilled workers up to $1,200 a week. Evidently almost everyone concerned supposed that he was going to be plunged into unimaginable hardships. To the Greenlander, and all who know the Arctic, this result of traditional myths about "Greenland's icy mountains" is an absurdity without parallel.

When Thule is put into operation by the Air Force, however, the United States will possess a base near the strategic center of the northern hemisphere. England, Germany, and much of the territory of the Soviet Union are equidistant from it and within easy flying range. Its Arctic flying conditions are far better than those of the sub-Arctic, and it is protected from attack by land or sea. This base, when coupled with our installations at the southern end of Greenland, will constitute an interceptive barrier for North America nearly impregnable for piloted planes. Its effectiveness will increase when meshed with our Alaska defenses in the northwest. It will also give the United States several hours of warning of the approach of guided missiles. Thule will also be useful as the most important refueling base for peaceful commercial aviation in trans-Arctic flights, since it is located on the shortest route between Eurasia and North America. The first of these routes will be inaugurated this autumn by the Scandinavian Airlines System in flights from Norway through Thule to the west coast of the United States. Greenland, the earliest republic in the New World, is developing from an isolated Arctic colony to a country vital to the commerce and security of peaceful nations.

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TOWARD FEDERATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA

By Roy Welensky

THE goal of federation for Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, long sought by Europeans on the spot though opposed by many of the native leaders, took tangible form when the Conference on Closer Association of Central African Territories, held in London last May, reached agreement on a draft constitution. Though it had seemed at one time that the London Conference would break up in failure, it reported agreement at the end on "all important matters of principle." The draft constitution has been published as a White Paper for discussion in the United Kingdom and Central Africa, and another conference will be held in January to put it in final form.

The proposed constitution includes provisions for the setting up of a federal legislature and executive, the maintenance of the protectorate status of the two northern territories and of the self-governing status of Southern Rhodesia within the federation, the composition of the federal assembly (including two elected Africans from each of the three territories), and the division of powers between the federal and territorial governments. The draft also suggests financial arrangements for the federation, and covers such important matters as the method of appointment and the function of a statutory African affairs board, the establishment of a Federal Supreme Court, and the procedure for amending the federal constitution. The conference also reaffirmed and gave effect in the draft scheme to earlier assurances on the subject of African land rights. It was decided to appoint fiscal, judicial and public service commissions to fill in the details of certain parts of the draft constitution in the light of principles accepted at the conference. The White Paper sums up the draft proposal in the following general terms:

> The scheme endeavours to safeguard the essential interests of the three Territories and all their inhabitants and to strike a fair balance between the need to create a Federation possessing, both economically and politically, adequate scope and strength for its work and the requirement that the Territories themselves shall continue to exist as vigorous entities, independent of the Federation within the sphere of government assigned to them.

Reporting the achievements of the Conference, the London

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Times found the most striking feature of the draft proposal to be the strength of the safeguards for African interests: "The protectorate status of the two northern territories is fully maintained. Assurances on subjects such as African land rights are written into the draft scheme. The protection of a Supreme Court, from whom appeal lies to the Privy Council, is given to these provisions, thereby differing materially from that obtaining in South Africa, where there is only appeal to a Court deriving its existence from South African law."

Even so, though the African representatives from Southern Rhodesia participated in the work of the Conference, African delegates from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland abstained. No one can foresee the exact results of the draft proposals on the two main communities in Central Africa. Already they are being attacked by the extremists on both sides. The African extremist sees in it the death of his prospects of settling up a purely African state, and his European counterpart says that since it rules out apartheid, it is selling the country to the blacks. The leader of the Opposition Party in Southern Rhodesia has declared that "Gold Coast ideas are permeating the Central African Federation." The moderate element will, I hope, see in this draft constitution a sincere and deliberate effort by the leading statesmen and officials of the various governments concerned with Central Africa to produce a state that will demonstrate to the world at large that the human race can devise a form of government that can make a multi-racial society work with justice to all men. Europeans in Central Africa cannot ignore the march of African nationalism, but they still have an opportunity to guide it on sane lines.

II

The latest estimate of the population of the three territories is 188,000 Europeans, 16,000 Coloreds and Asiatics, and 6,205,000 Africans. Of the Europeans 140,000 live in Southern Rhodesia, 40,000 in Northern Rhodesia and 4,000 in Nyasaland. In Southern Rhodesia, 55 percent of the Europeans live in the six main towns of Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, Gwelo, Que Que and Gatooma, the remainder in the rural areas. In Northern Rhodesia the Europeans live mainly along the line of the railways, with concentrations of population in Lusaka, Livingstone, Broken Hill and the copperbelt area which includes the towns of Ndola, Lu-

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

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anshya, Kitwe, Chingola and Mufulira. The European and Asiatic population of Nyasaland lives mainly in the three urban areas of Blantyre, Limbe and Zomba.

The African population in Nyasaland exceeds that of Southern Rhodesia, though its area is only one-third of the size and is by far the most densely populated of the three territories. Northern Rhodesia, with double the area of Southern Rhodesia, has an African population of approximately the same size. A common feature of the three territories has been the rapid expansion of the European population, which has more than doubled since 1938.

Southern Rhodesia is a self-governing colony. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are protectorates, though Northern Rhodesia has achieved a far greater measure of self-government than Nyasaland, which is at present administered by a Governor assisted by an Executive Council. The physical resources of the three territories are to a great extent complementary. Both Rhodesias possess much mineral wealth, Southern Rhodesia producing asbestos, chrome, gold, coal, iron ore and limestone, while copper, lead, zinc, vanadium, cobalt and limestone are mined in Northern Rhodesia. Nyasaland's mineral resources are largely unexplored, but deposits of coal, asbestos and bauxite are known to exist. The coal and iron resources, together with the wide range of non-ferrous metals in the Rhodesias, constitute a broad base for the provision of the capital goods required for the development of the area and for a valuable export trade.

Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia are both excellently suited to temperate-zone agriculture and the production of pastoral and dairy products. Nyasaland is particularly suited to the production of cotton, tung oil, tea and cassava, and her inland fisheries find a ready market in Southern Rhodesia. All three territories produce large quantities of tobacco and have many common problems in agriculture and conservation of natural resources.

Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland all use the port of Beira as their main route for overseas trade. Ever since the war the capacities of this port, and of the railway line to Beira, have been inadequate to meet the demands of British Central Africa. Under the terms of a convention signed in June 1950, the Portuguese Government has agreed to develop the port of Beira in return for guarantees that it will continue to be fully used by the Central African territories. Southern Rhodesia and

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Northern Rhodesia also make use of South African ports, particularly Port Elizabeth, for certain types of import traffic, in order to leave Beira as free as possible for the export of base metals. An agreement has been concluded, and awaits the approval of the Governments concerned, which will enable a certain amount of traffic for Northern Rhodesia to be moved via the port of Lobito Bay by the Benguela (Angola) and Belgian Congo Railways. There is an international airport at Livingstone in Northern Rhodesia, and air transport services are completely coördinated in the three territories through the Central African Air Authority which, besides representing the interterritorial control over Central African Airways, exercises control over operation by independent firms. The Rhodesia Railways serve Southern Rhodesia, the adjoining territories of Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and extend 112 miles into the Union of South Africa. Nyasaland operates its own group of railways from Salima to the port of Beira.

Northern Rhodesia is the watershed of Africa; from it many streams flow south to the Zambesi River where the magnificent Victoria Falls have already been harnessed to supply the electricity for the town of Livingstone. The power for the Broken Hill zinc and lead mine is produced from the Mulungushi River, a tributary of the Zambesi; and a much more ambitious hydroelectric scheme which would provide power from the Kafue River for the whole of the Copperbelt is at present under active consideration. In short, these territories are a naturally unified and well endowed area, with splendid possibilities for fruitful development.

The problem of peaceful political development in a multi-racial society such as exists in Central Africa, where there are such tremendous gaps between the standards of living of the various communities with different cultures, traditions, religions, languages and not least of all, political leanings, is a baffling task. But if there is to be industrial development and political peace in Central Africa it must be tackled.

The European population of Northern Rhodesia, composed mainly of immigrants from South Africa, the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, feel that if this country is to develop its magnificent natural resources a much greater share in the government of the country must be handed over to the settlers who now have their roots in this country. They argue that government by

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the Colonial Office 6,000 miles away is a failure. To support this contention they indicate the stagnation that existed in this country until the large copper deposits began to be developed by private enterprise; until money was available as the result of this exploitation, funds provided by the United Kingdom were infinitesimal. They argue, too, that it has been the Europeans who for some 60 years have provided the initiative and capital which have advanced Northern Rhodesia from a slave traders' paradise to a country where, out of a total African population of approximately 1,800,000 people, 140,000 African children are already receiving primary education. Hospitals are being provided as rapidly as funds permit and workmen being trained in skilled trades. With the progressive economic development of the area, the African is constantly assuming a greater share in the life of Northern Rhodesia. Through a body known as the African Representative Council, Africans already elect two members to the legislature; in addition, an African who has the ordinary franchise qualifications applicable to a European can also be included in what is known as the Common Voters Roll. The settlers themselves say they want large-scale immigration of Europeans into the country because there are insufficient people, white and black, in Northern Rhodesia to provide the labor to develop her resources. There are, in fact, less than seven people to the square mile.

In the main, the African leaders oppose placing a greater degree of self-government in the hands of the European community. They argue that the present legislature with only four out of 23 members (of whom two are Africans) representing African interests does not provide fair representation for them. They hold that since they are a majority of the population they should have at least the same number of members in the legislature as the Europeans. They argue alternately that even if they are not fit for direct representation now, no more progress toward self-government should be permitted until they are able to shoulder their fair share of that responsibility. African leaders go on to say that the whole of the African population is opposed to any suggestion of closer union with either Southern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, though this is not substantiated in fact. The underlying fear of Africans is that any federation may lead to a native policy similar to that in existence in the Union of South Africa. In particular they object to certain laws of Southern Rhodesia, one of which compels Africans to carry night passes for being in a town after

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certain hours of darkness; and they say that their land rights would not be safe in other hands than those of Her Majesty's Government.

Of late they have even begun to have doubts whether Her Majesty's Government can be trusted. I think it is correct to say that this latter development is a result of Communist influences. Nonetheless, the general attitude of the African toward Her Majesty's Government's representatives in this country is still one of considerable regard.

III

It is not a disservice to the African to state the truth about the present political capacities of the vast majority: not for two or three generations will they be able to play a major part in their own government. The vast majority are illiterate. The women are exceptionally backward and hold on most tenaciously to old tribal customs. The witch doctor is still the most powerful person in any purely African community; polygamy is very widely practised. The general standard of living is indeed unbelievably low in comparison with American standards, but so is the effort and output of a people who have not accepted the dictum of Western civilization that men must work for a living. Their communal way of life assures the majority of Africans a subsistence form of living in the villages, and there has been little sign of any great liking for accumulating wealth through self-exertion. Many Africans are still "target" workers: they will come to a town to earn sufficient money to purchase a specific article—a bicycle, a sewing machine or a wife, and leave when that particular objective has been achieved.

It is true, on the other hand, that the European at one time did not look upon Northern Rhodesia as a permanent home. He came here to make money, and then to return to his native land. But there has been a decided change here in the last 30 years. Europeans have gone in extensively for farming, and have provided the skill and the capital for agricultural development. Much more is needed. Even today a considerable portion of the effort of European farming is directed to feeding the African: only once during the last ten years has the maize crop been sufficient for the country's needs. But it would be wrong to convey the impression that every European in this country is blessed with a liberal outlook toward the progress of the indigenous people. There are

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some, but not too many, who would keep the African as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water forever. It is true that there is discrimination in this country against the black man. It is also true, though the fact is seldom realized abroad, that there is a great deal of discrimination in his favor. Eighty-odd percent of the land in this vast area is set aside for him. He pays no income tax no matter how much money he earns; the maximum direct tax he can pay per annum is 17/6d; and if he is an employee he has to be fed, housed and hospitalized by his employer.

I endorse fully the principle that political and economic partnership is the only solution of our ills in Central Africa, and I accept Rhodes' dictum of equal rights for all civilized men. It should not be beyond the bounds of human endeavor or ingenuity to produce an agreed definition of what is meant by "civilized man." The qualifications on the franchise, which require that a voter be a British subject, shall have resided in the country for six months or more, and be in possession of property worth £240 or earning more than £200 a year, is in itself an attempt to help define these standards.

I am under no illusion as to our difficulties; events in South Africa have caused the African to become even more suspicious than ever. He has asked quite openly, "What is the good of safeguards, and what safeguards can be produced, that cannot be torn up by people who are determined to do so?" I believe that adequate safeguards are enshrined in the draft constitution for Central African federation. Just as sincerely do I believe that the best safeguard that can be provided for the African, indeed for all of us in Central Africa, is a bloc of British states with close ties to the United Kingdom, peopled in the main from the British Isles and European countries—particularly those countries which have demonstrated their love of democratic freedom.

Now that the Northern Rhodesia Government has a draft constitution which can be explained to Africans, I do not believe that all Africans will reject the draft scheme. But I do not think that if the Africans persist in rejecting it after we have explained its provisions to them, the Government concerned should turn it down for that reason alone.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1947–1948. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 581 p. $9.00.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1947–1948. SELECTED AND EDITED BY MARGARET CARLYLE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 878 p. $14.00.

These two companion volumes resume the series interrupted by the war (the war years are being covered in a special series, mentioned below). The present survey takes up the story after the conclusion of the peace treaties with the minor Powers and with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. Though primarily concerned with the congealing of the cold war, it also includes sections on the Far East, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the United Nations. The volume of documents is, as always, a valuable reference work.

THE WORLD IN MARCH 1939. EDITED BY ARNOLD TOYNBEE AND FRANK T. ASHTON-GWATKIN. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 546 p. $9.00.

This is the first of a number of volumes covering the period 1939–1946, the wartime gap in the "Survey of International Affairs." A number of authors have contributed to this useful introduction to the history of the war. The most valuable and original section is probably H. C. Hillmann's study of the comparative economic and industrial strength of the Great Powers.

BACK DOOR TO WAR. By CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL. Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 690 p. $6.50.

The character of this revisionist contribution to the background of the Second World War can be indicated briefly by saying that the author sees Germany as having "been baited into war with Britain and France;" and Japan, more familiarly, as having been "maneuvered into firing the first shot at Pearl Harbor." Some new documentation is provided by the author's use of confidential diplomatic correspondence in the files of the State Department, but while Mr. Tansill, as he says, is free of any "compulsion to write a 'whitewash' of the Roosevelt régime," the book obviously suffers from the contrary compulsion to blackwash.

THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME. By HAROLD D. LASSWELL. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 65 p. $1.25.

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELITES. By HAROLD D. LASSWELL AND OTHERS. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 72 p. $1.25.

THE POLITBURO. By GEORGE K. SCHUELLER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 79 p. $1.25.

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THE NAZI ELITE. By Daniel Lerner and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 112 p. $1.50.

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SYMBOLS. By Harold D. Lasswell and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 87 p. $1.25.

THE "PRESTIGE PAPERS." By Ithiel de Sola Pool and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 146 p. $1.75.

SYMBOLS OF INTERNATIONALISM. By Ithiel de Sola Pool and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 73 p. $1.25.

SYMBOLS OF DEMOCRACY. By Ithiel de Sola Pool and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 80 p. $1.25.

The Hoover Institute is undertaking a series of studies to "describe the world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy." An introductory volume (part of Series A: General Studies) by Harold D. Lasswell, explains the purpose and methodology of the project. The other volumes which have appeared are divided into two groups: Series B: Elite Studies ("The Comparative Study of Elites," "The Politburo," and "The Nazi Elite"), and Series C: Symbol Studies ("Comparative Study of Symbols," "The 'Prestige Papers'"—*i.e.*, "newspapers which address themselves to the elite," "Symbols of Internationalism," and "Symbols of Democracy"). The reason for this classification is, in the somewhat dismaying language of the project, that the world revolution is "indexed by changes in the *composition* and *vocabulary* of the wielders of power."

HOW TO CO-EXIST WITHOUT PLAYING THE KREMLIN'S GAME. By James P. Warburg. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952, 228 p. $2.75.

An exponent of what he appropriately calls "dissent in a free society" offers a number of propositions for the achievement of a tolerable coexistence with the Russians. The problem of applying some of his recommendations is formidable.

THE CITIZEN DECIDES. By Ralph Barton Perry. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1951, 225 p. $3.00.

Tracts for the times: essays on topics of international and domestic concern.

L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES DEVANT LE CONFLIT CORÉEN. By Marc Frankenstein. Paris: Pedone, 1952, 364 p. Fr. 1500.

An extensive analysis and critique of the actions of the U. N. in dealing with the Korean conflict, up to the beginning of the armistice negotiations. While not a neutralist, the author is clearly worried by the implications of the actions taken and the tendency to turn the U. N. into a coalition.

ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS, 1951. Edited by Clyde Eagleton and Richard N. Swift. New York: New York University Press, 1952, 278 p. $4.50.

The proceedings of the third Institute for Annual Review of United Nations Affairs.

REALITIES OF WORLD POWER. By John E. Kieffer. New York: McKay, 1952, 336 p. $4.00.

A geopolitical analysis and prescription for strategy of the hard-boiled, war-is-inevitable variety.

THE ATOM SPIES. By Oliver Pilat. New York: Putnam, 1952, 312 p. $3.50.

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SOVIET ATOMIC SPIES. By Bernard Newman. London: Hale, 1952, 239 p. 15/.

Two somewhat journalistic accounts of the same story—Soviet espionage for the atomic bomb. Neither book is well organized, but Mr. Pilat's account is more restrained and to the point. Mr. Newman cannot refrain from excursions into Soviet atomic resources and the earlier history of Soviet spy organizations.

THE ANATOMY OF COMMUNISM. By Andrew MacKay Scott. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 197 p. $3.00.

A brief and critical commentary on the development of certain half truths in Marxism-Leninism.

LES PARTIS POLITIQUES. By Maurice Duverger. Paris: Colin, 1951, 476 p. Fr. 1100.

A valuable analysis of the nature and functions of parties in the contemporary world. Stressing the importance of party structure the author also investigates membership; single, biparty and multiparty systems; coalitions; and systems of voting.

CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II. Edited by Arnold J. Zurcher. New York: New York University Press, 1951, 351 p. $5.00.

Eight essays in comparative public law dealing with electoral changes, the position of the legislature, the cabinet system, local autonomy, and federalism.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

MEN IN BUSINESS. Edited by William Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 350 p. $5.00.

The 11 essays in this publication of the Research Center in Entrepreneurial History at Harvard are all aimed at illuminating the function of the businessman in promoting economic change. About half the papers are biographical, the others deal more broadly with the social climate of a number of countries and times.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. By Jacob Viner. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1951, 381 p. $5.00.

A collection of papers on international economics published during the last 30 years by a leading American economist. In an introductory essay the author comments on the applicability of classical theory to the present scene.

COFFEE, TEA AND COCOA. By V. D. Wickizer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 497 p. $5.00.

An analysis of economic issues relating to these three commodities, with particular emphasis on the effect of the Second World War.

MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Eugene Richard Schlesinger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, 76 p. $1.00.

A careful analysis of the benefits and disadvantages to countries with economic development programs of permitting foreign exchange to be bought or sold at different rates according to the use to which it is to be put.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM. By Edith Tilton Penrose. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, 247 p. $4.00.

A reëxamination and critique of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.

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MAGIC OIL, SERVANT OF THE WORLD. By Alfred M. Leeston. Dallas: Juan Pablos Books, 1951, 237 p. $3.75.

A substantial survey of the accomplishments of the oil industry in this country and abroad. While factually informative it is also intended to prove that the success of the industry is the "direct outcome of skillful, efficient, and alert management operating under a system of competitive free enterprise."

LES ASPECTS ÉCONOMIQUES DU RÉARMEMENT. Brussels: Institut des Relations Internationales, 1951, 236 p.

A study group investigates the effects of rearmament on domestic and international economics.

ENERGY SOURCES—THE WEALTH OF THE WORLD. By Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952, 344 p. $5.00.

A compact over-all survey of the world's energy resources, the problems of depletion, and the utilization of new sources.

L'ACCORDO GENERALE SULLE TARIFFE DOGANALI E SUL COMMERCIO (GATT). By F. Coppola d'Anna. Rome: Associazione fra le Società Italiane per Azioni, 1951, 475 p. L. 2000.

A detailed exposition of the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with a commentary on a number of issues.

THE CONDUCT OF LIFE. By Lewis Mumford. New York: Harcourt, 1951, 342 p. $5.00.

In this the last of a series of works, starting with "Technics and Civilization," trying to diagnose the crises of modern civilization, the author also turns to prescription and remedy. A bitter critic of the specialization of our times and the fragmentation of personality, Mr. Mumford pleads for a restoration of "wholeness" in the person and in society.

SOCIAL ORDER AND THE RISKS OF WAR. By Hans Speier. New York: Stewart, 1952, 497 p. $4.75.

A somewhat miscellaneous collection of papers written over the last 20 years, but with a certain emphasis upon war as a normal rather than an abnormal phenomenon for sociological investigation.

PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL CRISIS. Edited by Alfred H. Stanton and Stewart E. Perry. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1951, 260 p. $3.75.

A symposium of papers sponsored by the Washington School of Psychiatry, dealing with the bearing of new developments in the psychological and social sciences on the study of war and politics.

S.O.S.: THE MEANING OF OUR CRISIS. By Pitirim A. Sorokin. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 177 p. $2.50.

An application to current problems of some of the author's familiar concepts, but written as though Herr Teufelsdröckh had seized the pen.

NATIONS HAVE SOULS. By André Siegfried. New York: Putnam, 1952, 213 p. $3.00.

M. Siegfried's pleasant but conventional discussion of national characteristics—Latin realism, American dynamism, etc.—does not seem to lead to any new insights.

AU SECOURS DES RÉFUGIÉS. By René Ristelhueber. Paris: Plon, 1951, 319 p. Fr. 390.

The author of a study on Nansen describes the work of the International Refugee Organization. Originally considered to be only a temporary problem, the refugee question has become one of the permanent attributes of our pleasant century.

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The Second World War

THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA. By T. H. Vail Motter. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952, 545 p. $3.50.

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: RESPONSIBILITIES, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS. By Chester Wardlow. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952, 454 p. $3.25.

THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY: EUROPE AND ADJACENT AREAS. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951, 448 p. $3.25.

THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY: MEDITERRANEAN AND ADJACENT AREAS. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951, 465 p. $3.50.

These are four new volumes in the series "United States Army in World War II." The volume by Mr. Motter is the only one which is to appear in the subseries, "The Middle East Theater," and its scope is broader than the title would indicate. A section is devoted to United States military assistance and advice in Iran. Mr. Wardlow's study is the first of three to be devoted to the Transportation Corps and deals with function and organization primarily within the continental limits of the United States. The two volumes in the Pictorial Record subseries are made up of an extensive collection of photographs "selected to show important terrain features, types of equipment and weapons, living and weather conditions, military operations, and various matters of human interest."

HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION IN WORLD WAR II. By Robert Sherrod. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952, 496 p. $6.50.

An authoritative history.

MARINE AVIATION IN THE PHILIPPINES. By Major Charles W. Boggs, Jr. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1951, 166 p. $2.50.

This ninth in a series of operational narratives of the Marine Corps in World War II is concerned with the contribution of Marine aviation forces to the reconquest of the Philippines.

FOOD: VOLUME I: THE GROWTH OF POLICY. By R. J. Hammond. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1951, 436 p. 25/. (New York: British Information Services, $5.75.)

This first of two volumes on British food policy and administration during the Second World War deals with the development of plans and programs from 1936 through the end of hostilities. It forms part of the "History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series."

OPERATION OVERLORD: DESIGN AND REALITY. By Albert Norman. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1952, 230 p. $3.75.

A concise account based primarily on the files of Headquarters 12th Army Group, of which the author was wartime historian.

ACROSS TO NORWAY. By Lieutenant-Commander David Howarth. New York: Sloane, 1952, 286 p. $3.75.

The well-told and exciting story of Norwegian sailors and fishermen who operated the clandestine shuttle service between the Shetland Islands and Norway during the early years of the war.

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BLIND VICTORY. By J. Lonsdale Bryans. London: Skeffington, 1951, 191 p. 12/6.

The "Mr. X" of the von Hassell diaries, an Englishman, tells of his frustrated efforts to bring about Hitler's downfall through coöperation with the German anti-Nazi opposition.

RETOUR DE L'ENFER. By Jules Roy. Paris: Gallimard, 1951, 290 p. Fr. 480.

A war diary of an officer stationed with a French bombing group in England.

DIE OBERSTE WEHRMACHTFÜHRUNG 1939–1943. By Helmuth Greiner. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Limes, 1951, 444 p.

Hitler's strategy, revealed by the war diary of the high command. The author, a military historian who kept the diary until 1943, has made a useful contribution, especially in his demonstration that as early as July 1940 Hitler was contemplating an attack on Russia as a necessary step in the defeat of Britain.

DIE LETZTEN 30 TAGE. By Joachim Schultz. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Steingrüben, 1951, 132 p.

The war diary of an officer attached to the O. K. W. in its final days, covering the period from April 20 to May 20, 1945.

LA DÉFAITE ALLEMANDE À L'EST. By Colonel Léderrey. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1951, 270 p. Fr. 750.

A Swiss officer analyzes, as a classic example of a war of movement, the German and Russian campaigns on the Eastern front between 1941 and 1945.

MAIN FLEET TO SINGAPORE. By Captain Russell Grenfell. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 238 p. $3.75.

A sharply written, often polemical, account of the Singapore naval base from its inception to its loss in 1942. Highly critical of Prime Minister Churchill's Far Eastern strategy.

SUBMARINE! By Commander Edward L. Beach. New York: Holt, 1952, 301 p. $3.50.

A personal account of submarine warfare in the Pacific.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1951. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1952, 473 p. $5.00.

In this the sixth in the Council's series of annual surveys of American postwar world policy, the treatment of recent Far Eastern developments is unusually complete, thanks mainly to the quantities of high policy information released in connection with the MacArthur crisis. The author regards 1951 as a year of considerable progress toward the reëstablishment of a global balance of power despite strong diversionary efforts abroad and at home. This achievement involved a heavy emphasis on the strategic aspects of policy and left little margin to combat the worldwide Communist initiative on the economic, social and psychological plane.

THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY. By Dexter Perkins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 195 p. $3.25.

A series of lectures delivered at Uppsala University, Sweden, designed to explain the United States to a foreign audience, but well worth American attention.

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AMERICAN CRISIS DIPLOMACY. By Richard W. Van Alstyne. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 165 p. $3.50.

A skillful piece of condensation. The first two chapters, a revision of material from the author's earlier "American Diplomacy in Action," deal with the background of the Pacific War and the war in Europe. The third chapter reviews events since 1945.

SECTIONAL BIASES IN CONGRESS ON FOREIGN POLICY. By George L. Grassmuck. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, 181 p. $2.00.

A useful statistical analysis of roll call votes on certain classes of foreign policy legislation in the two periods 1921–1932 and 1933–1941. Interesting for its effort to compare the relative importance of regional interests and party affiliation.

WITNESS. By Whittaker Chambers. New York: Random House, 1952, 808 p. $5.00.

An important and of course highly controversial document for the history of the United States in the 1930's and 1940's. Mr. Chambers' recollections, testimony and reflections concern three distinct subjects: his own biography and life in the Communist Party, the Hiss case, and his critique of modern society. In the author's mind these form a necessary unity; the reader may be less convinced by this impressive and tortured demonstration that the life of Mr. Chambers is a mirror to the crisis of our times.

THE TENNEY COMMITTEE. By Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, 400 p. $5.00.

LOYALTY AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION. By Lawrence H. Chamberlain. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, 254 p. $4.00.

UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON. By Vern Countryman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, 405 p. $5.00.

THE STATES AND SUBVERSION. Edited by Walter Gellhorn. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 454 p. $5.00.

These four books are part of the series "Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty." The aim of this series is to study "the impact upon our civil liberties of current governmental programs designed to ensure internal security and to expose and control disloyal or subversive conduct." A first report by Walter Gellhorn, "Security, Loyalty and Science," was mentioned here in July 1951. Edward Barrett, Professor of Law at the University of California, covers the activities and methods of the Tenney Committee from 1941 to 1949. In his view the assumptions and standards of evidence employed by this committee undermined the purposes for which it had been formed. Dean Chamberlain, of Columbia College, reviews the Lusk, McNaboe, and Rapp-Coudert investigations in New York State, and suggests certain procedural safeguards for such legislative committees. Vern Countryman, Professor of Law at Yale, writes on the Canwell Committee, set up in 1947 and functioning until 1949, and includes a chapter on the case of Melvin Rader. Professor Gellhorn, of the Columbia University Law School, edits a volume giving a general picture of state and local activities in California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New York and Washington. More volumes are to appear.

HOW TO KEEP OUR LIBERTY. By Raymond Moley. New York: Knopf, 1952, 338 p. $4.00.

Alarmed by the trend toward statism, Mr. Moley proposes a course of action for the defense of what he calls the "middle interests," which are those of the

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great majority of Americans but which are threatened by the present structure of the political party system and "virulent minorities." "If that be conservatism," observes the author, "let my critics make the most of it."

THE CRY IS PEACE. By Louis F. Budenz. Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 242 p. $3.75.

The former managing editor of the *Daily Worker* turns from his personal experiences to a general discussion of the cold war and the problem of Communism. Very little new information.

THE NEGRO AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY. By Wilson Record. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951, 340 p. $3.50.

COMMUNISM VERSUS THE NEGRO. By William A. Nolan. Chicago: Regnery, 1951, 276 p. $3.50.

Two competent books dealing with the profoundly important fact that despite their past and present difficulties and frustrations the Negroes of the United States have simply not been attracted to Communism. The explanation advanced by both authors is broadly the same: the feeling on the part of the Negroes that their expectations can be met within the framework of the American constitutional system and, just as important, that the Communist Negro program is designed not to promote the welfare of the Negro but as an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy. The result has been a series of disillusioning zigzags in the party line.

THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Scribner, 1952, 174 p. $2.50.

This stimulating book is less a reinterpretation of American history than a searching commentary on the position of the United States in the world and the complex interplay of our ideals, ambitions, myths, practice and achievements.

SOCIALISM AND AMERICAN LIFE. Edited by Donald Drew Egbert and Stow Persons. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, 2 v. $17.50.

More than a dozen authors—some Socialists, others not—have contributed to this broadly conceived study of American Socialism from the seventeenth century to the present. The whole second volume is an exceptionally useful and extensive critical bibliography of the subject, including material on Socialist theory and movements in other countries.

ONE MAN'S AMERICA. By Alistair Cooke. New York: Knopf, 1952, 268 p. $3.50.

Perceptive and friendly observations on the American scene, first prepared as B.B.C. broadcasts.

THE DAY BEFORE TOMORROW. By Robert Waithman. New York: Scribner, 1951, 240 p. $2.75.

Informal and entertaining sketches of the United States by a correspondent of the London *News Chronicle*.

CONGRESS AT WORK. By Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel. New York: Holt, 1952, 502 p. $5.00.

A series of specific scenes of Congress and Congressmen in action, designed to show both the organization and the actual procedure of the legislative body.

THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS. By Earl Latham. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for Amherst College), 1952, 244 p. $3.75.

A case study of group pressures, based on the political struggle in the 80th and 81st Congresses to enact legislation dealing with the basing point system of quoting delivered prices.

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MEN OF WEST POINT. By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, Ret. New York: Sloane, 1951, 486 p. $5.00.

A history of the United States Military Academy published for the sesquicentennial celebration. More than half the volume is devoted to the years since 1914.

WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT. By Samuel I. Rosenman. New York: Harper, 1952, 560 p. $6.00.

A close associate of Roosevelt from 1928 to 1945, Judge Rosenman's principal job was to prepare and assist in the drafting of the President's speeches. The memoirs of those years of collaboration are a valuable addition to the history of the New Deal and F.D.R.'s rôle in the Second World War.

ROOSEVELT AND DANIELS. Edited by Carroll Kilpatrick. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952, 226 p. $3.50.

The correspondence between F.D.R. and Josephus Daniels, at one time his chief in the Navy Department and later the United States Ambassador to Mexico.

SO IT SEEMED. By William L. Chenery. New York: Harcourt, 1952, 300 p. $4.00.

The pleasant autobiography of the former editor and publisher of *Collier's*.

WENDELL WILLKIE, 1892–1944. By Mary Earhart Dillon. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1952, 378 p. $4.00.

A substantial biography of the great amateur of the 1940 campaign.

A SCHOLAR IN ACTION: EDWIN F. GAY. By Herbert Heaton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 260 p. $4.25.

A biography of the Harvard economist who was also active in the field of journalism and public service.

AMERICAN CAPITALISM. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 217 p. $3.00.

Competition on the classical model does not exist in many major industries in the United States. There are great concentrations of private power. Yet the economy performs well, production expands, and few liberals cry for nationalization or detailed government regulation. To explain these paradoxes, Professor Galbraith sets forth the concept of countervailing power—the organization by labor, suppliers, retailers or others of means of sharing in the power and economic advantages accruing to oligopoly. Inflation is the great danger; it emasculates countervailing power and inspires attempts at centralized control. A stimulating and important book.

HOW TO GET RICH IN WASHINGTON. By Blair Bolles. New York: Norton, 1952, 309 p. $3.75.

As the subtitle, "Rich Man's Division of the Welfare State," indicates, this book develops the thesis that federal agencies established over the last two decades have been corrupted to become a profitable source of private gain.

IS ANYBODY LISTENING? By William H. Whyte, Jr. and the Editors of Fortune. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952, 239 p. $3.00.

Why American business, with its "Free Enterprise" campaign, fails to reach its audience.

THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING. By Siegfried Stern. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 447 p. $5.25.

A substantial, if uneven, survey of the overseas activities of United States banking during the years between the two world wars. The author has had long experience as manager of the foreign departments of several New York banks.

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COMMERCE AMÉRICAIN ET PRODUCTIVITÉ. By R. Catherine and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1951, 356 p. Fr. 800.

The report of a French mission which came to the United States in 1950 to study the structure and techniques of American commerce.

Western Europe

TRADE AND PAYMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. By William Diebold, Jr. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1952, 488 p. $5.00.

This book provides both a descriptive account and a critical analysis of what Western European countries have accomplished since the beginning of the Marshall Plan in facilitating trade and payments among themselves. The account is based in part on public sources, in part on investigations in Europe and conversations with persons actually supervising the mechanisms of economic coöperation. The book is more than current history, for the author has interwoven analysis and interpretation with his narrative, to show why Great Britain, France, Germany and other countries have sometimes favored and sometimes opposed the European Payments Union, trade liberalization and other coöperative measures.

COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Mario Einaudi and Others. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, 239 p. $3.00.

Although the title is somewhat misleading—the inquiry is limited to France and Italy—Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach and Aldo Garosci have achieved an excellent piece of work in analyzing the Communist Parties, and their relation to the societies within which they are operating. Valuable reading for Americans puzzled by the existence of mass Communist movements west of the Iron Curtain.

LES FINANCES DE LA FRANCE ET L'OCCUPATION ALLEMANDE (1940–1944). By Pierre Arnoult. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1951, 410 p. Fr. 800.

A detailed study of the financial and other means employed by Germany to harness and exploit the French economy after the defeat of 1940.

LA FRANCE BLESSÉE ET RENAISSANTE. By René Dubreule and Jean Courtassol. Asnières (France): Éditions du Temps qui Passe, 1950, 551 p. Fr. 1900.

Articles and statistics by many contributors, to demonstrate that France, while badly mauled in recent years, is recovering and still has her mission in the world.

L'OUVRIER FRANÇAIS: ESSAI SUR LA CONDITION OUVRIÈRE (1900–1950). By Michel Collinet. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1951, 197 p. Fr. 510.

A militant syndicalist examines the transformations in the structure of the French wage-earning groups in the present century.

LA BELGIQUE ET L'ENTRÉE EN GUERRE DES ÉTATS UNIS, 1914–1917. By Suzanne Tassier. Brussels: Renaissance du Livre, 1951, 171 p.

A concise account of American feelings toward Belgium and their part in the United States' entry in the First World War, based largely on material in the Hoover War Library.

THE DANISH SYSTEM OF LABOR RELATIONS. By Walter Galenson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 321 p. $4.50.

A valuable study of the Danish trade union movement and the development of methods for settling labor disputes. The subject is skillfully related to the workings of the Danish economy as a whole.

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PAX HELVETICA. By Hermann Weilenmann. Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch, 1951, 343 p. Sw. Fr. 16.

An interesting historical, geographical and sociological analysis of the nature of Swiss democracy, that unique example of a state based on a multitude of languages, religious denominations and particularist traditions.

LE BALCON SUR L'EUROPE. By Pierre Béguin. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1951, 285 p.

A Swiss journalist discusses the position of Switzerland during the Second World War, the mood of the citizens, the measures taken to meet the threatening dangers. Not a comprehensive history.

ARMEE OHNE PATHOS. By Adelbert Weinstein. Bonn (British Zone): Köllen, 1951, 165 p.

A German journalist and onetime staff officer sets down the opinions of a number of former high officers regarding the rearming of Germany, the nature of a new military force and its relation to a European army. The result is an illuminating discussion, if not resolution, of these important issues.

AM ABEND DER DEMONTAGE: SECHS JAHRE REPARATIONSPOLITIK. Bremen: Trüjen, 1951, 196 p.

Calculations on the cost to the German economy of the dismantling program since the war.

WARUM WURDE KRUPP VERURTEILT? By Tilo Frhr. von Wilmowsky. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Vorwerk, 1950, 224 p.

An attack on the Krupp trial as an act not of justice but of war psychosis.

DER STATIST AUF DER GALERIE, 1945–50. By Paul Schmidt. Bonn (British Zone): Athenaeum, 1951, 305 p.

Hitler's interpreter (his "Statist auf Diplomatischer Bühne" was mentioned here October 1950) continues his recollections into the postwar years. He has much less to talk about.

OHNE AUFTRAG IN BERLIN. By Sven Hedin. Tübingen (French Zone): Internationaler Universitätsverlag, 1950, 280 p.

A Swedish explorer and geographer writes of his association with the Nazi leaders from 1935 to 1942 and of his efforts to aid occasional victims.

DAS OFFENE PROBLEM. By Otto Abetz. Cologne (British Zone): Greven, 1951, 330 p.

Diplomatic memoirs of the German ambassador in Paris after the fall of France, currently in a French prison as a war criminal. Largely a complaint that the Nazi leaders did not strive for German-French friendship during the war.

BERLIN 1936–1940. By Vicomte Jacques Davignon. Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1951, 265 p. Fr. 570.

The memoirs of the Belgian ambassador, based largely on his personal notes but utilizing a number of postwar diplomatic publications.

ES GESCHAH IN DEUTSCHLAND. By Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk. Tübingen (French Zone): Wunderlich, 1951, 383 p.

Brief interpretative sketches of his contemporaries from Chancellor von Bülow to Admiral Dönitz, by the former finance minister under von Papen.

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DAS RASSESTRAFRECHT IN DEUTSCHLAND IN DEN JAHREN 1933–1945 UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES BLUTSCHUTZ-GESETZES. By Marianne Sigg. Aarau (Switzerland): Sauerländer, 1951, 126 p. Sw. Fr. 7.

A conscientious dissertation on the racial legislation of the Third Reich.

MUSSOLINI DIPLOMATICO (1922–1932). By Gaetano Salvemini. Bari: Laterza, 1952, 536 p. L. 2500.

In 1932 this distinguished anti-Fascist scholar wrote a brief study of the Duce's foreign policy, "Mussolini Diplomate" (Paris: Grasset, 1932, 338 p.). The present study is based on this earlier work and, like it, carries the story only to the tenth year of the Fascist régime. But it is greatly expanded, makes use of later publications, and has, of course, the advantage of 20 years' additional perspective. A subsequent volume on the conquest of Ethiopia is to follow. Professor Salvemini, in his comment on Mussolini's ability as a propagandist, is properly dismayed by a current tendency, not in Italy alone, to rehabilitate the dictator and criticize only his "errors."

VENTICINQUE SCRITTI E UN DISCORSO DI BENITO MUSSOLINI, DA LUI PROIBITI (1915–1919). By Edoardo Susmel. Milan: Edizioni del Milione, 1950, 200 p.

Early articles and a speech not included in the "Edizione Definitiva" of the Duce's works, largely because of anti-German and anti-monarchic passages.

CIANO'S DIARY, 1937–1938. London: Methuen, 1952, 220 p. 21/.

An English translation of the earlier portion of this important diary, from August 23, 1937, to December 31, 1938. (The Italian edition was noted here October 1950.)

RESISTENZA ED AZIONE (RICORDI DI UN LIBERALE). By Massimo Salvadori. Bari: Laterza, 1951, 310 p. L. 1400.

The most interesting sections of these memoirs by a member of the anti-Fascist organization *Giustizia e Libertà* are those dealing with British and American wartime attitudes toward the various Italian political factions, in Italy and abroad.

L' ITALIA E GLI ACCORDI TEDESCO-SOVIETICI DELL'AGOSTO 1939. By Mario Toscano. Florence: Sansoni, 1952, 96 p. L. 500.

A modest contribution to the history of the German-Soviet pact of 1939, making use of the Italian diplomatic documents now in the course of publication.

DIE ITALIENISCHE SÜDFRAGE. By Friedrich Vöchting. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1951, 680 p.

A solid analysis of the economic and social problems of southern Italy: the agrarian question, ingrown poverty, and overpopulation.

LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS EN ESPAÑA Y SUS JEFES EN LA EPOCA CONTEMPORANEA. By Enrique Esperabé de Arteaga. Madrid: Reus, 1951. 345 p. Ptas. 60.

A history of Spanish politics since 1868. The last 20 years are covered very sketchily.

LAS CLASES MEDIAS ECONOMICAS. By Francisco Fernandez Sanchez-Puerta. Madrid: Instituto Balmes, 1951, 575 p. Ptas. 75.

A study of the middle classes, in part theoretical, but with special emphasis on their problems in the agricultural and urban sectors of the Spanish economy.

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Eastern Europe

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY: VOLUME II, 1925–1932. SELECTED AND EDITED BY JANE DEGRAS. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 560 p. $9.00.

This second volume continues the extremely useful service of collecting and translating the most significant Soviet documents, statements and speeches on foreign policy.

VISA TO MOSCOW. BY MICHEL GORDEY. New York: Knopf, 1952, 419 p. $4.50.

A correspondent for *France-Soir* writes up a 63 days' visit to the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The result is perceptive reporting under very difficult circumstances, though occasionally the author seems to be describing a "Potemkin village."

ONE GREAT PRISON. BY HELMUT M. FEHLING. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 175 p. $2.50.

A rather disjointed record of the personal experiences of a German prisoner of war in the U.S.S.R. during and long after the war.

JOURNEY BETWEEN FREEDOMS. BY TANYA MATTHEWS. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951, 281 p. $3.50.

The autobiography of a Russian girl who married a British correspondent in World War II.

THE SOVIET FINANCIAL SYSTEM: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN WORLD. BY MIKHAIL V. CONDOIDE. Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University, 1951, 230 p. $4.00.

A brief and cursory survey, based primarily on Soviet publications.

HOW STRONG IS RUSSIA? BY T. ZAVALANI. New York: Praeger, 1952, 244 p. $4.00.

An Albanian, one-time Communist, assesses the Soviet Five Year plans and finds to his, if not to the reader's satisfaction, that the whole effort has been unsuccessful and Russia is not such a formidable economic power after all.

THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION, 1917–1920. BY JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, 363 p. $5.00.

The author, a lecturer in politics at Princeton, has performed a most welcome service by this scholarly effort to unravel the intricate history of the Ukrainian question in the three years following the collapse of the old Empire.

BORDERLANDS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION. BY OSCAR HALECKI. New York: Ronald, 1952, 503 p. $6.00.

A well-known Polish historian makes a broad survey of the modern history of the nations lying between the Germans and the Russians.

MUISTELMAT. BY G. MANNERHEIM. Helsinki: Otava, 1952, 526 p. M. 2100.

The second and concluding volume of the Finnish Field Marshal's memoirs, covering the years 1931–1946. (The first volume was noted here April 1952.)

ONKO MAALLAMME MALTTIA VAURASTUA? BY URHO KEKKONEN. Helsinki: Otava, 1952, 131 p. M. 200.

The present prime minister's program for Finland's future economic development.

SAILING TO FREEDOM. BY VOLDEMAR VEEDAM AND CARL B. WALL. New York: Crowell, 1952, 246 p. $3.50.

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Sea adventures of a group of Estonian refugees sailing from the Baltic to the United States.

JOURNAL 1933–1939. By Comte Jean Szembek. Paris: Plon, 1952, 504 p. Fr. 1200.

This diplomatic diary of the former Polish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is an important source for the background of the Second World War. With almost daily entries for the years 1935 to 1939 it gives the most complete picture so far available of Poland's foreign policy in those years.

LA VÉRITÉ SUR LE DRAME POLONAIS DE SEPTEMBRE 1939. By Victor Grosz. Paris: Éditions du Pavillon, 1951, 135 p. Fr. 200.

A Communist criticism of Colonel Beck's foreign policy.

LA POLOGNE. By Jean Noaro. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1951, 309 p. Fr. 300.

A Communist picture of Communist Poland.

DOKUMENTE ZUR AUSTREIBUNG DER SUDETENDEUTSCHEN. Munich (U. S. Zone): Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interressen, 1951, 590 p.

A collection of personal testimonies by Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945 and 1946.

BY THE WATERS OF THE DANUBE. By Alexandra Orme. New York: Duell, 1951, 360 p. $3.50.

Budapest after the war, as seen by the author of "Comes the Comrade!" (noted here October 1950), to which it is a worthy sequel.

I WAS STALIN'S PRISONER. By Robert A. Vogeler with Leigh White. New York: Harcourt, 1952, 314 p. $3.75.

The story of the American I.T. and T. official's arrest in Hungary in 1949, his subsequent treatment, enforced confession as a spy, trial, and imprisonment. The book concludes with recommendations for United States action to prevent such treatment of American citizens by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

LES MAILLES DU FILET. By Sorana Gurian. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1950, 376 p. Fr. 450.

AU COMMENCEMENT ÉTAIT LA FIN. By Adriana Georgescu-Cosmovici. Paris: Hachette, 1951, 300 p. Fr. 500.

Two grim stories from Communist Rumania. Both authors were journalists. Sorana Gurian began by working with the Russians and the Rumanian Left, only to trace the path of growing disillusionment, disgust and eventual flight (Italian edition, "Per Aver Scelto il Silenzio," Florence: Sansoni, 1950, 421 p. L. 1200). Adriana Georgescu was in opposition from the start and her path was the even more painful one of arrest, interrogation and prison.

THE TRUTH ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA. By P. D. Ostović. New York: Roy, 1952, 300 p. $3.50.

Largely about Jugoslavia under the monarchy, written from a strongly Croatian point of view. With regard to the present and future the author, while acknowledging Tito as a Communist dictator, feels that "should Tito fail, for any reason, there is, as far as we can see, nothing Yugoslav in character to replace him."

LA YOUGOSLAVIE SOUS LA MENACE INTÉRIEURE ET EXTÉRIEURE. By A. Ciliga. Paris: Les Iles d'Or (Plon), 1951, 132 p. Fr. 180.

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A former member of the Jugoslav Communist Party discusses the Tito-Stalin rupture and attempts to analyze the probable influence on the conflict of the earlier and unresolved struggle between Serb and Croat.

TRAITSCHO KOSTOFF UND SEINE GRUPPE. Berlin: Dietz, 1951, 667 p.
A translation of the proceedings of the trial in 1949 of the Bulgarian Communist Kostov and co-defendants.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

IN PLACE OF FEAR. By Aneurin Bevan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952, 213 p. $3.00.
The importance of this book, which is not without substance as a political credo though it often seems neither fair nor reasonable, lies in the fact that it does present the outlook and prejudices—notably the anti-American animus—of an extremely able and forceful politician who could well become the dominant figure in the British Labor Party.

AFTER ALL. By Norman Angell. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1952, 370 p. $4.50.
The autobiography of the octogenarian journalist, publicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner. In many respects his life has been a projection of "The Great Illusion," the work which brought him into prominence more than 40 years ago, but which has been almost universally misunderstood.

WINSTON CHURCHILL: 1874–1951. By Lewis Broad. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 611 p. $6.00.
A reprinting of a biography first appearing in 1941, brought up to date in 1945, and now carrying the story, without significant revision of earlier material, down to the 1950 general election.

A HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By Keith Feiling. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 1229 p. $7.50.
A formidable and masterly survey of the whole range of English history, conservative but judicious in temper.

LESSONS OF THE BRITISH WAR ECONOMY. Edited by D. N. Chester. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951, 260 p. $4.50.
A collection of 13 essays on Britain's wartime economy, prepared by economists and other academicians who were temporarily in the government service.

POVERTY AND THE WELFARE STATE. By B. Seebohm Rowntree and G. R. Lavers. New York: Longmans, 1951, 104 p. $2.00.

A social study of York, the third that Mr. Seebohm Rowntree has made, this time with the purpose of examining the effects of the last decade's welfare legislation.

TRUTH WILL OUT. By Charlotte Haldane. New York: Vanguard, 1951, 339 p. $3.50.
The wife of J. B. S. Haldane reviews with pain but with clarity her years as a worker for the British Communist Party. The sections on the British left-wing intellectuals, the Spanish Civil War and wartime Moscow are the most informative.

NEXT-YEAR COUNTRY. By Jean Burnet. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951, 188 p. $4.00.
A survey of rural social organization in Alberta, one of a series on the background of the Social Credit movement.

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THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. Edited by G. W. Paton. London: Stevens, 1952, 355 p. 55/.

THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA. By Alan Gledhill. London: Stevens, 1951, 309 p. 45/.

These two volumes are the first to appear in a series of studies dealing with the development of the laws and constitutions of the members of the Commonwealth. Written for students of political science as well as lawyers, they are of value both for their exposition of developments within the two states and for the way they show the evolution of the diversified legal patterns of the new Commonwealth.

The Middle East

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Hedley V. Cooke. New York: Harper, 1952, 366 p. $4.00.

A review of development programs, native and foreign, in the years since 1919. The rather bleak conclusions point up the enormous difficulties involved in achieving economic and material progress, or even avoiding retrogression, in such areas.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By George Lenczowski. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 459 p. $6.00.

A general and able survey of the play of contemporary politics and diplomacy in an increasingly troubled area.

TÜRK INKILABI TARIHI, VOLUME II, PART III. By Yusuf Hikmet Bayur. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1951, 513 p.

A history of the attempts by the Great Powers to divide up Asiatic Turkey; the Armenian problem; the Arab question before World War I; German military reforms in Turkey; and the problem of the Straits. It follows Volume I (Istanbul, Maarif Matbaasi, 1940, 343 p.) on events from 1878–1910; Volume II, Part I (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1943, 522 p.) on the Tripoli War; and Volume II, Part II (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1943, 504 p.) on the Balkan Wars.

TURKISH CROSSROADS. By Bernard Newman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 258 p. $4.75. (London: Hale, 18/.)

Primarily a travelogue, but of interest for its somewhat facile discussion of recent developments in Turkish life and politics.

I MARRIED AN ARAB. By Mary Winifred Bushakra. New York: Day, 1951, 246 p. $3.50.

The experiences of an American writer and her Arab husband in returning to his home in Lebanon.

ISRAEL: THE BEGINNING AND TOMORROW. By Hal Lehrman. New York: Sloane, 1952, 358 p. $3.75.

An able journalist reports, with fairness and discernment, on the present state of Israel. On many of the touchier issues he is likely to remark "the truth, as usual, lay in between"—a commendable starting point, at least.

THE STRUGGLE FOR TRANSCAUCASIA (1917–1921). By Firuz Kazemzadeh. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 356 p. $5.75.

A competent monograph on a comparatively neglected facet of the Russian Revolution, the formation and destruction of the independent republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND EGYPT. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952, 216 p. $2.25.

This revised edition of a study first published in 1936 carries the story of Anglo-Egyptian relations to the Egyptian abrogation of the alliance in October 1951. While presenting the British point of view, a useful appendix summarizes the principal points of the Egyptian case.

South and Southeast Asia

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN. By Alan Campbell-Johnson. London: Hale, 1951, 383 p. 25/.

The Press Attaché on the former Viceroy's staff presents the valuable diary he kept during the ticklish days of Britain's withdrawal from India.

INDIANS OVERSEAS, 1838–1949. By C. Kondapi. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1951, 558 p. $6.50.

An extensive and detailed discussion of Indian emigration abroad. Principal emphasis is upon the restrictions and discrimination encountered by such migrants in their new homes.

PLANNING FOR A SHORTAGE ECONOMY. By C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmananda. Bombay: Vora, 1952, 319 p. Rs. 7.

A discussion and exposition of the Indian Government's five-year economic plan for 1952–1957.

THE LEGISLATURES OF CEYLON, 1928–1948. By S. Namasivayam. London: Faber, 1951, 185 p. 18/.

The story of the achievement of self-government in the first non-European British colony to gain Dominion status, with an analysis of the Donoughmore Constitution and the Constitution of 1948.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST, 1945–1951. By Harold M. Vinacke. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1952, 144 p. $3.00.

A concise introduction, originally prepared for the Lucknow Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in October 1950, but incorporating events through the summer of 1951.

SPIES, DUPES, AND DIPLOMATS. By Ralph de Toledano. New York: Duell, and Boston: Little, Brown, 1952, 244 p. $3.50.

The book starts with the story of the extremely effective, Soviet-directed, Sorge spy ring in Tokyo and Shanghai and then moves on to a general indictment of American Far Eastern policy before and after Pearl Harbor. The link between the two themes is not clearly established, but rests in part upon the premise that professional spies not only gather information but recommend and determine policies.

THE END OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA. By Wesley R. Fishel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952, 318 p. $4.50.

A study of the rise and decline of the extraterritorial system, with particular emphasis on the years after 1918. Makes extensive use of unpublished as well as published American diplomatic materials.

RED DUST: AUTOBIOGRAPHIES OF CHINESE COMMUNISTS. As Told to Nym Wales. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 238 p. $5.00.

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Twenty-five autobiographies gathered orally from Chinese Communist leaders by the former wife of Edgar Snow during a stay in Yenan in 1937. Source material but obviously to be used with care.

DECLARATION ON HUMAN WELFARE. By Lo Meng-tze. Hong Kong: Chu Lieu (Main Current) Society, 1951, 156 p.

A somewhat derivative attempt to establish a new social outlook—drawing heavily on Fabianism and T.V.A.—but of interest in its Chinese context.

RED FLAG IN JAPAN. By Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1952, 276 p. $5.00.

Two well-trained students, making use of Japanese, Chinese and Russian sources, tell the story of the Communist movement in Japan. While going back to the party's origin after the Russian Revolution, the authors are primarily concerned with the revival of organized Communism after 1945.

THE LEFT WING IN JAPANESE POLITICS. By Evelyn S. Colbert. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952, 353 p. $4.50.

A study of the development of left wing movements—Socialist, Communist and trades unionist—since 1945 and down to the purging of the Communist leaders in June 1950. Biographical appendix.

THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR. By I. F. Stone. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952, 364 p. $5.00. (Distributed by Citadel Press.)

An effort to demonstrate, on the basis of published evidence, that the Korean War is not what the United States Government and press have said it is. The author supports the thesis, which at times verges on the official Soviet line, that the South Koreans provoked the attack and were abetted by various "warmongering" American officials, who have since refused to let the war end. The obvious diligence which went into the book only makes the Bacon-wrote-Shakespeare argumentation the more painful.

Africa

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 286 p. $6.00.

A survey of the human and material resources in Africa south of the Sahara, prepared by a study group of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

ATTITUDE TO AFRICA. By W. Arthur Lewis and Others. Baltimore: Penguin, 1951, 155 p. 50 cents.

Four authors contribute to a brief survey of the main problems of British Africa.

THE YEAR BOOK AND GUIDE TO EAST AFRICA. Edited by A. Gordon-Brown. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1952, 435 p. $3.00. (London: Hale, 6/.)

THE YEAR BOOK AND GUIDE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. Edited by A. Gordon-Brown. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1952, 860 p. $3.00. (London: Hale, 8/6.)

Revised editions of these useful and informative handbooks.

ARCHAEOLOGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF NATAL. New York: Oxford University Press (for the University of Natal), 1951, 140 p. $6.50.

This is the first volume of a regional survey undertaken by the Natal University

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College. The series aims at presenting an accurate and comprehensive picture of the economic and social structure of the province.

AFRIQUE ÉQUATORIALE FRANÇAISE. By Henri Ziéglé. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1952, 199 p. Fr. 500.

A brief geographical, economic and historical survey of French Equatorial Africa.

ALGÉRIE . . . TERRE DE LUMIÈRE. By Charles Hanin. Paris: Alsatia, 1950, 336 p. Fr. 750.

An evocative tour of Algeria, more concerned with moods than mores, with shadings than statistics.

ÉCONOMIE ALGÉRIENNE. By J. Saint Germès. Algiers: Maison des Livres, 1950, 343 p. Fr. 750.

A survey rather than a study of the Algerian economy.

HISTORIA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS. Madrid: Estado Mayor Central del Ejército, Servicio Historico Militar, 1947–51, 2 v.

The first two volumes of an extensive official history of the military campaigns in Spanish Morocco. Volume I presents the nineteenth century background. Volume II is devoted to the Rif, Kert, and Yebala campaigns from 1909 to 1919.

LIBERIA. By R. Earle Anderson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952, 305 p. $5.00.

A concise survey of the African republic by the former Director of Finances of the United States Maritime Commission.

LA FRANCE DE L'OCÉAN INDIEN: MADAGASCAR, LES COMORES, LA RÉUNION, LA CÔTE FRANÇAISE DES SOMALIS, L'INDE FRANÇAISE. Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, 1952, 314 p. Fr. 900.

These surveys of France's possessions in the Indian Ocean suffer from a tone of official discreetness.

Latin America and the West Indies

THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICA. By Germán Arciniegas. New York: Knopf, 1952, 416 p. $4.50.

A Colombian educator and political expatriot writes a country-by-country review of the political situation south of the United States. Writing with feeling and sympathy, his picture of the present perilous status of democracy in this part of the world is not designed to promote complacency.

ACCULTURATION IN THE AMERICAS. Edited by Sol Tax. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 339 p. $7.50.

A selection of papers read at the 29th International Congress of Americanists and dealing with the intermingling of the cultures of Europe, Africa and aboriginal America in the New World.

LAZARO CARDENAS: MEXICAN DEMOCRAT. By William Cameron Townsend. Ann Arbor (Mich.): Wahr, 1952, 379 p. $4.00.

A favorable, often eulogistic, biography of Mexico's president from 1934 to 1940.

DEFENSE OF FREEDOM. By the Editors of La Prensa. New York: Day, 1952, 315 p. $4.00.

The story of the Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa,* and its suppression by the Peróns in 1951.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1825 Jefferson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Achievement in the Gold Coast; aspects of development in a British West African Territory. Accra, Public Relations Department, 1951. 96 p.

The African in Southern Rhodesia. London, Office of the High Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia, 1952.

1. Education. 16 p. *2.* Health. 16 p. *3.* Agriculture. 16 p. *4.* Marketing. 16 p.

Liberia. Monrovia, Department of State, Bureau of Information, 1952. 48 p.

Canada

Report of the Committee to Study Combines Legislation and Interim Report on Resale Price Maintenance. Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1952. 72 p.

China

Premier Chen Cheng speaks. Taipei, Office of the Government Spokesman, 1951. 56 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

Basic instruments and selected documents. Geneva. The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1952.

v. 1. Text of the Agreement and other instruments and procedures. 139 p. $1.50. *v. 2.* Decisions, declarations, resolutions, rulings and reports. 228 p. $2.00.

Commerce with Latin America. Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Mar. 17, 1952. Washington, 1952. 41 p. (H. Rept. 1527.)

Customs Simplification Act. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, Senate, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 5505. Apr. 22–29, 1952. Washington, 1952. 318 p.

Blue mold cheese; report on escape-clause investigation under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. Washington, U. S. Tariff Commission, 1952. 33 p.

Imposition of duties on tuna fish. Report from the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 5693, Oct. 12, 1951. Washington, 1951. 9 p. (H. Rept. 1153.)

Suspending the import duties on tungsten. Report from the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 5248, Oct. 12, 1951. Washington, 1951. 5 p. (H. Rept. 1152.)

Economic Conditions

Recent changes in production; supplement to World Economic Report, 1950–1951. New York, 1952. 120 p. (1952. II. C. 1.) $1.00.

Espionage

Espionage activities of personnel attached to embassies and consulates under Soviet domination in the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., Jl. 9, 1951; Feb. 5–7, 1952. Washington, 1952. 52 p.

Germany

Convention on relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., on Executive Q and R, Je. 10–17, 1952. Washington, 1952. 267 p.

——. Report, Je. 28, 1952. Washington, 1952. 58 p. (Exec. Rept. 16.)

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THE SPECIAL projects program of the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, by J. F. J. Gillen. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1952. 76 p.

EAST Germany under Soviet control. Washington, 1952. 95 p. (Dept. of State, European and British Commonwealth Series 34.) 35¢.

KREDITANSTALT für Wiederaufbau. Third annual report covering the year 1951. Frankfurt, 1952. 83 p.

REFUGEE burdens and defence contribution. Bonn, Federal Ministry of Finance, 1951. 22 p.

GREAT BRITAIN

ECONOMIC survey for 1952. London, 1952. 46 p. (Cmd. 8509.) 1s. 3d.

PROBLEMS of foreign policy. London, Labour Party, 1952. 16 p. (Policy Discussion Pamphlet, No. 1.) 4d.

SALES to public authorities in the U.S.A.; a survey of purchasing legislation and practice in relation to Federal, State and Municipal Agencies. London, 1952. 186 p. 12s. 6d.

HUMAN RIGHTS

UNIVERSAL declaration of human rights. New York, 1952. unp. (1952. I. 15.) 15¢.

INDIA

THE CONSTITUTION of India (as modified up to 1st September, 1951). Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1951. 300 p. Rs.1/10.

ECONOMIC controls in India. Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1952. 60 p. 2s.

THE HYDERABAD question before the United Nations. (Documents and other materials.) Karachi, Prepared by the Hyderabad Delegation to the United Nations, 1951. 148 p.

JAPAN

TREATY of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco, September 8, 1951 with related documents. Washington, 1952. 25 p. (Dept. of State. Far Eastern Series 54.) 10¢.

KOREA

KOREA; A geographical appreciation. Ottawa, Dept. of Mines and Technical Surveys, 1951. 84 p. (Foreign Geography Information Series, No. 4.) (Distributed by Institute of Pacific Relations, N. Y. $1.00.)

AUTHORIZING the sale of warbuilt coastal ships to the Republic of South Korea. Report from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany S. J. Res. 104. Sept. 26, 1951. Washington, 1952. 6 p. (S. Rept. 839.)

LABOR

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference, 35th Session, Geneva, 1952. Reports. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1952.

FIFTH conference of American States Members of the International Labour Organisation, Rio de Janeiro, April 1952. Report of the Director-General. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1952. 152 p.

CONDITIONS of work in the fishing industry. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1952. 215 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series No. 30.) $1.25.

LATIN AMERICA

FOURTH meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Washington, D.C. March 26–April 7, 1951. Proceedings. Washington, Pan American Union, 1951. 268 p. (Conferences and Organizations Series 12.) 75¢.

APPROVING the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which was adopted by the people of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952. Report from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. J. Res. 430. Apr. 30, 1952. Washington, 1952. 31 p. (H. Rept. 1832.)

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TO REVISE the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Possessions, House, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 2644. Jan. 14–16, Mar. 5, 1952. Washington, 1952. 175 p.

INTER-AMERICAN Commission of Women. Report presented to the Sixth Session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, Geneva, March–April 1952. Washington, Pan American Union, 1952. 20 p.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA de la literatura sobre educación de adultos en la América Latina. Washington, Pan American Union, 1952. 88 p. (Bibliographic Series 37.) 25 centavos.

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North Atlantic Treaty

Mutual Security Act of 1952. Message from the President. . . . Mar. 6, 1952. Washington, 1952. 14 p. (H. Doc. 382.)

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——. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 7005. Mar. 13–Apr. 29, 1952. Washington, 1952. 1136 p.

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